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In the seven decades following the Investment Company Act of 1940 coming into force in 
the United States, the mutual fund industry has undergone dramatic changes including, some argue, a 
transition from stewardship to salesmanship with asset-gathering becoming the industry’s driving 
force. As fund managers incrementally assumed a more pronounced role in the investment fund 
industry, an emerging strand of finance literature focused on their characteristics and their potential 
impact on investment performance. While a large body f academic research concurs that fund 
managers cannot outperform systematically better than chance, there are also a significant number of 
studies that link the psychological characteristics of investors to their investment performance. 
Importantly, we know that fund managers, as a representative sample of professional investors, often 
have to operate under enormous anxiety and associated psychic pressures. In their effort to cope with 
these pressures and make sense of an immensely unpredictable and complex work environment, a 
wide range of psychic defences and behavioural biases may be triggered.   
The purpose of this research is to investigate, on the one hand, to what extent mutual fund 
managers are prone to overconfidence and associated behavioural biases such as self-serving 
attribution. On the other hand, the extent to which overconfidence, proxied by a wide range of 
variables including overoptimism, excessive certainty and excessive self-reference, may have any 
bearing on fund performance is of interest. The fundamental question is why, how, and through which 
mechanisms does overconfidence affect performance. The underlying research questions are 
motivated by three large areas of research: studies of mutual fund performance and persistence, 
studies of financial accounting narratives, and studies of professional investor psychology. I also 
explore how overconfidence is fundamentally generated nd, in a sense, resorted to by fund managers 
as a defence mechanism against the psychic pressures of having to work in a highly intangible, 
complex and uncertain environment. Drawing on evidence from fund manager reports written for 
investors, I explain how they use the medium of narratives, and in particular stories, to make sense of 
what they do as fund managers and their added value for clients. I demonstrate how analysing fund 
manager commentaries, both through computer-assisted corpus-linguistic approaches and through the 
“close reading” method, sheds light on the link between fund manager psychology and investment 
performance. In particular, from the perspective of narrative analysis, I explain how fund managers 
write their reports in distinguishably different genr s depending, among others, on their past 
performance record, fund size and investment style. In addition, I establish in a longitudinal study tha  
the overall economic environment in which fund managers operate does influence the rhetoric of fund 
manager reports as well as the evidence for the Pollyanna hypothesis. 
My findings also suggest that excessive overconfidece is associated, to a large extent, with 
diminished future investment returns. While superior past returns are expected to increase fund 
manager confidence which, in turn, may introduce the overconfidence bias in the investment decision-
making process and thus diminish returns (through inefficient stock selection, suboptimal market 
timing and other possible mechanisms), this is not a simple regression towards the mean. The asset 
pricing model employed in my empirical analysis, the Carhart four-factor model, controls for the 
effect of previous-year momentum, and my overconfidence measures are only slightly correlated with 
the momentum figures. Hence, one is led to the conclusion that the narrative-based variables used in 
this study indeed capture some aspect of the professi nal investor psychology, and are capable of 
enhancing the explanatory power of conventional asset-pricing models such as Carhart’s. 
In investigating the dynamic relationship between fund manager overconfidence and 
investment performance, the cross-sectional variations in my study demonstrate that superior past 
performance boosts overconfidence as measured by all proxies employed. In addition, there appears to 
be an inverted-U relationship between overconfidence and subsequent investment performance. In 
particular, a hedging strategy based on shorting funds with extremely overconfident managers and 
going long in funds with normally (over)confident managers, yields positive average returns. The 
impact of overconfidence on subsequent returns is robust across different investment styles, although 
it is stronger among growth-oriented funds. Incorporating average scores for fund manager 
overconfidence over longer periods yields similar results. In addition, fund manager duration appears 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
The investor's chief problem - and even his worst enemy - is likely
to be himself... Individuals who cannot master their emotions are 
ill-suited to profit from the investment process. 
- Benjamin Graham (1973), “The Intelligent Investor”, p. 283. 
 
Professional investment may be likened to those newspaper 
competitions in which the competitors have to pick out the six 
prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the prize being 
awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds 
to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole; so that 
each competitor has to pick, not the faces which he himself finds 
the prettiest, but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy 
of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at the problem 
from the same point of view. 
- John Keynes (1936), “The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest and Money”, p. 156. 
 
1.1 OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the thesis and set the scen for the 
following chapters. I discuss the background and objectives of the research, and 
justify why it is important to study investor psychology in general. In the broad 
context of behavioural finance and investor psychology, I frame my research 
questions and explain the approach used to investigate them, before providing a 
summary of the research results and the original contribution to the relevant 
literature. I then conclude with an outline of the thesis structure and a brief summary 







 1.2 BACKGROUND 
Traditional finance uses theoretical models which predominantly assume that 
economic agents are rational, i.e. efficient and unbiased information processors who 
constantly seek to maximise their utility. It is now widely agreed that these 
appealingly simple assumptions are quite inaccurate. As Barberis and Thaler (2003) 
remark, “unfortunately, after years of effort, it has become clear that basic facts 
about the aggregate stock market, the cross-section of average returns, and individual 
trading behaviour are not easily understood in this framework.” 
Behavioural finance, on the other hand, assumes that investors are often subject to 
behavioural biases that can negatively affect their financial decisions. These biases 
and heuristics, which are typically grounded in the cognitive psychology literature, 
are being increasingly applied in financial contexts. Indeed, studies in behavioural 
finance often lead to conclusions that significantly resonate with what professionals 
in the finance industry experience and “know” at a deeper and perhaps unconscious 
level (Taffler and Tuckett, 2010). In this way, behavioural finance has revolutionized 
the way we think about investments.1 
In this context, studying investor psychology is of paramount importance. 
Hirschleifer (2008), among others, provides a detailed survey of studies linking 
investor psychology to asset pricing and claims that this issue lies at “the heart of the 
grand debate in finance spanning the last two decades.” While a complete 
understanding of investor psychology requires familiarity with a wide range of 
individual and group behaviours, a few psychological traits are often recognized as 
highly influential in shaping investors decisions. Based on the behaviourl finance 
literature, overconfidence clearly belongs to this list. As Plous (1993) argues, “no 
problem in judgment and decision making is more prevalent and more potentially 
catastrophic than overconfidence.”  
                                                                 
1 This change of paradigm from a framework based on neoclassical assumption to one based on 
psychological assumptions is still an ongoing and highly dynamic process. Shefrin (2009) discusses 
this issue and provides a detailed review of the str ngths and weaknesses of both approaches. Shefrin, 




To properly understand overconfidence, an excellent approach is to start from he 
closely related concept of “optimism”. Optimism seems to be an integral part of the 
human psyche. From the perspective of evolutionary processes, it is proposed that 
optimism must have brought the early humans important benefits, and therefore, in 
the course of thousands of years of evolution, it has become part of the genetic 
hardwiring of our brains. Our early ancestors who lived in the very hostile 
environment of African savannahs and had to step out of their caves to hunt f r food 
in competition with the wildest predators of that age, did in fact require optimism, 
and perhaps even some level of overconfidence to take this first step.     
Apart from this evolutionary perspective, it is now widely known that umans 
constantly learn about themselves and their abilities by observing the consequences 
of their actions. In doing so, most people overestimate the degree to which they play 
a role in their own successes. This tendency is often amplified by an illusion of 
control, i.e. by thinking that one can control or influence an outcome. The 
overconfidence resulting from this mechanism can have several negative 
consequences for decision making, as I will discuss in detail in the literature review. 
In fact, many researchers cite overconfidence as an explanation for wars, strikes, 
litigations, entrepreneurial failures and, not surprisingly, stock market bubbles 
(Glaser, Noth and Weber (2007); Moore and Healy (2008)).  
This study focuses on professional investors. As financial agents, professional 
investors often operate in an environment that is significantly different from the 
assumptions of conventional models. Conventional finance views financial agents in 
terms of “rational” actors in the marketplace who use formal methods of asset 
valuation in an attempt to identify those stocks or other assets which may be 
mispriced; even though, on the other hand, markets are viewed tradition lly as 
efficient. In contrast, the world of the r al investment manager is one where she is 
swamped by information, is subject to acute information asymmetry, is under intense 
competition, and, in the end, has to rely to a large extent on subjective judgment, 
intuition and “gut feeling”. Added to this are the many imponderables which are 
outside her control, may largely drive her investment performance, ad are intangible 




investment manager is required to do a job which is very difficult if not impossible to 
do, and is under constant threat of dismissal if the returns she earns are not deemed 
satisfactory.  
I argue that such environmental forces can, in a subtle way and through time, feed 
into professional investors’ overconfidence, and indirectly affect how they make 
investment decisions. Specifically, such features of financial markets, together with 
investors’ past performance results and their personal attributes, can breed or 
diminish overconfidence, which, as this thesis explains, may affect investment 
performance in several ways.  
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The phenomenon of overconfidence, due to its broadness and importance, has been 
widely influential outside the field of psychology (see Daniel, Hirshleifer and 
Subrahmanyam (1998), Santos-Pinto and Sobel (2005), Statman, Thorley and 
Vorkink (2006) and Garcia, Sangiorgi and Urošević (2007) among others). The role 
of overconfidence in influencing the behaviour of economic agents and, by 
extension, the functioning of financial markets, is an emerging, icreasingly 
important and widely researched topic. I have found 1,517 peer-reviewed journal 
articles published between 2000 and 2010 in a major literature database that contain 
the keyword “overconfidence”.2  
A large body of literature has more recently focused on the overcnfidence of 
corporate managers, and its impact on corporate investment decisions in areas such 
as capital structure and M&A activity (see Malmendier and Tate (2005), Malmendier 
and Tate (2008), Malmendier, Tate and Yan (2011) and Gervais, Heaton and Odean 
(2011) among others). The questions asked in this research, however, concrn the 
impact of overconfidence on professional investors, which is a far less studied 
research area. The underlying research questions are motivated by three large areas 
                                                                 
2 The search was conducted in January 2011 on the daabase Business Source Premier (EBSCO Host). 
Almost half of the total number of articles (724 items) are published after 2007, clearly showing a 




of literature, i.e. studies of mutual fund performance and persistence, studies of 
financial accounting narratives and business communication, and studies of 
professional investor psychology. 
In particular, the following research questions are asked in this thesis:  
1. How does a fund manager’s prior investment performance affect her sat  of 
mind, and particularly overconfidence? 
2. To what extent, if at all, does a fund manager’s overconfidence impact the 
subsequent investment performance of the funds he manages? 
3. How does the self-attribution bias interact with overconfidence and 
investment performance?  
4. How does self-attribution bias driving overconfidence manifest itself in the 
way fund managers communicate their investment results to their clients, in 
particular by engaging in “storytelling”?  
5. How does the above process relate to the anxieties generated by having to 
explain, justify and cope with poor past performance as well as ahighly 
uncertain working environment?  
6. Can what we know about fund manager overconfidence help investment 
companies recruit more “successful” managers? 
 
1.4 THE OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
My research aims to achieve a number of objectives. Fir tly, I set out to explore the 
extent to which mutual fund managers are categorically prone to overconfidence. It 
has to be noted that overconfidence is a bland term and can have several meanings in 
different contexts. I clearly specify what I mean by overconfidence in each case and 
make use of a number of different proxies associated with measuring this construct 




Secondly, I investigate whether a fund manager’s overconfidence can affect her 
investment performance in any significant way. I survey the literature to arrive at 
some theoretical expectations in this context and empirically test several hypotheses. 
The research results can potentially be informative to the fund manager skill versus 
luck debate as well as the ongoing debate on performance persistence.  
Thirdly, this study demonstrates how the self-serving attribution bias interacts with 
investment performance and overconfidence. It also shows how fund managers use 
the medium of narratives, and “stories” in particular, to generate conviction in what 
they are doing, and to be able to continue their highly complex and demanding task 
of adding value for their clients despite having to invest in an environment with 
uncertain and almost unforeseeable outcomes. Through narrative analysis, I i lustrate 
how fund managers who are swamped by an enormous amount of conflicting 
information that needs to be processed and made sense of in some way, can find only 
a loose connection, at best, between their investment thesis and successf l outcomes. 
Finally, I explore the implications of the research results for fund manager selection, 
and overall financial regulation of the mutual fund industry. 
 
1.5 THE ORIGINALITY OF THE RESEARCH 
This research is located within the mainstream of behavioural fin nce and formal 
narrative (content) analysis in accounting and finance. It lies at the interface of the 
literature that seeks to measure whether mutual fund manager skill exists, the 
literature on the psychology of professional investors and the recent research in the 
domain of emotional finance which explores how fund managers deal with and m ke 
sense of their inability to do what they are expected to do, which is to outperform the 
market on a measurable basis knowing on one level this is beyond their control.  
In addition, the thesis builds on the literature on content analysis of corporate 
narratives e.g. investigating Chairmen’s Statements, etc. The research results make 
original contributions to the understanding of how certain behavioural and emotional 
mechanisms are employed by professional investors to operate in a very uncertain 




Furthermore, the current study is, to the best of the researcher’s knowledge, one of 
only two studies that have examined the issue of overconfidence among mutual fund 
managers in detail (the other study being the Choi and Lou (2008) working paper). In 
addition, the approach used to measure overconfidence, as will be explained in the 
subsequent sections, is highly original and makes use of a large sample of fund 
annual reports.   
 
1.6 THE CHOICE OF TOPIC AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
A robust research design clearly requires an appropriate choice of research topic. I 
have chosen the topic of “professional investor psychology and investment 
performance” for a number of reasons. Importantly, the broad area of behavioural 
finance and the sub-domain of emotional finance is an emerging and increasingly 
influential area of finance research with significant implications in the finance 
industry. In addition, the above topic is well suited to both qualitative and
quantitative research methods, and I have used both methodologies to enhance the 
robustness of this study. Finally, my epistemological perspective, interpre ivism, is in 
accordance with the framework of this research. Interpretivism, a explained by 
Bryman (2004), “requires the social scientist to grasp the subjective meaning of 
social action”, and holds that meaning is imposed on objects by subjects. In this 
research, the former can be seen as investments in general, and the latter can be 
construed as fund managers under study.  
My research is based on a combination of longitudinal design and some case studies. 
The longitudinal design which constitutes the major part of my resea ch studies the 
impact of overconfidence on a large sample of fund managers using regression 
analysis. The case studies intend to investigate a number of fund manager narratives 
that are considered theoretically-contributing cases in terms of how they make 
investments in the presence of emotions. Hence, from a methodological perspective, 
the research design falls into the fl xible design category as it seeks to explain the 
role of dynamic variables in a constantly-changing context. Accordingly, the 




overconfidence in investment decision-making. This conforms to interpretivism as 
my epistemological position.  
The longitudinal design is chosen over other possible designs since longitudinal 
research is best suited for studying changing social processes, a  Blaikie (2000) 
explains. In addition, other possible designs do not sit well with the requirements of 
my research. For instance, a cross-sectional design is not suitable for my purpose 
because the process I am looking at is dynamic and constantly changing. That is to 
say, the performance of a fund manager cannot be judged by measuring he  
performance at a single point in time. An experimental design appro ch is also not 
appropriate, since it is very difficult, for obvious reasons, to gather a sufficiently 
large sample of fund managers at the same place and time for conducting a realistic 
experiment.  
This thesis attempts to take a mixed methods research approach. Prior research has 
found significant potential in applying mixed methods research strategies in the 
accounting and finance domain. The key strengths of mixed methods research 
include both testing and building theories through extension of existing theories as 
well as convergence and contradiction of findings. 
Mixed methods research is not uniquely defined in the literature. Johnson et al. 
(2007) reviews 19 studies to demonstrate the significant variation in the definition of 
this concept. Most studies in this area concur that mixed methods research should 
include both a quantitative and qualitative component. However, with regards to 
variations in definitions, Grafton et al. (2011) write: “Where inconsistencies and 
disagreements seem to originate is in the consideration of how these quantitative and 
qualitative components are related, and whether these components reflect 
quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis techniques (i.e. methods) 
and/or quantitative and qualitative approaches to research (i.e. methodologies).”  
Grafton et al. (2011) also argue that further points of contention exist in the emphasis 
placed on the quantitative and qualitative elements of the study, the stag s of the 




in which quantitative and qualitative methods are used. Hence, the mixed ethods 
research is not a clearly defined methodology.  
A closely related concept is that of methods triangulation which is often defined as 
“the use of more than one research method as part of a validation strategy to ensure 
that the explained variance is the result of the underlying phenomenon and ot an 
artefact of the research method adopted” (Campbell and Fiske, 1959). Triangulation 
can refer to within-methods triangulation (i.e. the use of several quantitative or 
qualitative components) as well as between-methods (the use of both quantitative and 
qualitative components. With the above introduction, this thesis mainly seeks to 
adopt a between-methods approach although each of the qualitative and quantitative 
sections consist of several elements.  
 
1.7 THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: OVERVIEW OF DATA COLLECTION 
AND ANALYSIS 
This section provides a brief overview of the methodological aspects of the current 
study. I take several steps to arrive at the reported results. Firstly, US mutual fund 
annual reports belonging to the 2003-2009 period are extracted from the EDGAR 
database provided by SEC. The year 2003 is chosen since it is the firs  year in which 
SEC required investment companies to file annual reports as mandatory disclosure.  
Secondly, the procedure of content analysis is used to analyse the linguistic features 
of fund manager narratives. Content analysis is based on the assumption tha  the 
language people choose to express themselves in contains information about the 
nature of their psychological states, an assumption implying a presentational or 
descriptive model of language as explained in Viney (1983). In order to analyse the 
fund manager narratives, I mostly use the Diction computer program. I use three 
proxies to measure overconfidence given the considerable body of textual data 
available, and employ Diction to extract these variables. Diction is a well-known 
content analysis software that is widely used in the field of finance and accounting, 




text.3 It has been used extensively to analyse political speeches, CEO speeches, 
earning announcements and corporate annual reports. The algorithm uses a series of 
thirty-three dictionaries (word-lists) to search text passages for different semantic 
features such as praise, satisfaction, or denial. In this study, I predominantly use the 
optimism and certainty master variables used in Diction. I also make use of 
Concordance to complement Diction results in some sections.   
Thirdly, I use the Carhart four-factor model to test an augmented model using 
regression analysis. Generally, momentum strategies that recommend buying stocks 
with high returns and selling stocks with low returns over the previous 3 to 12 
months generate significant excess returns in most equity markets. Carhart (1997) 
famously constructs a risk factor to capture this one-year momentu  anomaly, and 
proposes a four-factor model by adding the momentum risk factor to the Fama 
French three-factor model, which already controls for the effect of excess market 
returns, size and book-to-market value. Carhart demonstrates that, compared to the 
Fama French three-factor model, his model significantly decreases the average 
pricing errors of portfolios that are sorted by one-year lagged returns. In my study, 
the overconfidence scores and other related variables derived from the narratives are 
incorporated in the original Carhart four-factor model as additional independent 
variables. The mutual fund monthly returns, sourced from the CRSP Mutual Fund 
Survivor-bias Free Database, are then regressed on the four factors s well as the 
narrative scores that represent fund manager overconfidence.  
 
1.8 THE OVERALL CONCLUSIONS 
The empirical results suggest, among others, that excessive overconfidence is 
associated with diminished future investment returns. I develop a theore ical model 
that seeks to explain why, and through which mechanisms, overconfidence affe ts 
decision-making and hence, investment performance. From a psychological 
viewpoint, the effect of overconfidence on judgement and decision-making ca  be 
                                                                 





explained by the dynamics between overconfidence and three important intermediate 
variables i.e. anxiety, concentration and motivation. As I will explain in detail, the 
bulk of research evidence in cognitive psychology suggests that while higher 
confidence levels are associated with lower decision-making anxiety, they are also 
associated with lower task-specific concentration and lower general motivation. 
Overall, this results in an inverse relationship between overconfidence and decision 
performance, in the form of an inverted-U shape.   
From a pure finance perspective, the observation that superior past returns can 
introduce the overconfidence bias in the investment decision-making process of fund 
managers, and thus result in diminished returns (possibly through inefficient stock 
selection, suboptimal market timing etc.) may initially be interpr ted as a type of 
regression towards the mean. However, the Carhart four-factor model used in this 
study, by definition, already controls for the effect of previous-year momentum, and 
the overconfidence measures in my study are only slightly correlated with the 
momentum figures. Hence, one is led to the conclusion that the narrative v riables 
indeed capture some aspect of the fund manager psychology that can enh nce the 
explanatory power of a conventional asset-pricing model such as Carhart’s. 
The impact of overconfidence on subsequent returns is robust across different 
investment styles, and is generally stronger among growth-oriented funds. As a 
possible explanation, I argue that the nature of investing in growth stocks lends itself 
more easily to fund managers becoming overconfident. In other words, growth-
oriented fund managers often appear to believe in an underlying “growth story” 
associated with the stocks they invest in, and as I illustrate in Chapter 5, they seek to 
communicate these stories in a style which is often more pronouncedly dramatic and 
emotional compared to that used by value-oriented managers.  
I arrive at similar conclusions by incorporating average scores for fund manager 
overconfidence over longer periods. I also demonstrate that overoptimism and self-
reference are more representative proxies of overconfidence than cert inty, possibly 
due to the fact that professional investment writers are resolut by normal practice. 
Finally, fund manager duration appears to correlate with fund manager expressed 




throughout the range of the sample data, measured overconfidence tends to rise 
steadily and in agreement with theoretical expectations.  
In another section of the thesis, I explain how overconfidence is generat d and, in a 
sense, resorted to by the fund manager as a defence mechanism aga nst the psychic 
pressures of having to work in a highly competitive, complex and uncertain 
environment. Drawing on suggestive evidence from fund manager’s commentaries 
written to shareholders, I explain how they use the medium of narratives, and in 
particular stories, to make sense of what they do as fund managers nd their added 
value for clients. I also explain how analysing fund manager commentari s, both 
through computer-assisted corpus-linguistic approaches and through the “clos  
reading” method, sheds light on the link between fund manager psychology and 
investment performance. What can be generally learnt, from the perspective of genre 
analysis and corpus linguistics, is that fund managers write their reports in 
distinguishably different genres depending, among others, on their past performance 
record, their size and their investment style. My hypothesis regardin  the existence 
of distinct rhetorical genres in fund manager reports is supported using a number of 
cross-sectional tests.  
In addition, I establish in a longitudinal study that the overall economic environment 
in which fund managers operate does influence the rhetoric of fund ma ager reports 
in aggregate. I also test the Pollyanna hypothesis4 for which my results provide 
support particularly among a number of categories such as loss-making funds. For 
instance, the keywords “market” and “economy” are more frequently used among 
funds with negative absolute returns, and the least profitable funds in the positive 
return category. These observations seem to suggest that fund managers, in 
aggregate, refer to the market and the economy as external performance detractors in 
a self-serving way, which is consistent with the anecdotal evidence based on close-
                                                                 
4 The Pollyanna hypothesis (or principle) describes the tendency people have to agree with positive 
statements describing them. The word Pollyanna refers to the heroine of a 1913 novel of the same 
name by Eleanor Porter, an American writer, in which she portrays a person characterized by 
irrepressible optimism and a tendency to find good in everything. This character type is, in fact, the
exact opposite of Cassandra who, in Greek mythology, is a prophetess whose predictions were always 




reading the fund annual reports. The frequency of use for the keyword “index” 
suggests a similar conclusion, i.e. fund managers tend to make benchmark 
comparisons more frequently when performance is in the negative domain, and in 
doing so they strategically shift the reader’s attention away from the fact that he has, 
in fact, lost money by investing in the fund.  
To a certain extent, one may be able to conclude that fund managers strategically 
adjust the overall tone and rhetoric of their reports in a self-serving way. However, it 
is equally plausible for this behaviour to stem from the unconscious psychological 
processes that may be in play in the minds of fund managers, since,as it is 
demonstrated throughout this study, the underlying investment story can be an 
excellent sense-making implement for professional investors in general. 
 
1.9 THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis comprises eight chapters, with chapters 5, 6 and 7 comprising my 
empirical results. Chapter 1, this chapter, has introduced the background to the 
research in addition to the research questions and the area of focus in the thesis. The 
research objectives, a brief overview of the research approach as well as a summary 
of the conclusions are also discussed. 
Chapter 2 presents the review of literature on the role of overconfidence i 
investment performance of professional investors. The evidence on measuring the 
performance of mutual funds is anchored in the traditional finance literature, and 
presented in this chapter in relation to the research questions in the thesis. In 
reviewing a second strand of literature, the studies on overconfidence, which are 
grounded in psychology and, inter alia, linked to recent developments in behavioural 
finance research, are discussed. The third strand of literature, inextricably linked to 
my research questions, is the research on corporate annual reports and managerial 
obfuscation as well as impression management incentives. Finally, I identify the gaps 




Chapter 3 presents my hypotheses and the variables used to test them. I present null 
hypotheses for the potential impact of several psychological attributes (proxying for 
overconfidence) on the subsequent performance of investment decisions made by 
fund managers. Further null hypotheses test for the correlation of these attributes 
with past performance as well as the dynamic change of these masures alongside 
increase in fund manager duration. In addition, I discuss, in detail, the 
methodological approach employed in the thesis. 
Chapter 4 explains my sample section process, details of the data and relevant 
descriptive statistics. The first part of the chapter presents information on the sources 
of the data used in the thesis including the EDGAR database as well as the CRSP 
Mutual Fund Database. The second part presents the sample selection criteria, and 
data reduction considerations before providing preliminary descriptives.  
Chapter 5 examines how the self-attribution bias drives overconfidence through 
analysing fund manager commentaries using “close reading” methodology. By 
manually coding a random sample of fund manager reports in the spirit of Jameson 
(2000), I identify different “story types” embedded in fund manager narratives and 
explain how self-attribution bias and overconfidence is manifest in them. Further, I 
establish connections among these stories and the funds’ past investment 
performance, and use the results to explain the sense-making process of professional 
investors in their very unique work environment.  
Chapter 6 empirically investigates how past investment results influence fund 
manager tone and report readability which are closely associated wi h fund manager 
overconfidence. I focus on the way fund managers set out to communicate financial 
performance to their clients. By studying the corpus-linguistic features of fund 
manager reports, I demonstrate how different groups of fund managers develop the 
core message in their narratives in very different way (i.e. genres) in light of prior 
performance. In addition, this chapter also explores how past performance affe ts 
overconfidence directly as measured by the three proxies of overoptimism, excessive 




Chapter 7 empirically investigates the impact of fund manager overconfidence o  
future investment returns. I use the well-known Carhart four factor asset pricing 
model as the basis of an empirical model which I seek to improve by adding 
independent variables proxying for fund manager psychology. I test the research 
hypotheses using a number of different approaches including the calendar-time 
method and the portfolio-tracking method. The chapter includes controls for other 
potential confounding factors, and tests for overall robustness of the empirical model.
Chapter 8 presents a summary of the findings and draws conclusions relevant to the 
proposed research questions. The implications of the research both for theory and 
practice are discussed in detail. In addition, the research limitations are explained and 



















CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a summary of prior research related to the current study and 
identifies a number of research gaps which serve to motivate the r search questions 
briefly introduced in chapter 1. With this objective, several strands of literature are 
examined in the context of the current research. I review some research evidence on 
mutual fund investment performance and persistence, and the overconfidence eff ct 
and associated psychological concepts, in order to investigate the firs  three research 
questions in the thesis: 
1. How does a fund manager’s prior investment performance affect her sat  of 
mind, and particularly overconfidence? 
2. To what extent, if at all, does a fund manager’s overconfidence impact the 
subsequent investment performance of the funds he manages? 
3. How does the self-attribution bias interact with overconfidence and 
investment performance?  
Then, I review some studies on the structure of narrative disclosure in annual reports 
in order to answer the remaining research questions: 
4. How does self-attribution bias driving overconfidence manifest itself in the 
way fund managers communicate their investment results to their clients, in 
particular by engaging in “storytelling”?  
5. How does the above process relate to the anxieties generated by having to 
explain, justify and cope with poor past performance as well as ahighly 
uncertain working environment?  
The chapter is organised as follows: Sections 2.2 and 2.3 introduce key studies on 




on the overconfidence effect, and introduces the key relevant studies mostly from the 
area of psychology. Section 2.5 discusses the impact of overconfidence in the field of 
finance, while section 2.6 examines the parallel links between overconfidence and 
performance in other domains. Finally, section 2.7 develops a conceptual mode  that 
drives the thesis and inspires the research questions.  
 
2.2 HOW IS THE INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE OF MUTUAL FUNDS 
MEASURED? 
This thesis focuses on US mutual funds. The US mutual fund industry has witne sed 
dramatic changes in the seven decades following the Investment Company Act of 
1940 coming into force. Bogle (2005) explains that the industry transformed 
tremendously from being organized, operated, and managed in the interests of fund
shareholders to one that mostly serves the interests of managers and distributors. 
With this transition from stewardship to salesmanship, asset-gathering became the 
industry’s driving force. As fund managers incrementally assumed a more 
pronounced role in the mutual fund industry, a new strand of mutual fund literature 
increasingly focused on their characteristics and their potential influence on 
performance. 
So far, despite the near five-decade attempt to reach a consensus, there is no 
agreement in the academic literature with regards to the most appropriate 
benchmarks and models for performance measurement. Since measurement of 
investment performance is a key part of my thesis, I briefly introduce the most 
relevant and influential papers in this area and point out the existing research gaps. 
Then, I locate my thesis in the literature and discuss its potential contributions.  
In order to empirically examine the link between mutual fund performance and fund 
manager psychology, first it is necessary to measure investment performance. Since 
the early 1960’s, more than five decades of academic studies have been dedicated to 
mutual funds in areas as diverse as performance measurement, carer concerns of 
fund managers, fund characteristics, marketing and advertising of mutual f nds, fund 




has formed during this period, the topic of performance measurement and the closely 
related areas of performance persistence and the skill versus luck debate have been 
subject to considerable academic and industry attention. This is of course not 
surprising given that most individuals invest in mutual funds in the expectation of 
making profits, and the performance of mutual funds and their managers has to be 
evaluated in order to provide an appropriate basis for future investment decisions. 
However, there are two challenging issues in measuring fund performance that make 
this task considerably difficult: (1) the choice of an appropriate benchmark, and (2) 
the choice of the best model for measuring performance.  
The academic literature on mutual funds relevant to the current study tarts with 
Close (1952), perhaps the first academic paper on this subject, which discusses the 
differences between closed-end and open-end funds and anticipates many future 
contributions to this literature. The different criteria required for assessing 
performance of different types of funds is explained by Brown and Vickers (1963) 
who demonstrate that funds on average perform no better or worse that the markets 
they operate in. Sharpe (1966) is among the first studies to use concepts from modern 
portfolio theory, and builds on his earlier development of the CAPM in Sharpe 
(1964). He explains that an optimal investment portfolio is the one with the greatest 
reward-to-variability ratio or Sharpe ratio. Sharpe uses data from 34 open-end 
mutual funds from the period of 1954-1963, and finds significant variability in heir 
Sharpe ratios, with 0.78 for the best and 0.43 for the worst performing funds in his 
sample. He attributes this considerable variation to either excessive fund expenditure 
or possible fund manager investment skill. Sharpe also finds some evidence of 
persistence in the fund rankings.  
Do fund managers have any actual ability to anticipate major turnsin the stock 
market? Treynor and Mazury (1966) ask this question in their study: “Is the fund 
manager speculating if he attempts to anticipate major market movements? Or is he 
negligent if he fails to try?” Examining a sample of 57 open-end mutual funds from 
1953 to 1962, they compute a characteristic line for each mutual fund base on its 
volatility in both good and poor market years. Since they discover no curvature in 




ability to outguess the market and hence should not be held accountable for failing to 
predict changes in market direction.  
Jensen (1968) is one of the first examples of measuring absolute performance. His 
data covers 115 mutual funds spanning 1945-64, and the S&P 500 returns are used as 
a market proxy. He shows that the funds on average earned 1.1% less than they 
should have earned given their level of systematic risk. By evaluating the statistical 
significance of alphas (or risk-adjusted returns), Jensen finds little evidence that any 
given fund does better than pure chance. Jensen’s alpha is now commonly used to 
measure the relative performance of equity mutual funds.  
Carlson (1970) shows that mutual fund performance with respect to the mark t is 
affected by fund type, time period under study, and the choice of benchmark. He 
argues that mutual funds need to be grouped by broad investment objectives before 
their performance can be compared in any way. Studying funds from the period 
1948-1967, the author finds that past performance has little predictive value for 
future performance.  
Subsequently, with the development of more advanced theories of market 
equilibrium, researchers make further attempts to deconstruct mutual fund 
performance. Fama (1972), for example, finds that mutual fund returns can be 
generated by two distinct activities: stock selection and market timing. Kon and Jen 
(1979) employ the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossine and Black models of market equilibrium 
to study the market timing and stock selection performance of mutual funds. They 
conclude that fund managers, both individually and on average are unable to recover 
their research expenses, fees and other costs through superior stock selection.  
Kon (1983) focuses on the market-timing performance of mutual funds and shows 
that fund managers who believe they have above average market timing ability, 
adjust the risk level of their portfolios in advance of market movements. Thus he 
correlates evidence of systematic risk non-stationarity for a fund with its timing 
activity. Examining a sample of 37 mutual funds from 1960 to 1976, Kon finds that a
number of funds display significant timing ability/performance, but in aggregate, 




different methodology that involves partitioning the return data into up-market and 
down-market periods and examining them separately, Chang and Lewellen (1984) 
similarly find no overall evidence of skilful stock selection or market timing ability 
by mutual fund managers.  
The study by Grinblatt and Titman (1989) is another comprehensive examination of 
mutual fund performance. They investigate both actual returns and gross portfolio 
returns, which differentiates their work from previous studies. Using quarterly data 
for the 1975-64 period, they test for abnormal returns while controlling for 
survivorship bias. Although the authors do not reject the likelihood of superior 
performance among growth funds, aggressive growth funds, and smaller funds, they 
show that these funds have the highest expenses, hence eliminating ay likelihood of 
abnormal investor returns.  
In a study using the same sample of funds from their 1989 article, Grinblatt and 
Titman (1993) introduce a new measure of performance, the “Portfolio Change 
Measure”. This new measure does not suffer from survivorship bias and benchmark 
problems earlier pointed out by Roll (1978) and others. They find that aggressive 
funds exhibit the strongest evidence of abnormal performance, and that their 
performance persists both for superior and inferior funds. However, as p ior research 
suggests, any abnormal investment returns are eliminated by fund expens s and 
transaction costs. Nevertheless, investors may be able to achieve abnorm l returns by 
mimicking the portfolios of superior funds.  
Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993) search for evidence of short-run persistence 
by studying quarterly returns between 1974 and 1988 for a sample of 165 no-load, 
growth equity funds. They demonstrate that the superior performing funds (hot 
hands) in the sample continued to perform well relative to their peers in the near term 
(one to eight quarters) with most performance persistence in the first year and a 
reversal thereafter. Similarly, those funds that perform poorly (icy hands) in the most 
recent year continue their poor performance in the near term, and their performance 
is more inferior than hot hands’ performance is superior. The authors attribute their 
results to possible model misspecifications, or to several other plausible conjectures, 




following an excessive flow of funds to successful performers, a bloated organization 
emerges with fewer good investment ideas per managed dollar; (3) once the fund 
manager establishes reputation, his or her sense of urgency and drive im nishes; (4) 
market sensitivity of managers is limited to short-term market conditions; and (5) 
manager salaries and fees rise following recent successes. The authors leave the door 
open for future researchers to identify the main cause of the observed short-term 
persistence. In a similar vein, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994) explore the then 
nascent subject of performance persistence. Studying a sample of 728 mutual funds 
from 1976 to 1988, they find evidence that both top-quartile and bottom-quartile 
funds in the most recent period experience persistence of returns.  
A more comprehensive examination of performance persistence as well as fund 
expenses and survivorship bias is performed by Malkiel (1995). After studying every 
diversified equity mutual fund over the twenty-year period of 1971-1991, Malkiel 
reports that the average fund alpha across this period is -0.06% and indistinguishable 
from zero. He also finds some evidence for performance persistence during the 
1970s, but no such evidence during the second decade under study. He notes that 
such persistence is likely due to survivorship bias and thus may not be robust.  
In a related way, Brown and Goetzmann (1995) investigate a survivorship-bias free 
database of fund returns for the period 1976-1988 and establish that performance 
persistence more likely exists because of repeat-losers than repeat-winners, echoing 
the findings of Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993). They suggest that the 
subjects of cross-fund correlations and the persistence of poor performance merit 
further research.  
Since expected returns and risk vary over time, using unconditional expect d returns 
in any mutual fund performance evaluation model is inherently unreliabl . On this 
basis, in a methodological breakthrough, Ferson and Schadt (1996) use a conditional 
model of performance evaluation in studying the returns of 67 mutual f nds over the 
period 1968-1990. In their model, the relevant expectations are conditioned on public 
information variables in the semi-strong sense of market efficiency. This produces 
alphas with a mean value of zero, which is in contrast with traditional measures of 




Warther (1996) take a similar approach in their study of 63 funds and argue that 
unconditional approaches to performance evaluation lead to the wrong conclusion 
that managers display positive abnormal performance. 
 
2.3 THE CARHART MODEL AND MORE RECENT STUDIES ON FUND 
PERFORMANCE 
The seminal work by Carhart (1997) is an excellent starting point f r the review of 
more current mutual fund literature. Carhart investigates a survivorship-bias free 
sample of 1892 equity funds from the relatively long period of 1962-1993.5 He 
classifies the funds into categories of long-term growth and growth-and-income, and 
studies them using both CAPM and his own four-factor model (Fama-French factors 
plus one-year return momentum). He finds that the strong persistence in short-term 
returns is mostly explained by common factors in the four-factor model, 
predominantly size and momentum. Consistent with previous studies, Carhart finds 
that the persistence of underperformance by funds in the bottom decile cannot be 
explained by the common four factors and fund expenses.  
Among Carhart’s contributions is the explicit test of whether psistence in 
performance can be explained by common factors in stock returns. Carhart finds a 
strong positive (negative) relation between the previous one-year momentu  and the 
returns on the best (worst) performing decile of funds. His findings suggest that the 
portfolios of the best funds are tilted towards past winning stocks, and consequently 
capture their premium. In a similar way, funds belonging to the top decile tilt their 
portfolios such that they capture the premium on small stocks. 
Development of multi-factor models such as Carhart’s model helped explain, among 
other things, the various style-timing activities that exist in addition to market timing, 
                                                                 
5 The importance of working with fund data free from survivorship bias is fully explained in 
Hendricks et al. (1997). The authors demonstrate how studying survivorship-biased data can result in 
the false discovery of a spurious J-shaped relation between first and second period performances, 




namely: size timing, growth timing, and momentum timing.6 The importance Carhart 
placed on fund size, for instance, was followed by many studies focu ing on its role 
in mutual fund performance. Indro, Jiang, Hu and Lee (1999), for example, study 
683 funds from 1993 to 1995 for this purpose. While growth in assets under 
management can result in lower expense ratios and lower turnovers, th y report, it 
can equally be disadvantageous due to higher impact costs, more visibility and 
administrative complexities. The authors then calculate optimal fund sizes for 
growth, value and blend funds, respectively $1.4 billion, $0.5 billion and $1.9 billion.  
Attempts to deconstruct mutual fund performance continue with Volkman (1999). 
Through studying a sample of 332 funds from the period 1980-1990, Volkman shows 
that few funds correctly anticipate market movements during periods of high 
volatility. However, he claims that many funds still outperform the market through 
stock selection. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) adopt a different approach to find 
whether genuine find manager ability and skill exists. By investigating the cross-
sectional patterns in behaviour and performance of 492 fund managers during the 
period 1988-1994, the authors seek to find if some mutual fund managers in their 
sample are better than others. Their results suggest that some systematic cross-
sectional differences exist that cannot be attributed to differenc s in managerial 
behaviour. In particular, they find that managers who attended more selective 
(higher-SAT) undergraduate institutions have higher performance than others, a 
result which the authors mainly attribute to differences in inherent stock selection 
ability, and by extension, reasoning and judgment skills which may explain the 
difference in the selectivity of their academic institutions in the first place.  
Despite the considerable body of literature prior to 2000 demonstrating the aggregate 
underperformance of actively managed funds relative to passive benchmarks, the 
empirical question still remained as to why investors continued to invest significant 
amounts of money in these funds. To find an answer, Wermers (2000) studies the 
                                                                 
6 Market timing refers to the ability to weigh equity exposures according to one’s forecast of future 
market states. Size timing relates to adjusting the fund’s exposure between small-cap and large-cap 
stocks. Growth timing refers to adjusting exposure along the value-growth continuum. Finally, 
momentum timing modifies the investment strategy betwe n momentum investing (buying high past-




entire record of stock holdings for all equity funds in the period 1980-2000, together 
with their turnover and expense ratios, investment objectives, net returns and total 
assets under management during each fund’s history. The results show that during 
the studied period, mutual funds on average hold stocks that outperform the market
by 1.3% per year, which roughly equals their total expenses and transactio  costs. In 
addition, the average net fund return is 1% lower than the CRSP index. Wermers 
finds that 0.7% of this 2.3% difference between net returns and the return on stock 
holdings is attributable to lower average return for the non-stock holding component 
of the portfolio, while fund expenses and transaction costs account for the remaining 
1.6%. He posits that part of the higher return for the high-turnover funds is due to the 
stock-picking skills of the fund managers. In a related way, Chen, Jegade sh and 
Wermers (2000) show that growth-oriented funds possess better stock-selection skills 
than income-oriented funds.  
Assuming that fund manager skill exists as some studies suggest, how can this be 
reconciled with the typical mutual fund underperformance documented ex nsively 
in the literature?7 Berk and Green (2004) claim that the answer lies in diminishing 
returns to scale, a phenomenon that funds experience as their assetsund r 
management grows. “The failure of managers as a group to outperform passive 
benchmarks does not imply that they lack skill... [rather] the provision of capital by 
investors to the mutual fund industry is competitive.” The authors identify fund flows 
and manager changes as two equilibrating mechanisms that play an important role in 
weakening performance persistence.8  
                                                                 
7 A comprehensive study of the cost of active investing is performed by French (2008). French 
examines the US equity market over 1980-2006 and finds that, on average, investors spend 0.67% of 
the aggregate market value each year searching for superior returns. In other words, the typical 
investor would add 67 basis points to his average annu l return by switching to a passive market 
portfolio. French, Kenneth R., 2008, Presidential Address: The Cost of Active Investing, Journal of 
Finance LXIII.  
8 The extent of influence these two factors can exert on persistence is examined in Bessler et al. 
(2010). The authors study a sample of 3946 active US equity mutual funds over the period 1992-2007. 
They show that the following year risk-adjusted retu ns of recent winner funds which have not 
experienced high inflows or departure of skilled fund managers, outperforms by 3.6% relative to those 
funds suffering from both effects.  Bessler, Wolfgang, David Blake, Peter Luckoff, and Ian Tonks, 
2010, Why does Mutual Fund Performance not Persist? The Impact and Interaction of Fund Inflows 




In a related way, Pollet and Wilson (2008) explain that a mutual fund typically has 
two choices when faced with an increase in investor demand: either to increase the 
number of investments in the portfolio (diversification), or to increase their 
ownership shares. According to the authors, while most funds choose the latter 
option, it can be shown that diversification is associated with better performance. 
Interestingly, they hypothesize that overconfident fund managers either do not 
diversify at all when facing significant fund inflows, or do not diversify optimally. 
However, the authors provide no explanation on how to measure overconfidence. 
That the rise in assets under management can be detrimental for fund managers is 
further shown by studying fund managers’ trade motivations. For example, 
Alexander, Cici and Gibson (2007) demonstrate that purely valuation-motivated 
purchases by managers result in outperforming the market. However, onc purchases 
are made only to invest excess cash from investor inflows, managers do not 
outperform the market. They record a similar, but weaker effct or stocks that are 
sold.  
Prior to 2006, a key item missing from major mutual fund studies including Carhart 
(1997) and Wermers (2000) was the explicit identification and modelling of the role 
of luck in fund performance. The important study by Kosowski, Timmermann, 
Wermers and White (2006), hereinafter referred to as KTWW, advocates the use of 
bootstrap techniques in analyzing fund returns, because of the non-normality existing 
in returns distribution. This non-normality can result from heterogeneous risk-taking 
across all funds as well the non-normal distribution of individual fund alphas. 
KTWW contrast previous literature by showing that a sizable minority of fund 
managers select stocks well enough to “more than” cover their expenses. In their 
study, the authors use monthly returns of all US open-end domestic equity funds 
belonging to the 1975-2002 period, one of the largest panels of fund returns data 
examined to that date. They report that while strong evidence of superior 
performance and performance persistence exists among growth-oriented funds, 
managers of income-oriented funds seemingly lack any such ability. After discussing 
the benefits of bootstrapping, the authors invoke the need for employing this 




Avramov and Wermers (2006) echo the findings of KTWW by showing that 
predictability in fund manager skill is the primary source of investment profitability, 
and that active management adds significant value. While most previous studies 
focus on the US market, Cuthbertson, Nitzsche and O'Sullivan (2008) study UK 
equity mutual funds over the period 1975-2002. Their results similarly suggest that 
genuine stock selection skill exists among a relatively small number of superior fund 
managers. They also show that inferior fund managers are not merely unlucky; rather 
they demonstrate “bad skill”. Consistent with prior literature, theauthors find 
evidence of persistence among loser funds, but not among winner funds. 
Among KTWW’s findings is that certain growth-oriented fund managers have 
substantial skill, but the authors do not specify the type of such skill. Jiang, Yao and 
Yu (2007) employ a holdings-based measure of market-timing for the first time, 
instead of the returns-based measures which were previously used in the literature 
and suffered from “artificial timing” bias. They find that, on average, active US 
domestic-equity fund managers have positive-timing ability. In an attemp  to further 
deconstruct skill, Chen, Adams and Taffler (2009) examine 3181 US growth-
oriented equity mutual fund over the period 1993-2006. They show that growth 
timing is the main contributor to the persistent abnormal returns reported by KTWW. 
The authors also demonstrate that successful growth timing is confined to those 
managers who invest predominantly in growth stocks.  
While key studies such as KTWW, Avramov and Wermers (2006) and Fama and 
French (2010) discuss the existence of outperforming or underperforming mutual 
funds in the extremes, they are not particularly helpful in explaining the distribution 
of skill, or lack of it, in the entire fund population. Barras, Scaillet and Wermers 
(2010) attempt to address this issue in their study of 2076 actively-managed domestic 
equity mutual funds between 1975 and 2006. Their results suggest 75% of funds 
exhibit zero-alpha, i.e. they are neither skilled nor unskilled, which is onsistent with 
the equilibrium discussed in Berk and Green (2004). The authors also find a 





Although the subject of performance evaluation and persistence has been mor  or 
less studied with regards to investment vehicles other than mutual funds, the research 
findings do not point in the same direction. For example, performance in inst tutional 
investment management has recently attracted equally-deserved attention. In one of 
the latest studies on the subject, Busse, Goyal and Wahal (2010) investigate the 
performance of 4617 actively-managed domestic equity institutional product 
between 1991 and 2008. They reveal that only modest evidence of persistence exists 
in the Fama-French three-factor model, and little to none evidence when momentum 
is taken into account. As for hedge funds, recent studies e.g. Jagannathan, Malakhov 
and Novikov (2010) have found evidence of significant performance persistence 
among superior funds, but little or no such evidence among inferior funds, which 
appears to contrast parallel literature in mutual funds.  
 
2.4 THE GENERAL PARADIGM OF THE OVERCONFIDENCE EFFECT 
The objective of this section is to survey the evidence on the overconfidence effect in 
its more general context and set the scene for the following section which discusses 
the applications of overconfidence in the domain of finance.  
The terms “confidence”, “trust” and “full belief” are usually considered synonyms.9 
The level of collective trust and confidence among individuals can demonstrably 
have significant impacts on their group behaviour. The dynamic between one 
individual’s level of trust and another’s is a particularly interesting area of research. 
For example, Akerlof and Shiller (2009), in their book Animal Spirits, propose using 
confidence multipliers to arrive at a general model of how confidence spreads in a 
group.10  
                                                                 
9 In fact, “confidence” is derived from the Latin fido meaning “I trust”. The credit crisis we have just 
witnessed is also described as a confidence crisis, and it is interesting to observe that “credit” is 
similarly derived from the Latin credo meaning “I believe”. 
10 They base this on the idea of Keynsian multipliers that model how marginal propensity to consume 
spreads in a population of investors in response to, for instance, a government stimulus. They argue 




On an individual level, humans constantly learn about themselves and their abilities 
by observing the consequences of their actions; and in doing so, most people
overestimate the degree to which they play a role in their own succe ses.11 A number 
of constructs need to be clearly differentiated in this discussion. Van den Steen 
(2002) provides a comprehensive categorization for this purpose: Self-serving 
attribution bias refers to the fact that people attribute success to theirown 
dispositions and skills, while they attribute failure to external forces or bad luck; ego-
centric or self-centric bias refers to the fact that individuals taking part in a joint 
endeavour relatively over-estimate their contribution to a good outcome; 
overconfidence relates to the fact that people over-estimate the accuracy of their 
estimates and predictions; overoptimism refers to the observation that individuals 
tend to be overoptimistic about future events and the consequences of their ac ions; 
and finally, illusion of control indicates that people think they have more influence 
than they actually do over the outcome of a random or partially random event.  
Overconfidence is very widely researched in psychology. “No problem in judgment 
and decision making is more prevalent and more potentially catastrophic than 
overconfidence”, Plous (1993) concludes. The concept of overconfidence, however, 
is not uniquely defined in prior literature. Moore and Healy (2008) reconcile three 
common but distinct definitions of overconfidence, which, in decreasing order of 
citation in the literature, are: (1) overestimation of one’s actual level of ability, 
performance, chance of success, or level of control; (2) overprecision (excessive 
certainty) in the accuracy of one’s beliefs, also called miscalibration and (3) 
overplacement of one’s ability, etc. relative to others, also known as the better-than-
average effect. While overestimation and overplacement are often considered 
equivalent manifestations of self-enhancement, there is also some inconsistency 
between them such that those domains contributing to strongest overestimation 
usually produce the least overplacement and vice versa.  
                                                                                                                                                                                      
similar extent multiplied by the relevant consumption multiplier. In this way, they propose a simple 
mathematical framework to model how confidence or lack of it can quickly spread among individuals. 
11 This effect has been extensively studied in the psychology literature. A number of key papers in this 
relation have been cited in Gervais and Odean (2001). Gervais, Simon, and Terrance Odean, 2001, 




Moore and Healy (2008) propose a theory to deal with this apparent contradiction. 
They posit that individuals often have imperfect information about their own 
performance and ability, yet have even worse information about others. Therefore, 
while people’s self-estimates are regressive, their estimates of others’ abilities are 
even more regressive. As such, when faced with difficult tasks, people overestimate 
their abilities, overestimate others even more, and thus believe they hav  performed 
(or will perform) worse than others. On the other hand, when faced with easy tasks, 
people underestimate their own performance while underestimating others ev n 
more, which leads them to believe that they are better than others. This distinction 
also serves to explain the prevalence of underconfidence (particulrly 
underestimation and underplacement) in circumstances where subjects are faced with 
easy tasks. This confirms the view held by Klayman, Soll, Gonzalez-Vallejo and 
Barlas (1999) who summarise the results of many studies as “the confidence people 
have in their judgments exceeds their accuracy and that overconfidence increases 
with the difficulty of the task.”  
Prior psychology literature produces different types of explanations f r the 
overconfidence effect. Mostly, these phenomena have been interpreted in the 
framework of motivational biases, the argument being that individuals are motivated 
to hold unrealistically positive self-perceptions in order to increase their own 
happiness and well-being. The core assumption is, of course, that people s ek to 
maximize their happiness in a utilitarian way. On the other hand, a challenging view 
has been put forward by cognitive psychologists. They claim that people generally 
expect to succeed, and they generally accept responsibility for their expected 
outcomes. Hence, in combination of the two effects, people tend be prone to self-
serving attribution bias which, in turn, engenders overconfidence.  
Another strand of psychology literature offers two alternative categories of 
explanations for overconfidence. The first view highlights biases in information 
processes, hypothesizing that individuals aiming to arrive at a decision search for 
relevant information in their memories in order to reach a preliminary conclusion. 
Then, they proceed to search selectively for further evidence consistent with their 




explanation emphasizes the role of unbiased judgmental error in generating 
overconfidence. A detailed discussion of this perspective can be found in Moore and 
Healy (2008). 
Whatever the underlying psychological mechanisms that produce overconfidence, 
there is an ongoing debate as to whether overconfidence is static or dynamic. Glaser 
and Weber (2010) elicit a number of factors that are considered to have an influence 
on the actual level of an individual’s overconfidence as well as how it is measured. 
These factors include the specific elicitation method used, the difficulty level of 
questions asked, gender, culture, the amount of available information, monetary 
incentives, and expertise. I will briefly discuss how these factors can potentially 
affect overconfidence, and how this may be relevant to the current study. 
First, in terms of the licitation method, interval estimates (also known as the fractile 
method) and direct probability judgments are two common approaches used to 
measure overconfidence. Studies that use interval estimates (e.g. by asking the 
subjects to estimate the length of the Nile river or the future value of the S&P 500 
index within a 95% confidence interval) often find very tight probability distributions 
(see Lichtenstein, Fischhoff and Phillips (1982) and Keren (1991) among other
studies). On the other hand, only a modest bias is induced by direct probability 
judgments, as Glaser and Weber (2010) explain. Hence, the method used to m asure 
miscalibration strongly influences the degree of evaluated overconfidence. 
Second, the difficulty level of the questions asked from subjects also influences the 
measurement of overconfidence. As discussed above, overconfidence is often 
diminished, or even reversed, when subjects are faced with very easy questions. This 
phenomenon, first documented by Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977), is also known 
as the hard-easy effect.   
Third, gender is often cited as an important distinguishing variable in overconfidence 
research. Men are generally considered more overconfident than women, while 
general differences among the two groups are highly task-dependent. (see Barber and 




Fourth, cultural variations exist in the level of observed overconfidence among 
different nations. For example, studies indicate that the Chinese ar  generally more 
overconfident than the Americans which may be due to the Americans’ tendency and 
cultural predisposition to challenge others as well as their own opinions (see Yates, 
Lee and Bush (1997) as an example). 
Fifth, the amount of information and monetary incentives provided in experimental 
settings is shown to affect the degree of observed overconfidence. For xample, the 
availability of more information is associated with increased overconfidence si e, as 
Glaser and Weber (2010) explain, “subjects do not adjust for the cognitive 
limitations that reduce their ability to effectively use additional information.”  
Sixth, the effect of the subject’s level of expertise on their judgement and decision-
making is the topic of an ongoing debate. Glaser and Weber (2010) summarise a 
substantial body of research suggesting that overconfidence proxied by 
miscalibration is equally common among experts in most domains, although certain 
underlying mechanisms may be different. For instance, with regards to interval 
estimates, although both novices and experts demonstrate similar levels of 
overconfidence, experts report narrower intervals (which decrease the estimation hit 
rate) but report midpoints closer to the correct value (which increases nd thus 
balances the net effect on overconfidence).  
 
2.5 OVERCONFIDENCE IN THE DOMAIN OF FINANCE 
Investors have a general tendency to falsely attribute superior past performance to 
their own skill, and inferior past performance to chance, which produces 
overconfidence (Gervais and Odean, 2001). Overestimation of one’s investment 
skill, in this manner, can have a wealth-diminishing effect, as documented by Odean 
(1999) and Barber and Odean (2000) who study this phenomenon among traders. 
They demonstrate that excessive trading following increased confidence often results 




A similar pattern seems to work with regards to analysts. Hilary and Menzly (2006) 
explain how: Analysts become overconfident in their ability to predict future 
outcomes after having made a random series of good predictions. As a result, they 
allocate excessive weight to their private information and less so to public signals 
including market reactions and other analysts’ forecasts. Therefor , their subsequent 
prediction is likely to be less precise, reducing the probability for their next forecast 
to be better than the competition. This, in turn, can trigger negativ  feedback such 
that overconfidence is reduced. Hence, this is a short-term, cyclical pattern the 
intensity of which varies with the analyst’s performance. The authors emphasize that 
“analysts acting under this form of overconfidence do not necessarily underperform 
relative to other analysts but rather they underperform compared to their own 
expected performance.” A possible scenario may even be that overconfident analysts 
consistently outperform others if the effect of overconfidence relativ  to other 
attributes such as “skill” happens to be small. 
With regards to investors, a commonly used proxy to gauge overconfidence is 
trading activity. Although trading activity as a proxy of overconfidence clearly works 
for retail investors, it cannot be as easily used for fund managers and other 
professional investors. Fund managers do not always engage in excessive trading due 
to overconfidence, rather they may have to increase their turnover after a rise in fund 
inflows, which usually follows good past performance. Putz and Ruenzi (2011) 
control for this effect in their examination of the turnover of US equity mutual funds 
over the period 1994-2004. The authors conclude that fund managers indeed trade 
more after good past performance, and their higher trading is driven by individual 
portfolio performance. This is consistent with superior past performance producing 
task-specific overconfidence. In a similar way, Chow, Lin, Lin and Weng (2009) 
examine a sample of equity mutual funds, and show that fund managers behave 
overconfidently conditional on prior performance. They also demonstrate that such 
behaviour reduces subsequent performance. However, one should note that other 
potential confounding factors may affect managerial trades, such as incentives for 
window-dressing, tax-management issues, preference for liquidity and changing 
investment styles to attract fund flows, thus reducing the robustness of trading 




Apart from the high levels of trading volume, other predictions have also been made 
in the literature concerning the financial effects of overconfide ce. For example, 
Odean (1999) finds that overconfident traders hold undiversified portfolios and have 
lower expected utility than rational traders. Caballe and Sakovics (2003), similar to 
Odean, explain the excess volatility of asset prices by the presence of overconfident 
traders. In a related way, Scheinkman and Wei (2003) provide evidence suggestin  
that overconfidence can explain the formation of bubbles in financial markets.  
Active Share is another proxy used in the literature for measuring investor 
overconfidence. It refers to the share of portfolio holdings that differ from 
benchmark index holdings, and is introduced as a new measure of active portfolio 
management by Cremers and Petajisto (2009). Using this measure, Choi and Lou 
(2008) are able to show that mutual fund managers are typically susceptible to the 
self-serving attribution bias. However, neither fund turnover nor Active Share is a 
“clean” measure of overconfidence, since a number of factors briefly discussed 
above potentially confound the link between these measures and investment 
performance. For example, defining an optimal fund-specific benchmark against 
which to measure the Active Share of a fund manager is challenging.  
A more straightforward way of measuring investor overconfidence may be to 
examine their actual estimates and predictions about their subsequent performance. 
Willis (2001), for examples, investigates annual earnings forecasts that are publicly 
released in conjunction with mutual fund manager stock recommendations, and finds 
evidence of excess optimism. Gort, Wang and Siegrist (2008) examine 
overconfidence using a similar method, and conclude that the pension fund managers 
in their sample provide too narrow confidence intervals when asked to forecast future 
returns or estimate past returns of various assets. However, since th s approach 
requires questionnaire-type surveys attempting to measure fund manager confidence 
intervals, it cannot be readily used for a large sample of respondents and i  subject to 





2.6 OVERCONFIDENCE AND PERFORMANCE: RELATED EVIDENCE FROM 
SPORT PSYCHOLOGY 
It can be helpful to explore the impact of confidence on an individual’s performance 
in other areas of activity and look for comparable patterns of judgement and decision 
making. One such area is sport psychology. Professional investors are similar to 
professional athletes in a number of ways, e.g. both groups of individuals (1) are 
expected to outperform on a consistent basis; (2) are aware on one level that this is 
not always possible (classic cognitive dissonance) and that luck play an important 
role in their results; (3) work under extreme pressure and intense competition; (4) 
have to rely to a great extent on subjective judgement, intuition and gut feeling; and 
finally, (5) are under constant threat of dismissal if they underperform.12  
However, some differences also exist between professional investors and 
professional athletes in this context. For example, the environmental factors affecting 
sporting competitions are arguably less complex than those affecting the 
performance of financial markets. In addition, it is demonstrably easier to distinguish 
and measure athletic skill compared to “investment skill.” For example, a basketball 
player who consistently scores around 95% of penalty throws in a number of 
consecutive games can more easily be described as skilled since(1) the 
circumstances of the experiment remain unchanged, (2) all players re subject to the 
same conditions, (3) all players employ equal assets and (4) the impact of players’ 
decisions are often immediately observable.  
In this context, it may be useful to see how confidence may have any role in the 
performance of professional athletes. Both coaches and high-performing athletes 
invariably agree that self-confidence is crucial to individual and team success. There 
is both anecdotal and scientific evidence supporting this observation (see Burton 
(1988) among others). In a more comprehensive study, Burton and Raedeke (2008) 
explain that self-confidence enhances performance through its relationship with three 
other characteristics: anxiety, motivation, and concentration. 
                                                                 
12 There are appears to be interesting links between th  literature on tournament behaviour of fund 
managers and its parallels in competitive sports which provides another potentially rich avenue of 




High self-confidence is often associated with low mental anxiety. Athletes enjoying 
optimal self-confidence experience fewer worries and self-doubts compared to other 
athletes. This results in positively interpreting high arousal as readiness or 
excitement (see figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: The anxiety-confidence dynamic 
 
  
Figure 2: The motivation-confidence dynamic 
 
In addition, athletes with optimal self-confidence are highly motivated to develop 
their game and continue their success record. On the other hand, while diffid nt 




which, in turn, diminishes their performance and traps them in a vicious ircle, 
overconfident athletes feel they are so talented that they do not need to improve their 
game. Finally, optimally confident athletes often have an optimal level of 
concentration on their game. Their confidence helps them block out most 
distractions and “focus on the attentional cues necessary to play their best” (Burton 
and Raedeke, 2008). See figures 2 and 3. 
 
 
Figure 3: The concentration-confidence dynamic 
 
The overall effect of the above three mechanisms results in the performance of 
professional athletes having an inverted-U relationship with their confidence. 
Therefore, one can distinguish the ideal level of self-confidence (optimal confidence) 
from too little confidence (underconfidence or diffidence) and too much confidence 
(overconfidence). While optimally confident athletes are prepared nd competent, 
and have all the required mental and physical skills to achieve their realistic goals, 
diffident athletes expect to fail because they lack or underestimate their preparation 
and competence, which, in turn, leads them to feel underconfident and contributes to 
actual failure through the self-fulfilling prophecy. Diffident athletes often 





Burton and Raedeke also argue that overconfident athletes are the most difficult 
group to coach. They distinguish athletes with inflated confidence from those with 
false confidence. Inflated confidence refers to the situation where athletes sincerely 
believe they are better than the competition, which can be due to pampering, 
excessive media hype, or playing against weak competitors. While these athletes are 
often very good, they often become complacent and their once-superior skills fail 
them through lack of preparation, “leaving them wondering what happened and why 
they felt so lethargic, out of sync, and off their game.”  
False confidence, on the other hand, is observed among athletes who believethat 
pretending to be confident on the outside helps them overcome their underconfidence 
and fear of failure on the inside. Falsely confident athletes are often considered 
“brash, cocky, and pretentious, but their arrogant facade is designed to mask their 
self-doubts” (ibid). They avoid situations threatening their fragile self-confidence, 
often misrepresent reality, and fall prey to simplistic positive thinking.  
No matter which type of overconfidence affects athletes, their performance suffers as 
predicted by the inverted-U relationship between performance and level of 
confidence. However, an optimal level of self-confidence is needed for athletes to 
reach their true potentials. Burton and Raedeke recommend four strategies for 
enhancing self-confidence: performance accomplishments, vicarious experience, 
verbal persuasion, and arousal control. The functioning of these four strategies can 






Figure 4: How self-confidence enhances performance in competitive sports 
 
Performance accomplishments refer to athletes taking credit for their success as a 
reflection of their hard work and ability. The consistency of past successful 
experiences, their recency, and their quality contribute to the developm nt of 
confidence in the athletes. A systematic goal-setting program helps athletes develop 
a strong history of performance accomplishments. Vicarious experience refers to 
helping athletes experience success indirectly, whether through modelling (watching 
others demonstrate how to perform a skill or strategy) or through imagery (a type of 
self-modelling, in which athletes form a mental idea of how to perform a skill or 
mentally rehearse a well-defined skill) since imagined success is a powerful 
confidence builder. Verbal persuasion includes all forms of compliments, positive 
feedback from coaches, teachers, teammates, parents, the media, and even positive 
self-talk. Finally, arousal control indicates the athlete’s level of control over 
physiological symptoms associated with readiness which can be interpreted 
negatively as anxiety or positively as excitement.  
 
2.7 THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS REVISITED 
The aim of this section is to integrate the above strands of literature to provide a 
conceptual model that serves to motivate the research questions approached in the 




overconfidence among ordinary individuals, corporate executives, traders, and retail 
investors, there are few studies that can claim to have examined the role of such 
biases in the decision-making behaviour of professional investors. In particular, due 
to the fact that the bulk of investment in financial markets is made by institutional 
(supposedly sophisticated) investors rather than retail investors, any link between a 
professional asset manager’s performance and her potential overconfidence or 
susceptibility to attribution bias can be of considerable importance, both to the 
academic literature and the investment industry. 
In such settings, it is reasonable to investigate to what extent mutual fund managers, 
as a fairly representative sample of professional investors, are prone to behavioural 
biases such as overconfidence. In the current research, the extent to which 
overconfidence and related behavioural traits e.g. over-optimism, narcissism, self-
serving attribution, etc. may have any bearing on fund performance is of interest. 
The substantial body of literature on overconfidence appears to suggest that, in 
principle, through the self-serving attribution bias, investors falsely attribute superior 
past performance to their own skill, and inferior past performance to chance (see 
Gervais and Odean (2001) for example). When performance is deemed poor and 
unsatisfactory, either relative to peers or in absolute terms depen ing on the 
manager’s perspective and the fund’s mandate, the fund manager is confronted with 
overwhelming emotional pressures in the form of fear, stress and anxiety. As 
explained before, several academic studies in psychology, inspired by Freud (1936), 
suggest that such pressures can negatively affect cognition by weakening, distorting, 
or delaying the process of true information signals.  
On the other hand, as was pointed out in the previous sections, the bulk of prior 
research on overconfidence concurs that increased levels of this variable can lead to 
higher trading volumes and increased frequency of making investment decisions 
which, in turn, diminishes future performance. A summary of these studie  can be 
found in Choi and Lou (2008). 
Hence, the above arguments seem to have the overall conclusion that pas investment 




future investment performance. The net dynamic effect of these processes on 
overconfidence depends on the record of past results, i.e. whether the fund manager 
has experienced a round of recent good or recent bad results. Therefore, in a 
randomly alternating round of positive and negative returns, one may expect the 
average fund manager’s level of overconfidence to increase, cet ris paribus. I have 
developed the following simple system dynamic model to illustrate this point. 
 
Figure 5: The interaction between self-attribution bias, overconfidence and performance 
 
The model proposed by Gervais and Odean (2001) is essentially a learning model. 
They develop a multi-period market model that describes “both the process by which 
traders learn about their ability and how a bias in this learning can create 
overconfident traders.” They assume, in their model, that traders initially do not 
know their ability and that they learn about it through experience. Gervais and 
Odean argue that traders who accurately forecast next period dividends update their 




skill or superior ability, hence becoming overconfident in the process. Thi  is a 
dynamic model in which a trader’s level of overconfidence changes according to his 
or her successes and failures.  
However, an element missing from the Gervais and Odean model is, supposedly, the 
rise in a trader’s or fund manager’s level of expertise and f miliarity with how 
financial markets operate. The evidence in this area is rather mix d. There exist some 
studies showing that more experienced fund managers are less prone to self-serving 
attribution bias and overconfidence (see Locke and Mann, 2001; Christoffersen and 
Sarkissian, 2002 among others). However, a different set of studies indicate that 
compared to relatively inexperienced individuals, experts are more likely to be 
overconfident (see Heath and Tversky, 1991; Glaser et al, 2004 among others). 
Taking a different approach, Hirshleifer and Luo (2001) recognize that the self-
serving bias in the learning process explains the persistence of overconfidence and its 
importance in “a dynamic steady state even if overconfident traders lose money.” 
However, their approach differs in that they do not allow a trader’s confidence to 
grow over time although they allow overconfident traders to thrive profitably. 
In brief, there is no clear evidence concerning the impact of experi nc  on the 
behaviour of fund managers. This is, among other reasons, due to a heterogeneous 
set of definitions provided for overconfidence in prior research as well as the 
inherent difficulty of measuring possible outcomes of the learning process in a robust 
way (Menkhoff et al, 2006).  
In essence, several of my research questions are closely related to the components of 
the model displayed in figure 5. Let us revisit the research questions that this study 
seeks to answer:  
1. How does a fund manager’s prior investment performance affect her sat  of 
mind, and particularly overconfidence? 
2. To what extent, if at all, does a fund manager’s overconfidence impact the 




3. How does the self-attribution bias interact with overconfidence and 
investment performance?  
4. How does self-attribution bias driving overconfidence manifest itself in the 
way fund managers communicate their investment results to their clients, in 
particular by engaging in “storytelling”?  
5. How does the above process relate to the anxieties generated by having to 
explain, justify and cope with poor past performance as well as ahighly 
uncertain working environment?  
The first three research questions are closely related to the mod l above. In fact, 
chapters 6 and 7 address the first three research questions. The last two research 
questions are addressed in chapter 5. The following chapter, chapter 3, focuses on the 
development of the research hypotheses, research variables and a detailed iscussion 
















CHAPTER 3 - RESEARCH HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGICAL 
APPROACH 
  
3.1 INTRODUCTION   
The previous chapter concluded by laying out the conceptual model used in this 
study and the research questions derived from the literature. This chapter will 
introduce the research hypotheses that will be tested in subsequent empirical 
chapters. I will discuss in detail the key variables used in the hypotheses. Further, I 
will explain the research methods used in the study in terms of collection and 
analysis of the research data.  
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 explains the process f developing 
the research hypotheses based on the review of literature in the previous chapter. 
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 discuss the research variables. Section 3.5 introduces the 
research methodology in detail including the stages of data collecti n and data 
analysis.  
 
3.2 DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
My null hypotheses about the link between fund manager overconfidence and the 
performance of investment decisions are developed in this section. I group the 
hypotheses into three broad groups, the impact of prior investment performance on 
fund manager overconfidence, the potential impact of fund manager overconfidence 
on subsequent investment performance, and the link between performance and other 
narrative based variables including tone and readability. As I will explain later, 
abnormal values of tone and readability are closely related to overconfidence; 
however, these two variables cannot be interpreted as overconfidence proxies since 






3.2.1 THE IMPACT OF PRIOR PERFORMANCE ON OVERCONFIDENCE 
Prior research outlined in the previous chapter broadly concurs that an individual 
experiencing a round of positive outcomes associated with her decisions tends to 
become overconfident. Thus, it is reasonable to expect the same pattern to hold for 
the investment decisions of fund managers, i.e. those fund managers whose funds 
have experienced higher investment returns should, on average, become more 
overconfident than their peers. As I explain in detail later in this c apter, I use three 
proxies (overoptimism, excessive certainty, and excessive self-ref rence) to measure 
overconfidence. Hence, three null hypotheses are developed and grouped into a 
single null hypothesis below: 
H10: There is no significant difference in the optimism/certainty/self-
reference scores of fund managers whose funds have experienced varying 
levels of prior performance, ceteris paribus.   
3.2.2 THE IMPACT OF OVERCONFIDENCE ON SUBSEQUENT PERFORMANCE 
The vast body of research on overconfidence introduced in the previous chapter 
uniformly agrees that increased overconfidence leads both retail and professional 
investors to trade more frequently which, on average, diminishes their returns. Other 
more subtle mechanisms may also be at play which adversely affct overconfident 
investor decision-making ability. One such mechanism can be due to the p tentially 
“phantastic” nature of investments in general. In other words, even “sophisticated” 
fund managers can develop “love-hate” relationships with their investments and 
therefore not sufficiently consider the associated risks of investing in them.13 Hence, 
everything else being equal, one may expect an increase in fund manager 
overconfidence to be associated with diminishing investment returns in the 
subsequent months. Again, using the three overconfidence proxies, we develop the 
following hypothesis:  
                                                                 
13
 As a case in point, Eshraghi and Taffler (2012) argue that the recent hedge fund “bubble” and its 
collapse in 2008 was to a large extent driven by such emotions. Eshraghi, Arman, and Richard Taffler, 2011, Hedge Funds and Unconscious Fantasy, Uiversity 




H20: There is no significant difference in the future investment performance 
of mutual funds whose managers exhibit varying degrees of 
overoptimism/certainty/self-reference, ceteris paribus.   
3.2.3 THE LINK BETWEEN PERFORMANCE, FUND MANAGER TONE AND 
REPORT READABILITY 
A growing body of literature in finance and accounting seeks to measure the tone and 
sentiment of corporate annual reports, newspaper articles, press releases, and investor 
message boards using textual analysis. Examples of some recent studies include 
Engelberg (2008), Li (2008), Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky and Macskassy (2008), 
Sadique, In and Veeraraghavan (2008), Brockman and Cicon (2009), Loughran and 
McDonald (2010), Amernic, Craig and Tourish (2010), Demers and Vega (2010) and 
Loughran and McDonald (2011).  
The above studies generally point to the conclusion that negative word classifi ations 
can effectively measure tone, and can be significantly correlated with other financial 
variables. It is often argued that negative words can be more meaningful for content 
analysis purposes compared to positive words, since positive words occur more 
frequently in annual letters to shareholders regardless of the corporation’s financial 
position. This is consistent with the well-documented Pollyanna effect which, as 
Boucher and Osgood (1968) define, asserts that “there is a universal hum n tendency 
to use evaluatively positive words more frequently and diversely than ev luatively 
negative words in communicating.” Another drawback of positive words includes 
their use in conveying negative news, e.g. by utilizing negated positive wordssuch as 
“not good” or “did not improve” (Loughran and McDonald, 2010).  
Among the relevant studies, the topic of CEO tone (or “tone at the op”) has been 
frequently investigated. Cunningham (2005) defines tone at the top as “the hared set 
of values that an organisation has emanating from the most senior executives. It can 
be reinforced with written codes, and other policies and documents, but, more 
importantly, it reflects the actions of these executives. Are they ‘walking the talk’?” 





Arguably, the tone and rhetoric of fund managers can be analysed in a similar vein. 
Fund managers often play the role of CEOs for the funds they manage, i.e. they are 
solely and fully responsible for the performance of their investments. Fund managers 
report to their investors on all aspects of performance, much in the sam way that a 
corporate executive reports on the performance of a company. As such, fund-
manager-speak should be akin to CEO-speak. 
The general pattern of conclusions drawn in the past studies concerning tone is the 
following: Qualitative (soft) earnings information proxied by tone and other 
associated variables can additionally predict asset prices beyond the predictability in 
quantitative (hard) information (Engelberg, 2008). For example, the optimistic or 
“surprise” tone of earnings forecasts is positively correlated with the magnitude of 
subsequent abnormal returns (Brockman and Cicon, 2009). Davis, Piger and Sedor 
(2008) also find that managers use optimistic and pessimistic tone in earnings press 
releases to provide information about the firm’s expected future performance and 
investors respond to such disclosures, while Tetlock et al. (2008) demonstrate that 
the fraction of negative words in firm-specific news stories predicts low earnings. 
Sadique at al. (2008) also study earnings press releases and find that positive tone 
increases returns and decreases volatility while negative tone decr as s returns but 
increases volatility. More generally, Demers and Vega (2010) find that it takes 
investors longer to interpret this soft information component compared to the hard 
information in financial disclosures. 
Based on the above arguments, one expects similar effects to link fund manager tone 
with fund performance, i.e. superior past performance may inspire a comparatively 
more positive and hubristic tone by the fund manager. Excessive levels of such 
positive tone may provide an alternative proxy for overconfidence and may si ilarly 
subsequent returns.  
Finally, in terms of readability, it is widely agreed that narratives conveying a 
negative message or poor news are generally less readable that others. Firms with 
lower earnings have annual reports that are harder to read (Li, 2008), while the 
management is more straightforward in disclosing information when t firm is 




readability and other lexical features is often explained by strategic reporting and 
impression management incentives. In a related way, the simultaneous presence of 
low reading ease and high variability in readability, also known as obfuscation 
(Courtis, 2004), is an equally pervasive phenomenon in corporate annual reports. On 
this basis, I propose the following research hypothesis: 
H30: There is no significant difference in the tone/readability of fund 
manager commentaries whose corresponding funds have experienced varying
degrees of past investment performance, ceteris paribus.    
Hypotheses 1 and 3 are tested in chapter 5 and chapter 6 while several forms of 
hypothesis 2 is tested in chapter 7. The rest of this chapter introduces the operational 
definitions of the research variables, and includes a detailed discussion of the 
research methods employed.  
 
3.3 MAIN RESEARCH VARIABLES 
This section introduces the variables used in the research hypotheses and discusses 
their measurement. Of the five main research variables, three are measured directly 
using the DICTION software, while the remaining two are calcul ted by other 
methods. DICTION is a content analysis software that is widely used in the field of 
finance and accounting (see Appendix 3) to produce consistent narrative-based 
scores for any given text. It has been extensively used to analyze the speeches of 
policymakers, political speeches, earning announcements and corporate annual 
reports.  
The DICTION algorithms use a series of thirty-three dictionaries (word-lists) to 
search text passages for five main semantic features (Activity, Optimism, Certainty, 
Realism and Commonality) as well as thirty-five sub-features (e.g. Praise, Blame, 
Denial, etc). DICTION employs a 10,000-word corpus and the user can create 
additional custom dictionaries for specific research purposes. The program provides 
both alphabetic and numeric output files which include raw totals, percentages, and 




each of its forty scores, DICTION also reports normative datab sed on a 20,000-
item sample of contemporary discourse. One can use these general norms for 
comparative purposes or select from thirty-six sub-categories, including speeches, 
newspaper editorials, business reports, etc (DICTION 5.0 User’s Manual, 2010). 
The first  main research variable used in this study is optimism. In DICTION, 
OPTIMISM is defined as, “language endorsing some person, group, concept r event 
or highlighting their positive entailments.” The formula used for calcul ting “net 
optimism” is: [praise + satisfaction + inspiration] - [blame + hardship + denial]; in 
other words, “optimism” minus “pessimism”.  Further details about OPTIMISM and 
other master variables are included in Appendix 1. 
The normal range of OPTMISM scores calculated in this way depends on the 
reference dictionary used. For example, based on the Corporate Financial Reports 
dictionary,14 which may be appropriate for the purposes of this study, the normal 
range falls between 47.92 and 52.50. In other words, texts belonging to the category 
of Financial Reports are expected, on average, to have an OPTIMISM score 
distribution with a standard deviation range of 47.92-52.50 centred on the mean. 
Other viable choices for reference dictionaries include the Corporate Public 
Relations15 dictionary and the Financial News16 dictionary.  
The second research variable used in this study is certainty. DICTION defines 
CERTAINTY as “language indicating resoluteness, inflexibility, and completeness 
and a tendency to speak ex cathedra.” The formula for calculating CERTAINTY is: 
[tenacity + levelling + collectives + insistence] - [numerical terms + ambivalence + 
                                                                 
14 This dictionary is a sampling of annual financial reports from a variety of Fortune 500 companies, 
including 3M, Ford, Merk, Dynatech, etc. Reports were collected electronically from such internet 
sites as Annual Reports Library, Index: Annual Report Gallery, and Barron's Annual Report and 
Earnings Service. 
15 This dictionary is a broad-based collection of official mission statements, public pronouncements, 
and CEO speeches on behalf of major American corporations from the 1960s through the mid-1990s. 
Includes manufacturing companies (e.g., Boise-Cascade), mining and construction (e.g., Flour 
Daniel), transportation and telecommunications (e.g., AT&T), as well as, financial and service-based 
industries (e.g., Federated Department stores, H&R Block, etc.). 
16 This dictionary is a variety of news stories relatd to financial issues (e.g. tax returns, market 
predictions, trends in stocks and bonds, tax law, speculation on specific annuities, etc.) obtained from 




self-reference + variety]. I apply the adjustment proposed in Demers and Vega 
(2010) to include numerical terms as adding to rather than subtracting from the 
CERTAINTY score. Appendix 1 includes detailed definitions of the sub-categories 
used in this formula. 
The third  variable used in this research as a proxy for overconfidence (and by 
extension, narcissism) is self-reference. Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) use the 
percentage of all first person singular pronouns appearing in company press releases 
as a measure of CEO narcissism. Since fund managers rarely refer to themselves in 
fund commentaries in the singular format, I define SELF-REFERENC  as “the 
number of first person pronouns as a percentage of all words” in a given text. In 
other words, the frequency of all occurrences of I, I’d, I’ll, I’m, I’ve, me, mine, my, 
myself, we, we’d, we’ll, we’re, we’ve, us, our, ours, ourselves ar  calculated and 
added, and then normalized for the length of the text. In the empirical analysis in 
Chapter 7, I explore the possibility of constructing a meta-variable comprising some 
or all of the overconfidence proxies discussed above.  
And fourth, I seek to measure the tone used by the fund manager in her commentary. 
The conventional approach to measuring tone of a narrative is to use word 
classifications. For example, positive/negative tone can be defined as a function of 
positive and negative words mentioned in a text. Similar classifications can be used 
for words indicating a diverse range of themes such as uncertainty, litigation, strong 
modality, and weak modality.  
I use the approach adopted by Loughran and McDonald (2011) that employs positive 
and negative word lists developed by the authors. While the Harvard Dictionary is 
often used in prior studies, it is more suitable to research in the fields of psychology, 
sociology and other related disciplines. Furthermore, Loughran and McDonald 
(2010) find that almost three-fourths of the words identified as negativ  by the 
Harvard Dictionary do not have a negative connotation in a financial context. Words 
such as liability, taxing, foreign, etc. belong to the misclassified list. In addition, the 
authors exclude simple negation (o, not, none, neither, never, nobody) from their 
negative word list. Hence, I use their word lists to define the TONE variable as “the 




of words in both categories.” Therefore, the range of this variable is -1 to +1 and 
measures the relatively positive tone of the narrative.  
 
3.4 CONTROL VARIABLES 
Control variables are used to ensure that the test of the relation between the 
dependent variable and the independent variable is not confounded by other fac ors. 
In this section, I discuss the control variables used in the empirical model. The 
control variables are essentially the firm-specific characte istics in the Carhart model 
which is an augmented Fama-French asset-pricing model.  
The first  control variable used in this study is the market factor (excess returns) 
which is captured by the market beta. The role of the market beta in explaining 
average returns is well documented across the finance literature. Some of the key 
studies that have supported this effect include Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972) and 
Fama and MacBeth (1973). 
The second control variable in this research is f rm size. Several studies e.g. Banz 
(1981), Reinganum (1982) and Herrera and Lockwood (1994) suggest that firm size 
is a dominant factor that has additional explanatory power for average returns. In 
their key study, Fama and French (1993) form factor-mimicking portfolios to 
develop a risk factor for firm size known as SMB (Small minus Big). SMB 
effectively measures the size premium i.e. the return on a portfoli  of small stocks 
minus the return on a portfolio of big stocks.     
The fund’s investment style is the third  control variable used in the regression 
model. Similar to size, the effect of investment style is widely r searched by such 
studies as Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein (1985) as well as Chan, Hamao and 
Lakonishok (1991). The risk factor developed by Fama and French (1993) for this 
effect is known as HML. HML measures the value premium i.e. the return on a 





3.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This section introduces the research methodology used in this study. First, the data 
collection process is briefly outlined. More details on the data collection process are 
provided in Chapter 4 which includes a full discussion of data sources. Finally, the 
data analysis methods are explained in detail.    
3.5.1 DATA COLLECTION 
The research data is collected from a number of sources. The mutual fund annual 
reports are sourced from the EDGAR online database provided by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. It collects a wide range of mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures for US companies and individuals. A full description of this database is 
provided in Chapter 4. 
A key stage of collecting annual reports is downloading them from the EDGAR 
database. Clearly, manually downloading a large number of reports can be very time 
consuming. I automated this process in the following way. EDGAR is archived 
periodically and the archived filings are accessible through the ftp protocol. 
Fortunately, the web addresses of these filings are reasonably well-structured. In 
other words, by knowing the identifier of a given company and the year of an annual 
report, one can generate the address where the said report can be downloaded. 
Therefore, in principle, a computer program can that can automatically re d and save 
a list of web addresses in a predetermined location can resolve this issue. In 
collaboration with an IT expert,17 such a computer program was prepared and tested. 
This computer code can be found in Appendix 4.  
The mutual fund returns and other financial figures are mainly extracted from the 
CRSP Survivor-bias free Mutual Fund Database. This database is widely referenced 
in finance and accounting scholarly research and is available through the WRDS 
platform. More details on this database and the associated data collection procedures 
are provided in Chapter 4.    
                                                                 





3.5.2 DATA ANALYSIS 
This section introduces two of the main data analysis methods used for mpirical 
research in this study. The first section discusses the content analysis methodology 
that is used to analyse the fund manager commentaries. The second stion describes 
the analysis method used to deconstruct mutual fund performance using a regression 
model.  
3.5.2.1 CONTENT ANALYSIS OF FUND MANAGER NARRATIVES 
Krippendorf (2004) defines content analysis as “a research technique for making 
replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the 
contexts of their use.” As a research technique, content analysis is often praised for 
being objective, systematic and replicable. It is based on the assumption that the 
language people choose to express themselves in contains information about the 
nature of their psychological states, an assumption implying a presentational or 
descriptive model of language (Viney, 1983).  
What sets content analysis apart from other similar research techniques, according to 
Krippendorf (2004), is that content analysis is (1) an unobtrusive technique; (2) 
capable of accepting unstructured material; (3) context sensitive and therefore able to 
analyse symbolic forms; and, (4) able to cope with large volumes of data. The above 
features make content analysis a reasonably appropriate choice, in th  current study, 
for the purpose of analysing large-scale textual data derived from annual reports.   
The process of content analysis consists of a number of components. Krippendorf 
(2004) explains that the first three steps, i.e. unitizing, sampling and recording are 
somewhat interlinked and form the data making sub-process. First, the data have to 
be distinguished and segmented into distinct analytical units (unitizing); then if there 
are an unmanageably large number of units, a smaller segment of them has to be 
selected (sampling); and finally, each unit needs to be coded and described in an 
analysable format (recording). Data reduction is the next logical step which aims to 
reduce computational efforts. Inference is the key step in content analysis and seeks 
to “consume” all the knowledge a content analyst has about the data and the context. 




process of identification and representation of patterns that are not worthy, 
statistically significant, or otherwise accounting for or descriptive of the content 
analysis results.” Figure 6 shows the logical connection between th  above 
components.  
 
Figure 6: Components of the content analysis process, from Krippendorf (2004) 
 
In chapter 6, I provide a more detailed explanation of the content analysis 
methodology used in this study. 
3.5.2.2 THE CARHART FOUR-FACTOR ANALYSIS 
In 1997, Carhart investigated a survivorship-bias free sample of around 1900 equity 
funds during a relatively long 32-year period. The importance of working with fund 
data free from survivorship bias is explained by Hendricks et al (1997) who 
demonstrate how studying survivorship-biased data can result in the false discovery 
of a spurious J-shaped relation between first and second period performances, rather 
than a monotonically increasing pattern. Carhart classified the funds into categories 
of long-term growth and growth-and-income, and studied them using both CAPM 





What Carhart found in his study was that the strong persistence in short-term returns 
is mostly explained by common factors in the four-factor model, predominantly size 
and momentum. Consistent with previous studies, he also found that the persistence 
of underperformance by funds in the bottom decile cannot be explained by the 
common four factors and fund expenses.  
Instead, Carhart finds a strong positive (negative) relation between th  previous one-
year momentum and the returns on the best (worst) performing decile of funds. His 
findings suggest that the portfolios of the best funds are tilted towards past winning 
stocks, and consequently capture their premium. In a similar way, funds belonging to 
the top decile tilt their portfolios such that they capture the premium on small stocks. 
Development of multi-factor models such as Carhart’s model helped explain, among 
other things, the various style-timing activities that exist in addition to market timing, 
namely: size timing, growth timing, and momentum timing.18  
I aim to expand the Carhart model by adding a number of independent variables 
proxying for fund manager psychological features to the right side of the model. 
Specifically, I add the overconfidence measure as an independent variable to the 
model, as displayed in the equation below:  
 
I then regress the funds’ average monthly returns subsequent to the publication of the 
annual reports on the Carhart factors and my new overconfidence measure which is 
based on content analysis of fund manager commentaries. The analysis in Chapter 7 
shows that this addition improves, on average, the ability of the model to anticipate 
future investment returns. Further technical details concerning this analytical method 
                                                                 
18 Market timing refers to the ability to weigh equity exposures according to one’s forecast of future 
market states. Size timing relates to adjusting the fund’s exposure between small-cap and large-cap 
stocks. Growth timing refers to adjusting exposure along the value-growth continuum. Finally, 
momentum timing modifies the investment strategy betwe n momentum investing (buying high past-




are explained later in the thesis. The following chapter explains the sources of the 
data in this study as well as the sample selection procedure and provides a 



























The main purpose of this chapter is to provide a broad description of the data 
sources, the data collection and sample selection procedures. The essence of this 
study is to explore the relationship between fund manager overconfidence and the 
fund’s investment performance. Therefore, to be able to draw robust conclusi s, I 
need a large sample of mutual funds performance data, and the equivalent sample of 
mutual fund annual reports on which I perform the content analysis process 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
This chapter is organised as follows: section 4.2 includes a detaile  explanation of 
the data sources including both annual reports and the performance data for mutual 
funds. It also includes a discussion of the cross-referencing issues faced in linking 
the two databases for the purposes of this study. Section 4.3 describes the sample 
selection procedures used in the study. Section 4.4 provides the required sample
description. 
 
4.2 DATA SOURCES 
This section provides information about the sources as well as a general outline of 
the data used in this study. 
4.2.1 MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE DATA 
The source of the mutual fund performance data used in this research is the CRSP 
Survivor-Bias-Free Mutual Fund Database.19 This database, widely used in the 
                                                                 
19 This database is provided by CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices) and is accessible online 
at http://www.crsp.com/products/mutual_funds.htm as well as through the WRDS (Wharton Research 




finance and accounting literature, is designed to facilitate resea ch on the historical 
performance of open-ended US mutual funds. It claims to be “the only c mplete 
database of both active and inactive mutual funds” and distinguishes itself by 
providing survivor-bias-free data. The database was initially developed by Mark 
Carhart for his 1995 dissertation entitled, “Survivor Bias and Persistnce in Mutual 
Fund Performance”, to fill a need for survivor-bias-free data coverage which was 
previously lacking. Incidentally, the key regression model used in the current study is 
based on Carhart’s (1997) seminal paper, as explained in Chapter 3. 
According to the CRSP Mutual Fund Database Guide, the database includes a history 
of each mutual fund’s name, investment style, fee structure, holdings, a d asset 
allocation. It also incorporates monthly total returns, monthly total net assets, 
monthly/daily net asset values and dividends. Schedules of rear and front load fees, 
asset class codes, and management company contact information are also provided. 
All the data items are associated with open-end mutual funds and begin at varying 
times starting from 1962 depending on availability. The update frequency of the 
database as well as the distribution lag is quarterly. Figure 7 provides a highlight of 





Figure 7: Overview of data tables included in the CRSP Mutual Fund Database  
 
In terms of fund types covered, the CRSP Mutual Fund Database contains complete 
historical information for over 44,888 (17,565 dead and 27,323 live funds) open-end 
funds, including equity funds, taxable and municipal bond funds, international funds, 
and money market funds. The focus of the current study is on equity mutual funds.  
4.2.2 MUTUAL FUND ANNUAL REPORTS 
The mutual fund annual reports used in this study are sourced by the EDGAR 
database. EDGAR (hereinafter Edgar) stands for the Electronic Data-Gathering, 
Analysis, and Retrieval system and is a publicly available database provided by the 
US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). It performs automted collection, 




some cases, individuals who are legally required to file forms with the SEC. The 
database can be accessed via Internet (web or FTP). 
While most companies need not submit actual annual reports to shareholdes on 
Edgar, it is a mandatory requirement for mutual fund companies to do so. For ther 
companies, however, the annual report on Form 10-K containing much of the same 
information is required to be filed on Edgar. These requirements make Edgar an 
excellent source of annual reports for all US companies regardless of industry sector.
In Chapter 3, it is explained how I developed a computer program to automatically 
download the mutual fund annual reports filed in Edgar. The annual reports are 
mostly filed in the HTML format. In preparing these reports for c ntent analysis by 
the Diction software, a number of adjustments had to be made. First, all HTML 
coding has to be removed from the document. Then, all tables with numerical data 
and all exhibits are removed from the document, since most of them are included 
purely due to legal requirements and tend to contain template-based language.  
4.2.3 CROSS-REFERENCING BETWEEN DATABASES USED IN THE STUDY 
The Edgar database uses a Central Index Key (CIK) to identify each of its filings. 
CIK is a unique ten-digit number allocated to an individual or company by the SEC 
to identify the relevant filings across several databases. On the other hand, the CRSP 
Mutual Fund Database uses a different identifier known as CUSIP20 which stands for 
the Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures, founded in 1964. 
CUSIP is a 9-character alphanumeric code that identifies any North American 
security for the purposes of facilitating, clearing and settlement of trades. 
While both CIK and CUSIP are each useful identifiers within their own databases, 
there is not a publicly available matching table between the two systems. This was a 
big challenge in the way of my data collection. To circumvent this problem, I used a 
cross-referencing table provided by the S&P CUSIP Services to ma ch each CIK to 
                                                                 
20 In fact, the CRSP Mutual Fund Database lists funds by its own proprietary identifier known as the 




the corresponding CUSIP.21 The matching is however not one-to-one in many cases 
such that one CIK may be linked to a number of CUSIPs, and vice versa. In uch 
cases, I used the fund’s name in a difficult and time-consuming process to provide 
the correct matching between the two databases. 
 
4.3 SAMPLE SELECTION 
This section provides a description of the sample selection procedure. I explain how 
samples of mutual funds are formed and what data reduction procedures have been 
used.  
I begin by exploring the Edgar database in 2009 and look for all mutual f nd filings 
made during this year. I systematically search for all mutual fund annual reports filed 
in the form N-CSR (Certified Shareholder Report of Registered Management 
Investment Companies).22 As expected, most annual reports are filed in the first 
quarter. In fact, about 45% of the annual reports are typically filed in the first quarter 
and about 25% during the last quarter of the calendar year. The remaining 30% of 
annual reports are filed during the second and third quarters. I exclud  amended 
disclosures. Therefore, by looking at one full year, I acquire the whole annual set of 
unique mutual fund reports regardless of whether they correspond to the current or 
previous fiscal year.      
Next, I match the CIK identifier of the annual reports with the corresponding CUSIP. 
As explained above, with the help of the fund’s name, this often results in a unique 
matching. Then, I select only those CIKs whose corresponding CUSIPs belong to 
actively-managed equity mutual funds.  
I use the CRSP fund information to control for fund manager changes. I limit my 
sample to funds having complete returns data and a unique fund manager for at least 
three consecutive years. The mgr-dt variable provided by the CRSP database marks 
                                                                 
21 I gratefully acknowledge Prof. Richard Taffler’s support in obtaining this data.  





the date the current portfolio manager assumed responsibility for he portfolio. Since 
my whole sample consists of 2003-2009 annual reports, I initially exclude all funds 
whose mgr_dt variable is larger than 1 January 2006. I repeat this process for those 
annual reports filed during 2008 which have not been filed in 2009, and add the 
corresponding distinct mutual funds to the sample. I continue until I cover all 
actively-managed equity mutual funds with a unique manager and complete returns 
data for at least three consecutive years during the 2003-09 period. Finally, I remove 
from my sample the annual reports with no substantial fund manager commentary 
(i.e. less than 200 words). Table 1 illustrates this sample selection procedure.  
Table 1: The sample selection procedure for sample A 
Mutual fund annual reports filed in Edgar during 2009 3319 
Less amended annual reports (N-CSR/A) 166 
Unique mutual fund annual reports filed in Edgar during 2009 3153 
Less annual reports with no corresponding CUSIP match 224 
Less bond funds, money market funds and index funds 380 
Active equity mutual fund annual reports filed in 2009 2549 
Less annual reports with a change of the corresponding fund manager 
or missing returns data during 2006-09  831 
 
Active equity mutual funds with unique managers andfull returns data 
during 2006-09 1718 
 
Repeat the above process for the 2005-08 period and add  
corresponding distinct funds                      1421 
 
Repeat the above process for the 2004-07 period and add 
corresponding distinct funds                      1255 
 
Repeat the above process for the 2003-06 period and add 
corresponding distinct funds                        977 
Active equity mutual funds with unique managers andcomplete 
returns data for at least three consecutive years during 2003-09 5371 
 
Less mutual funds with missing or no significant fud manager 
commentary in the corresponding annual reports 712 





Hence, for the purpose of my panel data analysis, I arrive at 4659 unique activ ly-
managed equity mutual funds that have had a unique fund manager and complete 
returns data for at least three years during the sample period, and have corresponding 
fund manager commentaries. I call this sample A and use it as my main sample for 
most of the empirical tests in this thesis.  
In order to investigate the effect of a longer fund manager duration on the research 
variables, I make a similar sample of all actively-managed equity mutual funds that 
have a unique fund manager and complete returns data in the CRSP database during 
the whole 2003-09 period. I call this sample B.  
 
Table 2: The sample selection procedure for sample B 
Mutual fund annual reports filed in Edgar during 2009 3319 
Less amended annual reports (N-CSR/A) 166 
Unique mutual fund annual reports filed in Edgar during 2009 3153 
Less annual reports with no corresponding CUSIP match 224 
Less bond funds, money market funds and index funds 380 
Active equity mutual fund annual reports filed in 2009 2549 
 
Less mutual funds missing complete returns data during  
2003-09 507 
 
Less mutual funds with a change of the corresponding 
fund manager during 2003-09  887 
 
Active equity mutual funds with unique managers  
and complete returns data during 2003-09 1155 
 
Less mutual funds with missing or no significant fud  
manager commentary in the corresponding annual reports 149 
Sample B 1006   
  
Therefore, 1006 unique (actively-managed equity) mutual funds during the whole 
sample period are found subject to the said conditions. In the next section, I provide 





4.4 SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
Table 3 reports summary statistics on the total actively-managed equity mutual funds 
that have a corresponding CUSIP match in the CRSP database. The statistic  
provided are related to the annual performance on an absolute basis, fund size, 
expenses and turnover. Definitions of these measures are also listed.  
 
Table 3: Summary statistics of the sample mutual funds 
Average Return: Daily, monthly and annual returns values are calcul ted in CRSP as a change in 
NAV (net asset value) including reinvested dividends from one period to the next. NAVs are net of all 
management expenses and 12b-1 fees.23 Front and rear load fees are excluded. TNA : Total Net Assets 
as of the last trading day of each month, figures ar  averaged for each year. Expense Ratio: Expense 
Ratio as of the most recently completed fiscal year, representing the ratio of total investment that 
shareholders pay for the fund’s operating expenses which include 12b-1 fees. Turnover : Fund 
Turnover Ratio defined as the minimum of aggregated sales or aggregated purchases of securities, 
divided by the average 12-month Total Net Assets of the fund. 
Year Number 
Average Return  




(% per year) 
Turnover  
(% per year) 
2003 2169 30.2 295.2 1.5 86.3 
2004 2201 38.0 336.6 1.6 91.9 
2005 2287 32.6 385.0 1.4 105.2 
2006 2490 25.4 439.9 1.5 92.0 
2007 2355 -18.9 485.2 1.5 133.6 
2008 2612 -25.1 377.6 1.3 125.6 
2009 2549 -10.6 441.4 1.4 108.7 
      
Mean 2380 10.2 394.4 1.5 106.2 
Median  2355 25.4 385.0 1.5 105.2 
SD 173 27.2 65.9 0.1 18.9 
                                                                 
23 12b-1 fee denotes the ratio of the total assets attributed to marketing and distribution costs. It 
represents the actual fee paid in the most recently completed fiscal year as reported in the Annual 





Table 4 provides basic descriptive statistics on the proxies used for measuring fund 
manager overconfidence. The scores reported in Table 4 are not normalised. Since, 
for example, the normal range of the Diction optimism score of a typical narrative 
based on the Corporate Financial Reports dictionary is between 48.21 and 52.50, the 
relatively low standard deviations are no cause for concern and should be interpreted 
within this range. The same observation holds for the certainty and self-reference 
measures. 
 
Table 4: Summary statistics of overconfidence proxies in this study 
This table reports the distribution of selected overconfidence proxies based on the content analysis of 
fund manager narratives. The optimism scores are based on the fund outlook section, the self-
reference scores are based on the past-performance discussion section and certainty scores are based 
on the whole narrative. 
 





      
 Mean              SD     
       
 Min             1st 
Quart.         
 




2003 2169 51.31 1.96 47.15 49.44 50.68 52.35 57.41 
2004 2201 52.29 2.12 47.37 50.38 51.40 53.63 58.23 
2005 2287 52.31 2.18 47.47 50.25 51.68 53.57 59.50 
2006 2490 51.26 1.98 46.07 49.18 50.82 52.57 56.90 
2007 2355 52.77 1.41 49.64 51.44 52.36 53.59 57.42 
2008 2612 52.47 2.11 47.57 50.56 51.58 53.80 58.38 














      
 Mean              SD     
       
 Min             1st 
Quart.         
 




2003 2169 47.12 1.16 44.66 46.01 46.75 47.73 50.73 
2004 2201 46.99 1.19 44.23 45.92 46.49 47.74 50.32 
2005 2287 47.79 1.12 45.30 46.73 47.47 48.44 51.49 
2006 2490 48.14 1.50 44.21 46.56 47.81 49.13 52.42 
2007 2355 46.95 1.14 44.42 45.87 46.62 47.61 50.71 
2008 2612 47.21 1.18 44.47 46.14 46.71 47.95 50.51 
2009 2549 46.85 1.33 43.37 45.45 46.56 47.73 50.64 
 






      
 Mean              SD     
       
 Min             1st 
Quart.         
 




2003 2169 1.16 0.16 0.82 1.01 1.11 1.24 1.66 
2004 2201 1.07 0.20 
 
0.61 0.89 0.99 1.20 1.63 
2005 2287 1.11 0.10 
 
0.89 1.02 1.08 1.17 1.44 
2006 2490 1.36 0.19 
 
0.86 1.16 1.32 1.49 1.90 
2007 2355 1.29 0.18 
 
0.89 1.12 1.24 1.39 1.88 
2008 2612 1.01 0.20 
 
0.55 0.83 0.93 1.14 1.57 
2009 2549 1.19 0.24 0.56 0.94 1.14 1.35 1.87 
 
Panel D: Cross-correlations between the overconfidece proxies 






Certainty 0.416 1.000 
 
 





In chapter 6, I look at the distribution of the overconfidence scores more cl sely and 
plot histograms to demonstrate that there is no significant skewness in what is a 
relatively normal distribution. In addition, instances of extreme (outlier) fund 
manager overconfidence appear to be more common than underconfidence. I argue
that this may be due to the fact that fund manager selection processes that are in 
operation in the investment industry including hiring interviews are biased in the 
favour of overconfident managers. A similar distribution exists for the certainty and 
self-reference measures as can be seen in panels B and C. 
The cross correlation matrix in panel D suggests that while optimism and certainty 
are somewhat correlated measures, there is a significant correlati n between 
optimism and self-reference. This is consistent with the theoretical expectation, and 
empirical evidence discussed in Chapter 6, that an optimistic, confident fund 
manager tends to use the active voice as well as personal pronouns mre frequently, 
thus making her narrative more readable.  
The following chapter analyses fund manager commentaries using the “close 
reading” methodology, and investigates how the self-serving attribution bias often 
leads to overconfidence as can be understood from fund manager narratives. In 
addition, by manually coding a random sample of commentaries, different story 
types embedded in fund manager narratives are identified. Furthermore, connections 
are established among these stories and the funds’ past investment performance, and 
the results are used to explain the sense-making process that professional investors 









CHAPTER 5 – SELF-ATTRIBUTION AND OVERCONFIDENCE VIEWED 
THROUGH THE LENS OF FUND MANAGER REPORTS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I examine how the self-serving attribution bias drives overconfidence, 
and how this effect is manifest through fund manager annual reports to heir 
investors. By analysing fund manager commentaries using the “close reading” 
methodology and in the spirit of Jameson (2000), I identify different “story types” 
embedded in fund manager narratives and explain how self-attribution bias and 
overconfidence is traceable in them. Further, I establish connections among these 
stories and the funds’ past investment performance, and use the results to explain the 
sense-making process of professional investors in their very unique work
environment. 
Professional fund managers work under extreme pressure in a confusing and highly 
demanding environment.  They are expected to outperform other equally able 
managers and their benchmarks on a consistent basis although being aware all the 
time, on one level, that this is not really possible. Underlying this task is the 
enormous complexity and intangibility of the markets in which they operate and 
where there is ultimately little relationship between the decisions they make and the 
performance of their funds. In addition, there is great difficulty in deciding whether 
investment returns are due to skill or luck.  
Conventional finance views fund managers in terms of “rational” actors in the 
marketplace using formal methods of asset valuation in an attempt to identify those 
stocks or other assets which may be mispriced, even though, on the other hand, 
markets are viewed traditionally as efficient.  However, in co trast, the world of the 
real investment manager is one where she is swamped by information, is subject to 
acute information asymmetry, is under intense competition, and, in the end, has to 
rely to a large extent on subjective judgement, intuition and “gut feeling”.  Added to 
this are the many imponderables which are outside her control and may largel  drive 




do a job, which is very difficult if not impossible to do, and is under constant threat 
of dismissal if the returns she earns are not deemed satisfactory.   
It is of course clear that fund managers do not operate in a context-fre  world. 
Holland (2006 & 2009) identifies a number of important intangibles in the work 
environment of fund managers. These include:  
“1) Increasing significance of knowledge intensive processes, asets or intangibles in 
creating value within the enterprise, and within its immediate network of corporate 
alliances, suppliers, distributors, and customers. 2) Increasing use of technology 
within these value creation processes. 3) Major changes in the corporate value 
creation process such that knowledge creation, articulation, processing and 
leveraging, has become a central survival activity for multinatio l companies. 4) 
Changes in corporate structure from top heavy, multi layered managerial hi archies 
to flat hierarchies, and to companies establishing alliance and networks with 
companies in the same industry and with suppliers and distributors. 5) Increased 
internationalisation or globalisation of companies and industries. 6) Radical changes 
in corporate strategy arising from the above forces.” 
The above forces can potentially influence fund manager behaviour in direct or 
indirect ways. For example, in the case of disclosure behaviour, flat managerial 
structures may lead to corporate preference for secrecy over private disclosure. 
Equally, they can also lead to preference for private disclosure over voluntary public 
disclosure (Holland, 2006). In other words, fund managers may be motivated to 
exercise some level of self-censorship in communicating to their investors through 
fund manager reports. They may do so in an attempt to safeguard the larger interests 
of the financial institution in which they work. Clearly, the degre to which fund 
managers may be influenced by such organisational pressures is very difficult, if not 
impossible, to measure. However, it is important to recognize these intangible factors 
as the limitations of performing a largely context-free analysis. 
In this chapter, I also test the proposition that the way in which fund managers deal 
with their highly stressful, unpredictable and threatening environment is, as we all 




sense of what they are doing. These value-creation stories are, as Holl nd (2006) 
explains, an intangible part of the overall corporate financial communications 
framework which can be applied to investment companies in this research. 
 
5.2 UNCERTAINTY IN FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE CAREER CONCERNS 
OF FUND MANAGERS  
As mentioned earlier, fund managers operate in a highly competitive, uncertain, 
complex and stressful environment. They are often in constant fear of being fired if 
their investment performance, which is largely influenced by factors beyond their 
control, is deemed unsatisfactory. Hence, the strand of mutual fund literature 
discussing the career concerns of fund managers in the light of their performance is 
relevant to the discussion in this chapter. The hazards of mutual fund 
underperformance are clearly spelled out in many studies, e.g. Khorana (1996) and 
Lunde, Timmermann and Blake (1999). The latter study lists several r asons 
explaining why funds are terminated: (1) never reaching critical mass during market 
capitalization; (2) merging an underperforming fund with a similar, more successful 
one; (3) merging an underperforming fund with a similar one due to merger of two 
fund families; (4) closing an underperforming fund to improve overall performance. 
The authors also report that underperformance is generally associated with a higher 
hazard rate, and since funds to be terminated have higher average persistence than 
survivor funds, excluding them from persistence measurements results in lower 
persistence estimates. In a similar study, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) show that fund 
manager termination is generically performance-sensitive, and more so for younger 
managers, which may give them an incentive to avoid unsystematic risk. Goyal and 
Wahal (2008) find that once fund managers are fired, excess returns are typically 
indistinguishable from zero, though in some cases positive. 
The effect of employment risk on fund manager risk-taking behaviour is further 
investigated in Kempf, Ruenzi and Thiele (2009). They report that if employment 
risk is perceived to be more (less) important than compensation incetives, fund 




(increase) risk relative to leading managers. Hence, the balance between the 
desirability of compensation incentives and the undesirability of employ ent 
termination determines fund manager’s risk levels. Their results are consistent with 
the study by Hu, Kale, Pagani and Subramanian (2008) who find a non-monotonic 
(approximately U-shaped) empirical relation between the fund manager’s risk level 
and her prior performance relative to peers. In this context, it is not surprising that 
fund managers aggressively seek favourable ratings to improve their “perceived 
image” and eliminate the threat of being fired. Furthermore, numerous studies have 
shown that fund ratings can have a significant effect on fund flows, which implies 
that investors are clearly influenced by fund ratings in making their c oice.24 Despite 
the power of fund ratings to influence asset flows into or out of a mutual fund, their 
predictive ability is widely debated in the mutual fund literature.25 
 
5.3 SENSE MAKING THROUGH NARRATIVES: THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
The thesis of this chapter is that fund managers, in their reports to clients, seek to 
make sense of the uncertain and opaque world in which they operate th ough a 
constructed process of sense making using the medium of narrative, and in particular 
story. In this intricate sense making process, fund managers often in rpret 
investment outcomes in a self-serving way which, I argue, drives their 
overconfidence.   
                                                                 
24
 For example, Del Guercio and Tkac (2008) use event-study methodology to examine the effect of 
Morningstar ratings on a sample of 3388 domestic equity mutual funds over the period 1996-1999, 
while controlling for other contemporaneous influenc s. The authors show an initial 5* rating can 
result in a $26 million average six-month abnormal flow. They also record significant abnormal flows 
following rating changes. Del Guercio, Diane, and Paula A. Tkac, 2008, Star Power: The Effect of Morningstar Ratings on Mutual Fund Flows, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 43, 907-936. 
25
 In particular, most fund rating methodologies seem to suffer from a number of shortcomings 
compromising their usefulness for any ex-ante analysis. Amenc and Le Sourd (2005) point out a few 
of these in their comparative analysis of three major rating systems: Standard & Poor’s star rating, the 
Morningstar rating, and the Lipper Leader rating: (1) Ratings do not adequately capture the real risk 
taken by the manager and the necessity for taking extreme risks; (2) Measurement of performance 
persistence is not yet a major concern for rating agencies; and (3) The relative category-based ranking 
of fund performance makes the ratings dependent on he definition of the categories used, and 





 Sense making is an integral part of the fund manager’s search for meaning.  It is 
“fundamentally tied to processes of individual identity generation and maintenance” 
(Brown, Stacey and Nandhakumar, 2008).  “Sense making is a search for plausibility 
and coherence that is reasonable and memorable, which embodies past experience 
and expectations, and maintains the self while resonating with others. It can be 
constructed retrospectively, yet used prospectively, and captures though s and 
emotions” (Brown et al., 2008). It renders the subjective tangible.  Sense-making is 
the process by which we mould our own identity in an ambiguous world and “tell” 
ourselves who we are.  It is grounded in our constant struggle to construct ou  own 
identities. 
As well as seeking to persuade their investors that their funds are being well and 
competently managed (Jameson, 2000), I suggest that the manner in which fund 
managers report on their performance is, also, part of the process by which they seek 
to make sense of the impenetrable world in which they are located.  The way fund 
managers construct the cognitive schema they require to be able to do their job in the 
face of continued threats and reverses is by constructing narratives.  As Brown et al. 
(2008) point out, narrative “constitutes the basic organising principle of human 
cognition”.  Sense making is a narrative process where narrative is “the primary form 
by which human experience is made meaningful” (Polkinghorne, 1988).  
Although many authors use the terms narrative and story synonymously, in line e.g., 
with Czarniawska (2004), I view “story” here as a sub-genre of narrative.  
Narratives, broadly defined, are texts, spoken or written, that usually involve a 
sequence of actions and events in a chronological and generally logically consistent 
manner.  They involve temporal chains of interrelated events or actions, undertaken 
by characters (Gabriel, 2008).  Narrative truth is fundamentally different from factual 
truth but nonetheless real in that narratives allow us to make sense of situations.  
More broadly, in terms of the accepted rather than contested nature of financial 
markets, market participants also make sense of the environment in which they 
collectively operate through “jointly negotiated” narratives. Narratives carry the 




Gabriel (2000) defines stories as “narratives with plots and characters, generating 
emotion in narrator and audience…. Story plots entail conflicts, predicaments, trials, 
coincidences and crises that call for choices, decisions, actions and interactions, 
whose actual outcomes are often at odds with the characters’ intentio s and 
purposes.”  The plot functions to transform a chronicle or sequence of events (a 
narrative) into a story knitting together the events so that one can re ognise a deeper 
significance of an event in the light of other events (Gabriel, 2008). Stories are 
powerful devices for managing meaning and thus, potentially, an essential par  of the 
fund manager’s sense making process. Through the medium of story the unexpected 
can be transformed into the “expectable”, and the fund manager can feel, on one 
level, the unmanageable future is “manageable”. Interestingly “…the truth of a story 
lies not in the facts, but in the meaning.  If people believe a story, if the story grips 
them, whether events actually happened or not is irrelevant” (Gabriel, 2000).  The 
key is its “plausibility” rather than its “accuracy”. Importantly, in stories 
“unpredictability” does not imply “inexplicability”. 
I hypothesise in this chapter that through the use of stories and the broader narratives 
of group sense-making fund managers are able to engage in the process of identity 
construction and make sense of their impenetrable work task in terms of their needs 
for self-esteem and purpose, i.e., who they are. Brown et al. (2008), summarising the 
literature further, argue more generally that such activities can also be analysed using 
notions of “impression management” and “attributional egotism” (self-attribution 
bias). The former refers to the self-presentation behaviours that individuals employ 
to influence the perceptions that others have of them, and the latter the tendency of 
individuals to attribute favourable outcomes to their own actions and unfavourable 
outcomes to external factors.   
In this chapter, I provide a very preliminary analysis that seek  to test whether fund 
managers’ search for meaning in an environment where they are required to be 
exceptional but over which, ultimately, they have little control, can be explained 
through their use of story and narrative using the epistemology of close-reading 
(Amernic and Craig, 2009). I hold the belief that the language fund managers employ 




often convey strategic intent.26 I highlight the role of stories and narratives in this 
sense making process and, in the spirit of Tuckett (2011) and Tuckett and Taffler 
(2011) who report on the results of in-depth interviews with fund managers, d scribe 
how fund managers weave reason and emotion together in the reports they wri e to 
investors and, implicitly, themselves. 
The approach used here complements that of Jameson (2000) who also studies 
shareholder reports of mutual funds but focuses on the process by which fund 
managers engage with the readers of their reports and how they seek to manage the 
way in which the text is experienced. In addition, she studies funds whose total 
returns are high in absolute terms but low in relative terms. I, however, look at the 
full range of possibilities in terms of outperformance and underperformance relative 
to benchmarks and in absolute terms, and thereby distinguish four different types of 
commentaries written by fund managers. Importantly, I am directly concerned with 
how fund managers appear to be using their narratives not only to convince the 
reader that their investment in the fund is being appropriately and pru ently 
managed, but particularly as a means of helping them make sense of their task and 
individual identity construction. 
I also explain that the way fund managers describe their investment strategies and 
related processes ex post depends, to a large extent, on their prior investment 
outcomes, and this is an essential part of how they build their own desired self-image 
and confirm their beliefs in the rationale of their investment process even when their 
performance is disappointing. If the investment outcome is perceived as favourable 
i.e. the fund outperforms the market or its benchmark, the manager takes credit for 
her investment strategies and (consciously or unconsciously) seeks to portray herself 
as the hero(ine) of the investment story. However, if things go wrong, the manager 
typically attempts to explain why the strategy is still right but external factors wrong-
                                                                 
26 In their study of CEO-speak, Amernic and Craig (2006) similarly argue that the words managers 
use “are not chosen in a perfunctory way to report s me objective reality. Rather, the words and 
language are powerful and seductive rhetorical imple ents for fashioning outlook and opinion.” 
Amernic, Joel, and Russel Craig, 2006. CEO-Speak: The language of corporate leadership (McGill-




footed the underlying processes, and in doing so she depicts herself often as the 
unfair or undeserving victim of a tragedy type investment story.  
 
5.4 NARRATIVES WRITTEN BY FUND MANAGERS: LOCATING ATTRIBUTION 
AND OVERCONFIDENCE 
Stories are important elements of sense making in organizations, among internal and 
external stakeholders. As Boje (1991) points out, “people engage in a dynamic 
process of incremental refinement of their stories of new events as well as on-going 
reinterpretations of culturally sacred story lines.” He also explains that the 
storytelling activity is sometimes political since “part of the collective processing 
involves telling different versions of stories to different audiences.”  
I make my entry into the rich literature of organizational storytelling by focussing on 
a generic framework for studying organizational narratives. This framework 
investigates three types of narrative coherence, namely, (1) argumentative-structural 
coherence which relates to the internal logic of the story being told, (2) material 
coherence which corresponds to the inclusion of all facts and counterarguments, and 
(3) characterological coherence which is concerned with the believability of the 
authors or the narrators. Shortcomings associated with either type of coherence may 
be a sign of bad writing or mental duress, but can also be interpreted in the context of 
impression management and/or self-serving attribution bias.  
From another perspective, Gabriel (2000) studies narratives by focussing on their 
literary implements through differentiating rhetorical from poetic implements (or 
tropes). Under rhetorical implements, Gabriel lists metaphors, metonymies, 
synecdoches, and ironies, while under poetic implements; the author lists eight types 
of attribution, namely, attribution of motive, causal connections, responsibility, unity,




significance.27 Gabriel points out that without these poetic implements, “no amount 
of symbolic, rhetorical, or narrative elaboration can be effective.”   
Further studies on close reading of financial and accounting narratives include the 
methodological recommendations for analysing CEO communication proposed by 
joint authors Amernic and Craig. For example, Amernic and Craig (2006) explore 
the metaphors and persuasive language used by a number of well-known business 
leaders in their book titled CEO-speak and show that CEOs are often portrayed as 
heroes fighting the “wars of business” who are capable of astonishing miracles of 
financial performance and reinvention. In a methodological paper, Craig and 
Amernic (2009) recommend that any attempt on close reading CEO narratives should 
reveal (1) the metaphors used by, (2) the ideology adhered to, (3) the rhetoric 
implemented by the CEO as well as any (4) critical ‘silences’, (5) dichotomies and 
(6) false distinctions made by the executives. Amernic, Craig and Tourish (2010) add 
to this list (7) the CEO’s mindset and (8) her attitude to risk exposure and risk 
management. 
While it can be argued that close reading of fund manager narratives should be 
similar to investigating CEO communication, some distinctions need to be 
highlighted. Understanding these differences is helpful in comparing nd contrasting 
the results of academic studies on these two related sets of textual data. 
Firstly, it is important to recognize that fund managers operate in one industry, the 
investment industry, whereas corporate executives operate in different industry 
sectors. Thus, compared to CEOs, one expects to find more homogeneity in the core 
stories, rhetorical dimensions, and the lexis used by fund managers in their 
narratives. This feature lends more validity to inter-sample comparisons of fund 
manager commentaries.  
                                                                 
27 Metaphor is a figure of speech in which an expression is used to refer to something that it does not 
literally denote in order to suggest a similarity. Metonymy is a figure of speech used in rhetoric in 
which a thing or concept is not called by its own name, but by the name of something intimately 
associated with that thing or concept. Synecdoche is a figure of speech by which a part of a thing is 
put for the whole, the whole for a part, the species for the genus, the genus for the species, or the name 
of the material for the thing made, and similar. Irony is a rhetorical device in which there is a sharp 




Secondly, fund managers typically invest in a wide range of securiti s in many 
different sectors, each with their own distinct features, resulting in a range of 
potentially different investment sub-stories. Therefore, arguably, the fund manager 
may be better positioned, compared to a corporate executive, to be able to engage in 
constructing a complex meta-narrative of several dimensions when reporting 
investment outcomes, and better equipped to make rationalizations, find scapegoats 
and engage in false attributions and dichotomies in case of poor performance. By 
engaging in this type of storytelling, the narrator can indeed rpresent accidental 
actions and events as necessary, thereby overestimating what Goffman (1974) 
describes as the “causal fabric of experience.”  
 
5.5 STRUCTURE OF THE NARRATIVE DATA USED IN THIS STUDY  
I draw my evidence to support the above hypotheses from a pool of fund manager 
commentaries sourced from the SEC Edgar database. My data includes mutual fund 
annual reports filed with SEC since 2003, the starting year for such mandatory 
disclosures. There are on average around 3000 mutual fund annual reports filed in
each of the sample years. I select a 2% random sample of these funds for further 
manual analysis, excluding passive funds. Hence, the fund manager commentaries 
that drive my anecdotal evidence consist of 60 actively-managed US equity mutual 
funds. 
The body of mutual fund annual reports filed in SEC Edgar typically consists of 
several sections, among which only the president’s letter and fund commentaries by 
individual fund managers contain non-quantitative information useful for the 
purposes of this study. Often, the president and the fund manager narrate different 
but complementary chapters of the investment story, which demonstrates the concept 
of contrasting narrators (Jameson, 2000). Since the individual fund managers are 
often solely responsible for making investment decisions, I believe the fund manager 
commentaries, compared to the president’s letter, are likely to provide more traction 
in understanding any relation between the manager’s state of mind and past or future 




picture of the investment company’s present circumstances, it is often too broad to be 
helpful for my study purposes. In contrast, the fund manager commentary is n 
information-rich section of the annual report which helps explain the past 
performance of the fund and portray its likely short-term and long-term future 
performance.  
Fund manager commentaries often include sections on investment strategy, market 
environment, discussion of past performance and the fund outlook. Although these 
sections of the commentary often follow each other to form a single arrative, 
sometimes, particularly in the face of underperformance, fund managers choose the 
sub-genre of question and answer to communicate to investors. In this format, the 
manager answers questions on a variety of issues often covering the abov  sections, 
which are then transcribed to form the commentary. An important feature of this 
narrative structure is the reduced distance between the narrator and the reader. As 
Jameson (2000) explains, the question-and answer sub-genre invites the reader to 
imagine himself or herself as the interviewer posing the questions o the narrator, and 
also permits the narrator to use a more informal tone of voice. Therefore, employing 
this sub-genre leads the reader to empathize with the narrator and possibly discount 
the subpar performance.    
It is important to emphasize that not all fund manager commentaries contain stories; 
rather some are purely factual and mostly concerned with performance figures in a 
narrative format. This may not be surprising given the fact that the funds have to file 
these official disclosures with the SEC. I, as in Gabriel (2000), distinguish between 
descriptions that deal with facts-as-information, and stories that deal with facts-as-
experience for both narrators and listeners. While in the former, th  chronicler is 








5.6 WHAT DO FUND NARRATIVES REVEAL ABOUT THE MANAGERS’ STATE 
OF MIND AND OVERCONFIDENCE: A CLOSE-READING APPROACH 
Combining the notion of narrative coherence with the close reading procedure 
recommended by Craig and Amernic (2009), I propose that critical reading of fund 
manager communication should involve a search for the following themes: 
1. Contextualization of the narrative: fund characteristics, performance history, 
overall market conditions 
2. Narrative’s structural-argumentative coherence: attribution of causality, 
evidence of self-serving attribution 
3. Narrative’s material coherence: critical silences, dichotomies and false 
distinctions 
4. Mindset and ideology of the narrator: attitude to risk and uncertainty, 
metaphors employed 
The above themes may be more effectively explored when looked at in conjunction 
with the generic story types (or poetic modes) proposed by Gabriel (2000), i.e. Epic, 
Tragic, Comic and Romantic. Of these four, the epic and tragic modes adequately 
represent most of the stories fund managers narrate in my sample. The characteristics 














Protagonist Hero Non-deserving victim 
Other characters Rescue object, assistant, villain Villain, supportive helper 
Plot focus 
Achievement, noble victory, 
success 
Undeserved misfortune, trauma 
Predicament 
Contest, challenge, trial, test, 
mission, quest, sacrifice 
Crime, accident, insult, injury, loss, 




2. Motive  
3. Credit  




1. Malevolent fate 
2. Blame 
3. Unity 
4. Motive (to the villain) 
5. Fixed qualities by 
juxtaposition 
Emotions 
Pride, admiration, nostalgia, 
(envy) 
Sorrow, pity, fear, anger, pathos 
 
Hence, I suggest a standard close reading procedure which provides the link between 
the fund’s prior performance and the story type used by the fund manager i  h r 
commentary. Depending on significant outperformance or underperformance relative 
to the fund’s benchmark and the underlying market conditions, four different 






5.6.1 THE EPIC UNIFYING THEME 
The common feature of narratives with an epic unifying theme is that fund managers 
writing such commentaries often attempt to attribute positive investm nt 
performance to their own investment ability, skill or talent, while ignoring or 
downplaying the role of favourable conditions in the macro-environment. The fund 
manager’s critical silences can be identified by observing what significant 
information on external factors conducive to positive performance happen to be
either completely “left out” from the investment story or downplayed in terms of 
importance.  
Epic stories are mostly commonly observed among funds that have outperf rmed 
their (self-designated) benchmarks in the fiscal year of the annual report. Their 
narrative features, however, differ slightly depending on the absolute valu  of fund 
returns. In my empirical analysis, I have developed two checklists tha  can be used in 
close reading these such narratives. The first checklist addresses narratives of funds 
that have outperformed their benchmarks in a favourable market (hereafter referred 
to as Type A commentaries) and the second checklist focuses on narratives of funds 
in an unfavourable market (hereafter referred to as Type B commentaries).  
 







Figure 9: Outperformance in an unfavourable market (Type B) 
I now proceed with evidence from a number of fund manager commentaries that 
represent the epic unifying themes and implement the above checklists. The 
following example is from a large-cap equity mutual fund that has m naged to 
outperform its benchmark in the year prior to the publication of the report (a Type A 
commentary): 
Against the fund’s benchmark S&P 500’s return of 26.46%, Disciplined 
Equity rewarded investors with a strong 32.50% gain. This was also ahead of 
its Lipper peer group, as the Lipper Large Cap Core Index rose 28.15%. 
With our portfolio currently allocated across S&P 500 sectors, the positive 
results against the S&P 500 and the Lipper Index were largely a function of 
our stock selection,28 as we were able to concentrate the fund in stocks which 
showed relative strength above their broader sector... Our goal is to own the 
highest quality companies we can in each sector of the market, a judgment 
made on an array of business metrics that boil down to a combination of 
attractive valuation and the ability to produce consistent, predictable 
earnings going forward. In many cases, this means selling a stock and 
replacing it with another we feel has greater potential... The market slump in 
the first quarter of the year did trouble us to some extent [but] the strength of 
                                                                 




our stock picking was evident in our outperformance in all ten S&P 500 
sectors... With strong sector by sector performance, our only weak spots 
were a handful of companies that underperformed over our course of 
ownership.   
                                (Madison Mosaic Disciplined Equity, 2009) 
The protagonist of this story is the fund’s management team (or fund manager) who 
supposedly delivered superior returns relative to their self-designated benchmark. 
The story can be characterised as being in the epic genre with the protagonist as 
hero. Inter alia, the plot revolves around the market slump in the first quarter which 
constitutes a challenge or trial , despite which the fund manager is able to outperform 
her benchmark, or achieve success or, implicitly, a noble victory through the agency 
of her ability and skill. What is communicated to the reader is the emotion of pride 
and implicitly an expectation of admiration for the achievement. 
In terms of causal attributions and critical silences, while I do not wish to imply that 
the fund manager’s description of the factors contributing to the fund’s superior 
performance is deceitful, I point out that no reference whatsoever is made to the 
generally favourable investment environment of 2009 as demonstrated by an almost 
uniform rise in S&P 500. Therefore, I conclude that the narrator is exercising critical 
silence on exogenous factors (the first instance). Another critical silence by the fund 
manager is revealed by the choice of benchmarks against whichthe fund manager 
measures relative performance. In the 2007 commentary on the same fund, the same 
fund manager writes: 
We were quite pleased to show a positive return of 9.05% for the period, 
nicely ahead of our S&P 500 benchmark, which was up 5.49%. We slightly 
trailed our official Lipper peer group, as the Lipper Flexible Portfolio Fund 
Index advanced 9.57%. However, as we have evolved our fund towards a 
more fully invested, all-sector approach, a truer comparison can be made 
with the Lipper Large-Cap Core Index, which was up 6.63%. With our 
portfolio currently allocated across S&P 500 sectors, the positive results 
against the S&P 500 were largely a function of our stock selection, while 
members of the Lipper Flexible Index may have had greater exposure to 
higher-returning asset classes, such as government bonds and foreign stocks. 




The 2007 commentary above displays the fund manager’s sati faction with her 
performance and implicit expectation of admiration in the similar context of the pic 
genre. The fund manager proposes in 2007 that the Lipper Large-cap Core index is 
the appropriate benchmark for the fund. However, this benchmark is up 39.3% in 
2009 and it appears that the manager strategically chooses not to menti n this fact 
(the second instance of critical silence). 
In addition, while the manager attributes most of the 2007 outperformance to stock-
selection, she rules out a similar possibility for members of the Lipper Flexible 
index, who are supposedly riding “higher-returning asset classes.” Also interesting is 
that the fund manager uses precisely the same attribution phrase to ref r to stock-
selection in both years which provides anecdotal support for my hypothesis at the 
writing style employed in the commentary is, to a large extent, a function of 
performance outcome ex post.   
In commentaries with an epic unifying theme, fund managers typically end their 
reports with positive, optimistic remarks. For example, this is how a growth-oriented 
fund manager described her outlook in 2006, just before experiencing a sharp decline 
in share prices: 
We believe the Fund’s growth holdings have above-average growth 
prospects. It is hard to imagine repeating the stellar gains of this fiscal year 
in the coming year, although we began 2006 with an expected earnings 
growth rate more than twice that of the S&P 500 Index. The valuation of the 
overall market appears reasonable after two years in which earnings grew 
faster than share prices.  
 (Jennison 20/20 Focus Fund, 2006) 
The following vignette is an example of a fund manager commentary where the fund 
has lost in absolute terms but still outperformed its benchmark (hence a Type B 
commentary).  
Even more positive was our relative performance in the market downturn of 
the full fiscal year ending June 30, 2009. While declining a significant 
18.77%, we provided a sizable cushion relative to our performance 
benchmarks - just at the time when it counted the most (from a risk 
perspective). The S&P 500 Index declined 26.21% for the fiscal year, and the 
Lipper Large-Cap Core Funds Index declined 25.69%. Primary reasons for 




way down, b) significant benefit from our “roughly equal weighted” indexing 
strategy, which performs particularly well in a precipitous market fall and 
recovery, c) a flight  to “blue chip” quality in the first three quarters of the 
fiscal year... 
                                                   (Blue Chip 35 Index Fund, 2009) 
In framing this paragraph as an epic story, the fund manager starts by emphasizing 
that the fund has achieved to outperform its benchmark, although in the negative 
domain. While the reader may expect some “matter-of-fact” explanation as to why 
the fund has experienced negative absolute returns, the fund manager is critically 
silent on this issue. Instead, the reader’s attention is drawn by the fund ma ager to 
the “sizable cushion” she has provided against the loss in benchmark.  
In terms of causal attributions, the use of such vague terms as “a slight tailwind” to 
convey an external attribution of performance renders the argument abiguous and 
borderline meaningless. The description of “the roughly equal weighted indexing 
strategy” makes it appear as if the manager has some skill in d vining the volatility 
and that it was not a coincidence that the “strategy” succeeded under thos  market 
conditions. Their “flight” to blue chip presumably in anticipation of adverse market 
conditions has the same implication. 
The following example is derived from the annual report of a value-oriented fund 
that has outperformed its benchmarks in 2004 (Type A commentary): 
During the twelve months ended September 30, 2004, Artisan International 
Value Fund returned 32.81% outperforming both the MSCI EAFE and MSCI 
EAFE Value Indices. The Fund’s return was driven by the strength of the 
team’s security selection [while] two consumer companies negatively 
influenced performance during the fiscal year... As we have written on a 
number of occasions, we are value investors and our sole focus is the 
purchase of shares in companies that are selling at a meaningful discount to 
our estimate of economic value. This process is a constant one and does not 
change based on any prevailing macroeconomic or stock market trend. Over 
time, we believe our success will be a function of how effectively w  value 
companies, and how disciplined we are at buying them at a discount to fair 
value, and selling them when they approach fair value... We invest in 
companies of all sizes based on valuation and company fundamentals. We 
believe that smaller companies outperformed large companies because their 
valuations were more depressed at the beginning of the year, exactly the 
reason for their presence in our portfolio. 




Here the fund manager embarks on a lengthy discussion of the fund’s inve ting 
processes and makes the usual personal attributions of causality which is a common 
feature of Type A commentaries. The fund manager proposes that her succ ss is best 
measured by how well she performs a number of tasks associated with being a 
portfolio manager. This of course “makes sense” to the fund manager but does not 
necessarily translate to investment returns for the clients, a point on which she 
manifests a critical silence. It is also interesting how the same fund manager seeks to 
explain the fund’s underperformance relative to benchmark in the following fiscal 
year: 
The most noticeable aspect of the equity markets during the second and third 
quarters of 2005 was the absence of investor conviction. Trading volumes 
were low, held down by both the normal summer trading doldrums and by 
the high level of economic and geopolitical uncertainty... The earnings of 
small companies are particularly vulnerable to shifts in economic 
conditions, and small-cap stock prices have historically reflected this 
vulnerability. Small caps were strong toward the end of 2004, and they 
became weak when investor sentiment changed. The July decline of growth 
stocks was particularly marked in the small-cap market. Despite a September 
surge by small-cap Internet stocks, the Russell 2500 Index (a broad small-cap 
index) was still negative at period-end. 
                           (Artisan International Value Fund, 2005) 
The fund manager portrays herself as the undeserving victim in the 2005 
commentary, by focusing on the numerous challenges she has had to face in that 
year. Lack of investor conviction, the uncertainty in the environment and the 
“summer trading doldrums” all qualify for implicit villains of the story. The stark 
contrast between the two narratives in explaining the behaviour of small-cap stocks 
indicates how the fund manager has changed her investment story based on 
performance relative to the benchmark. I will explore this point in more detail in the 
following section. 
5.6.2 THE TRAGIC UNIFYING THEME 
In narratives with a tragic unifying theme, one often observes intricate causal 
attributions to associate the fund’s underperformance with external factors beyond 
the fund manager’s control. The fund manager’s critical silences can be identified by 




relative performance happen to be either completely “left out” from the investment 
story or downplayed in terms of importance. These often include referenc s to 
excessive risk-taking or poor stock-selection, sector weighting and timing decisions.  
The following is a typical example: 
It has not been an easy year to make money in the market. The war in Irq, 
natural disasters, record gasoline and natural resource prices, and fears of 
inflation, recession, terrorism, etc., have largely offset the positive impact of 
strong earnings growth resulting in the choppy market we’ve endured for the 
past 2 years. 29                                          
       (Masters 100 Fund, 2006) 
Narratives with a tragic unifying theme are most commonly observed among funds 
that have underperformed their benchmarks in the fiscal year of the annual report. I 
study two separate scenarios here similar to the case of outperf rmance and propose 
two close reading checklists. First, I have developed the checklist in f gure 10 which 
focuses on narratives of funds that have underperformed their benchmarks in an 
unfavourable market (hereafter referred to as Type C commentaries). 
                                                                 
29 This can be contrasted with very few instances where fund managers appear to take some 
responsibility for their decisions, albeit cautiously, as in the example below: 
The Fund’s higher relative weight in the industrial sector proved to be a headwind for 
performance and lagged the benchmark by approximately 100 basis points.  The 
improvement in GDP during the year, which followed signs of increased industrial activity, 
did not translate to better stock price performance out of this group...  We’ve either been 
wrong or just early on our industrial sector positioning.  We will actively monitor signs of 
industrial activity and the earnings progress of each company and adjust the portfolio 
holdings accordingly.                              








Figure 10: Underperformance in an unfavourable market (Type C) 
 
The checklist in figure 11 focuses on narratives of underperforming funds in a 
favourable market (hereafter referred to as Type D commentaris). This type of 
narrative is relatively more complex since returns are ambiguous, among other 
reasons. Jameson (2000) explains that such narratives typically use a nonlinear 
structure, contrast narrators to dramatize ideas, embed various sub-genres, and 
complement verbal with visual discourse such that readers are led to participate in 
constructing the investment story. I add to this list a number of otherbservations. 
Type D commentaries share some elements of epic narratives, since the fund 
manager often happens to take credit for having delivered positive returns in absolute 
terms, and does sometimes portray herself as a hero in that context. Hence, as 
complex as it may sound, this type of commentary may be said to have a tragic-epic 





Figure 11: Underperformance in a favourable market (Type D) 
 
Reports with a tragic unifying theme tend to display numerous indirect or implicit 
mentions of performance detractors. Simple phrases such as “underperformance” or 
“poor performance” are often replaced by various euphemisms such as: “the fund 
faced a few clunkers”, “we had only a blemish on performance”, “our stock selection 
left something to be desired”, “the fund was caught up in some investments we rather 
like to forget”, “the fund experienced a slight headwind”, “the fund absorbed an 
opportunity cost”, etc. Using euphemisms, metaphors as well as colloquia  
(sometimes humorous) phrases in explaining poor performance can be interpreted in 
the sub-genre of tragic-comic stories, and often serves to confound or obfuscate the 
underlying bad news. The following is an example: 
Despite a fair amount of interim short-term return volatility, U.S. stock prices 
“marked time” for the ten month period. Equities were buoyed by a number 
of factors (e.g., low interest rates, relatively constrained inflation, strong 
housing markets, generally strong corporate profits and balance sheets, 
continued productivity gains, generally improving labor markets), but also 
were buffeted by a variety of concerns (e.g., the war in Iraq and other 
geopolitical matters, higher oil prices, generally subdued capital spending) 
that tended to gain the upper hand in terms of investor sentiment. 




Another common feature of commentaries with a tragic unifying theme is the slow 
and careful development of the plot. As opposed to epic commentaries where the 
good news of outperformance is immediately broken to the readers, in the tragic 
scenario the fund manager often sets the scene for the bad news aft r a long and 
detailed description of the disastrous environment in which the fund operated and the 
predicaments it faced. The actual bad news can be hidden among plenty of other 
potentially confusing information, as can be seen in the following example:    
Uncertainty in both equity and fixed income markets dominated this year. 
Volatility, which was slightly bolstered at the end of 2007, soared to 
unimagined heights through the 3rd quarter of 2008. This environment was 
due to a confluence of decelerating global growth, energy and commodity 
price inflation and ongoing credit turmoil. While energy and commodity 
prices have retracted from speculative levels, credit problems and 
recessionary pressures persist...  
Major U.S. equity indices declined more than 35% for the twelve months 
ended October 31, 2008. The S&P 500 Total Return Index was down -
36.09%, the Russell 3000® Index down -36.60%, the NASDAQ Composite 
down -39.81%, and international markets fared worse, with the Morgan 
Stanley Capital International (MSCI) All Country World Index ex U.S. 
returning -48.53%. By contrast, bond indices were barely positive, with the 
12-month return of the Barclays Capital Aggregate Bond Index at 0.30% and 
the Merrill Lynch U.S. Corporate, Government and Mortgage Index 
up 0.70%. 
All four Pro-Blend Series continue to outperform over the current stock 
market cycle with solid absolute returns for long term investors. However, 
the one-year performance results versus the market and benchmarks were 
mixed for the year ended October 31, 2008 with the Pro-Blend Conservative 
Term Series and the Pro-Blend Maximum Term Series holding up slightly 
better than their blended benchmarks and the Pro-Blend Moderate Term 
Series and Extended Term Series underperforming... 
(Pro-Blend Series, 2008) 
Notice that only in the third paragraph and after a lengthy discussion of the how 
different benchmarks indices have performed is something written about the actual 
funds in question. No matter how negative and sometimes frightening a description 
fund managers provide of their operating environment in the face of poor 
performance, they typically end their narrative with a note of optimism or at least no 
major concern for the future. This is how the same fund manager ended her 




While volatility can be difficult to endure, it also provides investmen  
opportunities for those who maintain a disciplined individual security 
selection process. Our bottom-up process, focused on longer-term trends, 
solid fundamental analysis, and time-tested investment strategies, is well 
suited to this type of environment. 
       (Pro-Blend Series, 2007) 
The paragraph below is how a fund manager ended her 2006 commentary. In 2007, 
however, the fund suffered from a negative performance of -4.52% compared to a 
7.72% rise in its benchmark, the S&P 500 index: 
After three years of watching the companies in our portfolio grow earnings at 
double digit rates, but with little or no return to shareholders, it is refreshing 
to see the Fund beginning to perform better. In fact, we believe that we re 
entering a “catch up” period where our holdings should outperform both 
their respective fundamentals and the S&P 500 Index. Because of this, we 
look forward to the next year with optimism and continue to appreciate 
your support of our strategy through your holdings in the Fund.  
           
                (Thompson Plumb Growth Fund, 2006) 
In framing her story in the tragic genre, the fund manager of the above fund appeals 
to the emotions of the clients in the hope of maintaining their trust in the fund. The 
manifestation of pathos is a characteristic feature of stories with a tragic unifying 
theme.   
The following narrative is an example of a fund that has outperformed one 
benchmark and underperformed another. In this example, the fund manager labels 
the 0.88% outperformance compared to the primary benchmark “quite an 
accomplishment”, and blames the size “headwind” for the lower performance 
relative to the fund’s peer benchmark.   
 For the six months ending June 30, 2009, our Fund appreciated 4.04%, 
beating our primary market benchmark - quite an accomplishment in a 
market dominated by small- and mid-size stocks - but lagging our peer 
benchmark. The S&P 500 Index rose 3.16%, and the Lipper Large-Cap Core 
Funds Index rose 5.35%. Considering we had a “headwind” of almost two 
percentage points due to the size of our holdings versus our primary market 
benchmark, we are quite pleased.      





The self-admiration expressed in this vignette is a characteristic emotion associ ted 
with such commentaries. The “sailing” and “flying” metaphors employed here are 
commonly used by fund managers to describe their investment strategies in their 
commentaries. This may signal an unconscious need on the part of the fund manager 
to believe in “the ability to control and change direction” in what is essentially a 
highly unpredictable environment. 
The following excerpt is another example of a fund underperforming its benchmark 
in a favourable market (a Type D commentary). The narrative is interesting due to 
subtle critical silences of the fund manager: 
For the 12 months ended October 31, 2009, the S&P 500 Index finished with 
a return of 9.80% while the average large-cap blend fund monitored by 
Morningstar, Inc. recorded an average 11.86% result... In the same 12-month 
period, John Hancock Sovereign Investors Fund’s Class A shares returned 
8.75% at net asset value. During the market’s declining phases, the Fund 
outperformed its benchmark, as investors were on the defensive and focused 
on the kind of mega-cap, high-quality, dividend-paying stocks the Fund 
typically owns. However, the Fund lost ground versus the benchmark when 
share prices turned higher and investors adopted a more speculative 
approach, favoring lower-quality names with smaller capitalizations.  
              (Sovereign Investor’s Fund, 2009) 
In terms of causal attributions, the fund manager starts by focusing on the period 
during the prior year when the fund was outperforming its benchmark but stops hort 
of attributing this event to their superior stock selection. Rather, she portrays the fund 
as almost having a mind of its own that chooses to “typically own” certain stocks. 
This defensive explanation is subsequently used in the next statement to help the 
fund manager avoid taking responsibility when the market changes to a m re 
speculative mode. Therefore, the critical silence by the manager is on the actual 
reasons leading to the fund’s underperformance, possibly including poor decisions on 
stock selection, sector weighting, timing, etc. 
In seeking to explain underperformance and (consciously or unconsciously) 
obfuscating bad news, fund managers sometimes draw the readers’ attention to the 
fund’s performance potentials in the long term, which of course is an ambiguous 




The fiscal year was truly a tale of two markets. During the first four months 
of the fiscal year, equity markets experienced steep declines as severe 
problems in the credit markets, a rapidly weakening housing market, rising 
energy and food prices and a deteriorating outlook for corporate earnings 
led to a global economic recession. However, equity markets rapidly reversed 
direction beginning in March 2009 and rallied solidly through most of the 
remaining months in the fiscal year. 
However, the Fund began to underperform the Russell 1000 Growth Index 
when equity markets hit a bottom and began to rebound in March 2009. It is 
important to note that while our investment process may temporarily 
underperform our peers at market inflection points, our goal is to 
outperform over a full market cycle. 
(AIM Large Cap Growth Fund, 2009) 
The fund (manager) is again portrayed as the undeserving victim in this story, and the 
villain is supposedly the market with all its underlying uncertainty. Although the 
overall performance of the fund lags its benchmark, the dichotomy used by the fund 
manager to split the fund’s performance in two separate sub-narratives aids the 
reader in discounting the inferior performance. This phenomenon is explained by the 
mental splitting which occurs when subjects simultaneously analyse two pieces of 
contradictory information. Similarly, in the following Type D vignette, the fund 
manager is faced with the problem of justifying underperformance relative to 
benchmark: 
The financial statements that make up the Annual Report give us an 
opportunity to review what has happened and gain some insight into what 
may happen. For the twelve months ending September 30th 2006, the Growth 
& Income Fund was up 5.40%. This was below the S&P 500 Index which was 
up 10.79%. Although the return for the last year was below average, a 
review of the last three years shows the Growth & Income Fund to be 
competitive, up an average of 11.26% per year. This compares with the Dow 
Jones and S&P 500 which had annual average returns of 10.02% and 
12.30% respectively over the last three years. 
It is always a tug-of-war in the securities markets with the negative forces of 
geopolitical   events, natural disasters and corporate corruption pushing 
securities down. This is countered by man's desire to grow, achieve, and 
innovate. The good news is that in the long run, the positives have prevailed... 
Our investment story has been, and continues to be, that the negatives are 
more than offset by a strong US economy and record corporate profits. Our 
optimistic investment outlook goes beyond the US border...   






The above fund manager avoids having to explain the fund’s underperformance by 
engaging in another dichotomy, this time between the fund’s prior one-year and the 
prior three-year record. The villains of the story are again the uncontrollable market 
forces which one can always blame for anything that has gone wrong. The fund 
manager also employs the “fighting” metaphor to stress the role of external factors. 
In the last paragraph, the fund manager takes on the mantle of a tacher explaining to 
the reader how securities markets generally operate, prior to ending the narrative 
with a rather uncalled-for and prophetic note of optimism.   
 
5.7 CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, by analysing fund manager commentaries using the “clos  reading” 
methodology, I demonstrated how self-attribution bias and overconfidence are 
manifest in these narratives and how the former often drives the lat er. By manually 
coding a random sample of fund manager reports in the spirit of Jameson (2000), I 
identified different “story types” embedded in fund manager narratives and 
established connections among these stories and the funds’ past investment 
performance. Finally, I used the results to explain the sense-making process of 
professional investors in their very unique work environment.  
 
The research results help explain how fund managers often engage in telling
“stories” to their clients in order to help construct their identity, justify their added 
value and cope with the enormous pressures of a highly unpredictable and stressful 
working environment. A common set of unifying themes i.e. epic and tragic, as well 
as a number of sub-themes, motivate the stories that fund managers ess ntially 
narrate in their commentaries. Fund managers adjust, both consciously and 
unconsciously, the theme of the investment story, elements of the plot, critical 
silences, the tone of voice used, the readability of their narratives, th  level of 
obfuscation and other narrative features ex post depending on their investment 




commentaries help fund managers explain what they do, both to themselves and to 
their clients, and maintain conviction in their performance and processes against the 






























In this chapter, I empirically investigate how past investment r sults influence fund 
manager report tone and readability which are closely associated wi h fund manager 
overconfidence. I focus on the way fund managers set out to communicate financial 
performance to their clients and potentially engage in impression ma agement. 
Unlike the previous chapter which employed a close-reading methodology, this 
chapter adopts a corpus-linguistic approach facilitated by large-scale computer-
assisted analysis of textual data. By studying the corpus-linguistic features of fund 
manager reports, I demonstrate how different groups of fund managers develop the 
core message in their narratives in very different way (i.e. genres) in light of past 
performance.  
This chapter also explores how my selected overconfidence proxies (which I have 
derived directly from DICTION) are affected by prior investment performance. This 
step sets the scene for the following chapter which investigates the potential impact 
of overconfidence on subsequent investment returns. Hence, I test the following two 
null hypotheses in this chapter: 
- There is no significant difference in the tone/readability of fund manager 
commentaries whose corresponding funds have experienced varying 
degrees of past investment performance, ceteris paribus.    
- There is no significant difference in the optimism/certainty/self-reference 
attributes of fund managers whose corresponding funds have experienced 
varying levels of prior investment performance, ceteris paribus.   
I start this chapter by presenting, in section 6.2, some evidence on the systematic 
study of annual reports in the area of accounting and finance. Section 6.3 explores 
the fund manager commentaries in the sample from the perspective of th  genre 




manager. Section 6.4 focuses on the readability of the commentaries in light of 
different prior performance outcomes. Section 6.5 investigates the effect of past 
returns on optimism, certainty and self-reference (overconfidence proxies) across 
fund manager reports. Finally, section 6.6 summarises and concludes the chapter.  
 
6.2 SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING NARRATIVES 
The importance of studying finance and accounting narratives is illustrated by the 
growing emphasis on the objectivity of accounting literature as a me ns of 
communicating financial performance. The narratives dealt with in this research, 
including commentaries on evaluation of past performance, justifying present 
investment circumstances and expressing opinion on the investment outlook, merit 
close attention as they all are, according to Gabriel (2000), essential parts of the 
organizational sense-making process among various stakeholders.  
The annual report is the main medium used in the current study to research narratives 
prepared by professional investment houses. In terms of structure and intended 
purpose, investment company annual reports are reasonably comparable to corporate 
annual reports produced and filed as formal public documents by large companies in 
most western economies. Stanton and Stanton (2002) cite a study which 
demonstrates that corporate annual reports have become “a highly sophisticated 
product of the corporate design environment, the main purpose of which is to 
proactively construct a particular visibility and meaning rather an revealing what 
was there.” This is consistent with the inherent reflexivity of language, i.e. language 
both mirrors and constructs (construes) reality in a desired way Fairclough and Holes 
(1995). In other words, as Hines (1988) suggests, people create a picture of an 
organization, they think and act on the basis of that picture, and “by responding to 
that picture of reality, they make it so.”  
There exists a substantial body of literature examining corporate annual reports from 
various perspectives. Researchers often investigate sections of, or even the whole 
annual report and focus on themes such as impression (image) manageme t, 




and Stanton (2002) provide a comprehensive review of this vast literature by 
categorizing 70 of the most important “useable studies” in the field. The focus of 
these studies has been extremely wide, with no one particular area dominating the 
attention of the cited authors.  
The annual report studies that investigate narratives and stories app ar to agree on a 
number of shared patterns: the way a story is told by the narrator, as well as what the 
story says, both matter. Linguistic theory provides “a range of language choices and 
constructions that report preparers can use to pursue their goals without 
misinformation or complex language” (Stanton and Stanton, 2002) and, as such, the 
choice of verb structures, themes, subjects, context, cohesion and condensations all 
determine meaning, as Thomas (1997) explains. Just as importantly, narrative 
theories discuss different sets of factors that influence meaning, (Stanton and 
Stanton, 2002). These include the sources of meaning, the narrative structure, the 
reader interaction with the text, the existence of different narrators and different 
genres (modes of narration e.g. epistles, lessons, sermons, essays and question-and-
answer dialogues). In addition, the coherence of the narrative is highly relevant to 
this discussion. Ihlen (2002) explains three types of narrative coherence, namely, (1) 
argumentative-structural coherence which relates to the internal logic of the story 
bring told, (2) material coherence which corresponds to the inclusion of all facts and 
counterarguments, and (3) characterological coherence which is concerned with the 
believability of the authors or narrators.   
Prior research also seems to agree on the fact that language is often used to obfuscate 
the bad news and thus blur distinctions on the causes of poor performance. Courtis
(2004) defines obfuscation as “a narrative writing technique that obscures the 
intended message, or confuses, distracts or perplexes readers, leaving them 
bewildered or muddled.” Narrators often achieve this effect through “the use of 
esoteric or obscurantist vocabulary and/or gobbledygook, extraneous and non-
relevant information, long sentences with complex grammatical structures and/or 
high variability in reading ease, and convoluted and/or spurious argumentation.” 
More streamlined studies on financial and accounting narratives include the 




Amernic (2001) and Amernic, Craig and Tourish (2010). The former study states that 
any attempt at “close reading” CEO narratives should reveal (1) the metaphors used 
by, (2) the ideology adhered to, and (3) the rhetoric implemented by the CEO as well 
as any (4) critical ‘silences’, (5) dichotomies and (6) false distinctions made by the 
executive. The latter study add to this list (7) the CEO’s mindset and (8) the CEO’s 
attitude to risk exposure and risk management. 
In brief, the broad spectrum of perspectives used to investigate annual reports can be 
understood in the light of managerial incentives and the audience of these reports. 
Stanton and Stanton (2002) aptly summarize this point: 
“Whether an annual report is written from the perspective of seeking to 
reduce the effects of events perceived to be unfavourable to a 
corporation’s image, or as a proactive document seeking outcomes that 
advance the corporation’s or management’s objectives, reflects a 
division between the pursuit of legitimacy and corporate social 
responsibility on the one hand, and political economy, image 
management and marketing interpretations on the other. Accordingly, 
preparers presumably select and organise their material in terms of the 
kind of audience they seek to address.” 
 
In either case, managers are equipped with an increasingly “complex arsenal of 
communication tools” including selection and integration of narratives, language, 
images, graphs etc. to create, what Jameson (2000) calls, a hyperstructu e that 
effectively engages the audience as part of the story. Finally, it is important not to 
forget that the narrator is a hidden audience to her own story.     
 
6.3 ANALYSING GENRE AND TONE OF FUND MANAGER COMMENTARIES IN 
LIGHT OF PAST INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE 
This section investigates mutual fund annual reports from the perspective of genre 
theory. The notion of genre is grounded in organizational communications. Miller
(1984) defines genre as “typified rhetorical actions based in recurrent situations.” 
Genres exist at different levels of abstraction, and can be identif ed in very broad as 




section of UK corporate annual reports (also known as the Operating and Financial 
Review or OFR) as a middle-range genre of corporate communications between 
organizations and their stakeholders. In a similar way, I argue in this section that the 
commentary provided by the mutual fund manager can be treated as an imp ctful 
genre of corporate communication between the fund manager and the investors with 
its own distinct sub-genres. I use word-frequency analysis to demonstrate which sub-
genres exist in fund manager narratives and discuss their links to past and expected 
future investment performance. 
Word-frequency analysis is part of an increasingly versatile and modern 
methodological toolbox in corpus linguistics. As an empirical methodology, corpus 
linguistics seeks to analyse actual patterns of language use by employing a large, 
systematically organized body of texts known as the corpus (Rutherford, 2005). It 
can be used in textual analysis to distinguish between different genres, as well as 
explore features of individual genres. In the context of this research, word-frequency 
analysis is primarily used to identify the different sub-genres used in the fund 
manager’s communication of performance results. 
The sample used in this chapter consists of all actively-managed equity mutual funds 
with unique managers and complete returns data during 2003-09 that have significant 
fund manager commentaries in their annual reports. This corresponds to sample B in 
chapter 4 which comprises 1006 funds in total and, correspondingly, 1006 fund 
manager commentaries for each of the seven years from 2003 to 2009. The average 
length of each fund manager commentary is 692 words (about two pages). Th refore, 
on average, the whole corpus under study consists of around 700,000 words for each 
year. 
I look at the trend of certain corpus-linguistic features of fund manager 
commentaries throughout this period, and, in particular, focus on 2006 and 2008. The 
reason for selecting these two years is that they are, to a large extent, polar opposite 
snapshots of the overall economic environment of the mutual fund industry, a 
proxied by leading market indices (see Appendix 5). In other words, while 2006 is a 
sufficiently good proxy for a bullish year with regards to the US and global financial 




Based on the fund’s broad investment style reported in the CRSP database nd 
denoted by the fund’s Lipper Objective Code, I subdivide the sample funds into two 
categories of Value-oriented and Growth-oriented funds. Value-oriented funds (also 
known as Income-oriented funds) normally seek a high level of current income 
through investing in income-producing stocks, bonds, and money market 
instruments, and they consist of 277 funds in my sample. Growth-oriented funds
normally invest in companies with long-term earnings expected to grow significantly 
faster than the earnings of the stocks represented in the major unmanaged stock 
indices. My sample includes 382 funds in this category. I delete thos funds whose 
objective codes change during 2003 and 2009 (around 8% of the sample). 
 
I also divide the funds, based on prior-year absolute annual returns into loss-making 
(negative return), least-profitable (bottom decile positive return) and most profitable 
(top decile positive return) categories. The number of funds in each category changes 
during the sample years. Finally, I divide the funds based on size (total net assets) 
into the smallest (bottom decile) and largest (top decile) categories. Hence, I end up 
with seven categories for the purpose of corpus-linguistic analysis. 
The first stage of the analysis explores the frequency of eligible words across all the 
sample annual reports. Similar to the methodology used by Rutherford (2005), the 
following word groups are excluded from the analysis in order to make a list of 
eligible words: (1) frequently occurring grammatical elements such as articles, 
conjunctions, pronouns, and common verbs; (2) days, months and years; (3) 
numbers, including monetary amounts, in words, figures and denominations. 
Rutherford also manually removes specific company and product names, but this is 
clearly not feasible in my much larger sample. However, these specific words should 
not introduce any significant bias in my analysis as they often include the name of 
the fund discussed in each commentary and therefore, in aggregate, are not expected 
to appear among high-frequency words. 
The word-frequency analysis is performed using the Concordance software. 
Concordance is a powerful program which is primarily used, as its name suggests, to 




functions. Importantly, Concordance is capable of analyzing text files with unlimited 
length.  
Table 6 lists the average 50 most frequently used eligible words ac o s the sampled 
commentaries. I have merged all the fund manager commentaries to arrive at a single 
master corpus document for each year. Then, I have used Concordance to calculate 
the highest-frequency words in each year and then averaged the results across the 




















Table 6: Highest frequency eligible words used across fund manager commentaries in an 
average sample year 
Instances Frequency Word  Instances Frequency Word 
11312 1.63% Fund  2113 0.30% Holdings 
9323 1.34% We  1989 0.29% Opportunities 
7086 1.02% Year  1865 0.27% Current 
5967 0.86% Market  1865 0.27% Information 
5594 0.80% Performance  1740 0.25% Fiscal 
4973 0.71% Funds  1740 0.25% Fund's 
4973 0.71% Growth  1740 0.25% Industry 
3605 0.52% Investment  1740 0.25% Long-term 
3232 0.46% Interest  1740 0.25% Positive 
3232 0.46% Stock  1616 0.23% Inflation 
3108 0.45% Index  1616 0.23% Period 
3108 0.45% Sector  1492 0.21% Economic 
3108 0.45% Stocks  1492 0.21% Profit(s) 
2984 0.43% Companies  1492 0.21% New 
2984 0.43% Consumer  1492 0.21% Returns 
2984 0.43% Economy  1492 0.21% Return 
2859 0.41% Strong  1492 0.21% Services 
2859 0.41% Years  1367 0.20% Products 
2735 0.39% S&P  1367 0.20% Returned 
2735 0.39% Technology  1367 0.20% Shareholder 
2611 0.38% Prices  1304 0.19% Loss(es) 
2362 0.34% Past  1243 0.18% Because 
2362 0.34% Portfolio  1243 0.18% Business 
2362 0.34% Value  1243 0.18% Data 
2238 0.32% Believe  1243 0.18% Earnings 





The word “fund” is the most frequently used word in the corpus closely followed by 
the pronoun “we”. This is an interesting observation as the higher occu rence of the 
latter relative to the former may be an alternative proxy for self-reference and 
possibly even fund manager narcissism. Therefore, I define a simple “narcissism” 
ratio by dividing the number of “we” instances by the number of “fund” i stances for 
each narrative. For the whole sample, this “narcissism” ratio is equal to 0.824.30 
Higher values of the ratio (particularly more than 1.016 which is one standard 
deviation larger than its mean) can signal fund manager narcissisti  tendencies. As 
expected, this ratio is highly correlated (0.831) with my standard self-reference 
measure which looks at the frequency of all first-person singular and plural 
pronouns. 
Figure 12 shows the word length chart of the average fund manager commentary in 
the corpus. The average word length is 6.8 characters and four-character long words 
are the most frequently used in the narratives. I will revisit this statistic in a 
longitudinal study to explore the dynamic readability and verbosity of fund manger 
commentaries.    
 
Figure 12: Word length chart of the average fund manager commentary 
 
                                                                 
30 The researcher has observed that fund managers often tend to refer to their own fund under 
management in singular format and the competition or the industry in plural. Hence, instances of the 




Next, I investigate the linguistic features of the fund manager commentaries through 
the sample years. It is important to bear in mind that the mutual fund industry 
experienced two rather distinct economic macro-environments during the sample 
period, i.e. the “bullish” years of 2003-2006 and the “bearish”, volatile years of 
2007-2009. In this context, it is interesting to observe the impact of these external 
environmental factors on the lexical features of fund manager reports. Table 7 
demonstrates a number of these measures and also lists the 10 most frequently used 
words in the commentaries each year. 
 
Table 7: Corpus-linguistic features of fund manager commentaries through the sample years 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Total words 
(“tokens”) 594 552 636 679 729 795 860 
Distinct words  
(“types”) 2049 1833 2232 2370 2223 2202 2511 
Type-token  
ratio 3.45 3.32 3.51 3.49 3.05 2.77 2.92 
Words  
per sentence 9.8 10.2 9.5 11.0 12.4 13.9 13.5 
Characters  
per word 5.7 6.4 6.1 7.0 6.9 7.9 7.6 
        
We We We Fund Fund Fund Fund 
Fund Fund Fund We We We We 
Performance Growth Performance Year Market Year Market 
Growth Investment Strong Performance Index Market Year 
Year Performance Growth Strong Economy Index Economy 
Stock Strong Investment Growth Investment Economy Funds 
Strong Stocks Believe Funds Because Sector Index 
Believe Market Market Higher Performance Value Investment 





















A number of interesting observations can be made by looking at Table 7. During the 
“bullish” years, with the exception of 2006, fund managers more frequently r fer to 
themselves by mentioning “we” rather than the “fund”, while the reverse pattern 
emerges during the “bearish” years. The difference in word frequencies is significant 
at the 5% level using the t-test with unequal variance.  
 
Similarly, fund managers appear to write more frequently about their often “strong” 
record of “performance” or “growth” during the pre-2007 years. On the contrary, 
during the 2007-2009 period, fund managers make more frequent citations of the 
“market” as well as the “economy”, possibly for the self-serving purpose of 
projecting relatively less glorious performance on environmental externali ies.  
 
The word “because” makes two interesting appearances in the 10 highest-frequency 
words in 2007 and 2008. This can possibly be attributed to the fund manager’s 
preference to “talk herself out” of explaining an undesirable investment outcomes by 
advancing more causal arguments.31 The word “index” is also cited more frequently 
during the “bearish” years, for the likely reason of making relative performance 
comparisons. 
 
Figure 13 shows a plot of the linguistic variables reported in Table 7 across the 
sample years. Apart from a rather steady rise in the average length of the fund 
manager commentaries across the sample years, the narratives in h  post-2007 years 
appear to have, on average, longer sentences composed of longer words. In ad itio , 
the type-token ratio (ratio of distinct words to total words) is relatively lower during 
the “bearish” years, which, together with the above patterns, seemto suggest that 
fund managers write longer, more verbose and less readable commentaries when 
communicating less desirable performance results. 
                                                                 
31 Li (2008) demonstrates that a higher frequency of causation words (such as “because”) in the 
Management Discussion and Analysis of corporate annu l reports is associated with less persistent 





Figure 13: Some linguistic features of fund manager commentaries across the sample years 
 
Finally, I investigate the frequencies of individual keywords across different 
categories similar to the methodology in Rutherford (2005). In making these pair-
wise comparisons, I use the Mann-Whitney U test, a powerful, noncategorical, 
nonparametric test of between-subject differences, to find the differenc s between 
frequencies that are significant at the 5% level. Table 8 shows the frequencies of 
individual words on the consolidated 50 highest-frequency wordlist where tare 
significant differences in frequency among the seven groups of mutual funds. The 
word-frequencies reported in Table 8 are averaged across the sample years and 










Table 8: Word-frequency analysis of different fund categories 
 Word frequencies per 10,000 words 























































































































Market 105.6 70.4 54.6 64.0 98.8 79.3 82.1 86.2 * *  *  
Performance 65.2 90.1 102.9 85.5 79.9 66.4 81.3 79.7 *  *   
Growth 60.6 85.8 99.2 84.7 66.2 40.8 105.5 71.1   * * * 




Strong 37.2 43.0 49.1 35.5 39.8 30.3 48.9 40.8   *   
Higher 28.8 37.0 38.0 32.4 32.9 28.1 33.6 32.5 *  *   
Positive 20.0 30.9 35.5 22.0 24.4 20.4 27.6 24.5   *  * 
Profit(s) 34.1 16.7 35.9 21.7 24.4 18.0 21.3 21.4 * *    




Fund(s) 311.0 251.5 189.5 245.4 235.5 229.9 231.0 234.4 *  *   
We 76.6 135.1 199.0 145.2 151.7 156.7 125.4 133.7   *   
Other terms  
Opportunities 39.1 29.0 28.5 25.5 27.2 20.3 32.8 29.2   *  * 
Long term 40.4 32.5 21.4 25.9 22.2 21.3 28.3 25.0 *     
Because 30.6 25.2 15.9 14.4 20.3 19.6 26.9 18.3 *  *   




With regards to financial terms, the word “market” is more frequently used among 
funds with negative absolute returns, and the least profitable funds in the positive 
return category. The same pattern holds for the word “economy”. Although no firm 
conclusion can be drawn from this observation, it seems to suggest that fund 
managers, in aggregate, refer to the market and the economy as external performance 
detractors in a self-serving way, which is consistent with the an cdotal evidence 
based on close-reading mutual funds in Chapter 5. The frequency of use fr “index” 
yields a similar conclusion, i.e. fund managers tend to make benchmark comparisons 
more frequently when performance is in the negative domain, and in doing s  they 
strategically shift the reader’s attention away from the fact that they have lost money 
by investing in the fund.  
In contrast, the word “performance” is used more often by the mostpr fi able funds 
and less so by least profitable funds and loss-making funds. This can be due to the 
same self-serving attribution bias that leads fund managers to take own rship of 
favourable performance results. Not surprisingly, the term “growth” is used more 
frequently by growth-oriented funds, but also more so by most profitable funds. It is, 
however, difficult to attach significance to the latter, since “growth” may refer to a 
rise in assets as well as returns, both in the past fiscal year and the anticipated future. 
Continuing on to performance terms, we can observe that the triad of “strong”, 
“higher” and “positive” is used more frequently by the most profitable funds. 
However, the least profitable funds, and even loss-making funds do not use these 
terms much less frequently. This may be associated with the tendency of fund 
managers to report negative news in the false positive format (i.e. “the fund did not 
benefit from positive performance” instead of “our returns were negative”). In fact, 
the usage frequency of the word “not” is itself suggestive of the well-documented 
Pollyanna effect which can be defined as “the universal human tendency to use 
evaluatively positive words more frequently and diversely than evaluatively negative 
words in communicating” (Boucher and Osgood, 1968). With regards to the usage of 
“profit(s)” and “loss(es)”, our results are similar to Rutherford (2005). Loss-making 
funds refer to profits more frequently than to losses, and they even make ore 




the Pollyanna hypothesis. I will test the Pollyanna hypothesis more robustly later in 
this section. 
The use of self-reference terms in the commentaries is consistent with the pattern 
observed in the longitudinal study in Table 8. In other words, loss-making funds tend 
to use the term “fund” much more frequently than “we” while they bgin to refer to 
themselves using a personal pronoun when performance improves. This is, of course, 
a clear manifestation of the self-serving attribution bias inherent, more or less, in all 
economic agents, and by extension, in professional investors. 
Finally, some other terms in Table 8 merit attention. Loss-making fund managers, 
compared to their counterparts who have returned a profit, tend to talk more
frequently about lost “opportunities” as well “opportunities” for growth in the future. 
The same applies to growth-oriented funds versus value-oriented funds. Loss-making 
funds managers also cite “long term” more frequently in comparison. Both of these 
observations may suggest the same strategy of focusing the reader’s tt ntion on 
more positive messages. In addition, the word “because” is used more often in the 
negative domain, for the likely purpose of advancing causal arguments to justify sub-
par performance. This observation is also consistent with the anecdotal evidence 
provided in Chapter 5.    
Several of the observations based on Table 8 suggest the existence of the Pollyanna 
effect which refers to the general tendency to agree with positive statements about 
oneself. I aim to test this hypothesis more robustly in my large sample using a list of 
positive and negative words provided in Henry (2008). The list is extensively used in 
recent studies such as Loughran and McDonald (2010) and Craig, Amernic and 






Figure 14: List of positive and negative words, from Henry (2008) 
 
I search for instances of the above positive and negative words in the study corpus 
using the same categories of funds in terms of performance, i.e. loss-making, least 
profitable and most profitable. In addition, similar to Rutherford (2005), I explore 
two relevant categories. The first category is “up” words which generally connote 
growth or elevation and include “higher” “increase”, “increased”, “more”, “over” 
and “up”. The second category is “down” words which include “decrease”, 
“decreased”, “lower”, “reduced” and “reduction”. The word frequencies ar  averaged 
across all the sample years and normalised for a document length of 10,000 words. 







Table 9: Word-frequency analysis of positive and negative tone 


















625.6 618.1 735.2 626.5  * * 
Negative 
words 
251.0 260.5 187.8 255.4   * 
“up” words 118.5 115.3 129.7 120.2  *  
“down” 
words 
52.8 51.0 37.5 45.7   * 
 
The results reported in Table 9 suggest that positive words are more often used in 
fund manager commentaries than negative words (almost 2.4 times as much, which 
is slightly less than the 3 times proportion Rutherford (2005) found for corporate 
annual reports), which is another clear manifestation of the Pollyanna effect. What is 
more, this effect is stronger among loss-making funds compared to l ast profitable 
funds, i.e. the fund managers in the former group tend to use more positive words in 
order to “sugarcoat” the undesirable message they have to communicate to their 
clients in the commentaries. The results for “up” words and “down” words are 
similar.  
In this section, I demonstrated that key differences exist in the tone and genre of fund 
manager commentaries whose corresponding funds have experienced varying 
degrees of past investment performance. In the following section, I l ok at a closely 
related concept: readability. The objective is to understand how the readability of 







6.4 THE READABILITY OF FUND MANAGER COMMENTARIES IN LIGHT OF 
PRIOR PERFORMANCE 
This section explores the issue of readability of mutual fund annual reports and its 
links with current and expected future investment performance. Readability is 
measured using the well-known Flesch index as well as the more appropriate Plain 
English index popularized by Loughran and McDonald (2010). First, I begin by 
explaining the general concept of readability in accounting and finance literature. 
6.4.1 THE CONCEPT OF READABILITY IN FINANCIAL COMMUNICATION 
Readability is an important topic in financial communication. If the intended 
audience of financial disclosures face difficulty in understand their content, the 
whole process of financial communication may be rendered ineffective. Warren 
Buffet, one of the greatest investors of our times, describes his own occasional 
challenge in comprehending financial disclosures:  
“There are several possible explanations as to why I and others sometimes 
stumble over an accounting note or indenture description. Maybe we simply 
don’t have the technical knowledge to grasp what the writer wishes to 
convey. Or perhaps the writer doesn’t understand what he or she is talking 
about. In some cases, moreover, I suspect that a less-than-scrupulous issuer 
doesn’t want us to understand a subject it feels legally obligated to touch 
upon.”          
          (The SEC Plain English Handbook, 1998) 
The concept of readability is defined in a number of different ways. While 
readability generally denotes the ease and speed at which a text can be read and 
understood, some definitions stress the context-dependency of this construct. In other 
words, the degree to which certain groups of individuals can comprehend a given 
text illustrates the readability level for that particular audience. (see Jones and 
Shoemaker (1994), Hargis, Hernandez, Hughes, Ramaker, Rouiller and Wilde
(1998), and Clatworthy and Jones (2001) among others). 
In the context of annual reports, prior research has investigated the links between 
annual report readability and both current as well as future performance. In terms of 
the impact of current performance on readability, the management obfuscation 




about poor performance, and they often do so through preparing complicated, less 
transparent disclosures, as Bloomfield (2002) explains. In fact, according to the 
obfuscation hypothesis, managers seek to increase the processing cost of adverse 
information, hoping that such information is not reflected in stock prices or at least 
incorporated with a delay. There are a large number of empirical studies in support of 
this strategic behaviour. Jones and Shoemaker (1994) and Li (2008) provide 
examples of these studies. 
With regards to the relation between disclosure readability and the firm’s expected 
future performance, Li (2008) explains how opportunistic managers may be willing 
to make the annual report less readable if they believe that current good earnings are 
transitory or poor earnings are persistent. On the other hand, there is incentive for 
those managers expecting better future performance to disclose infrmation more 
transparently so that their information-processing costs are lowered and they are 
distinguished from the “lemons”. In other words, “to the extent that complicated 
annual reports can hide the transitory nature of good news or the permanent nature of 
bad news by increasing investors’ information-processing costs, the management 
obfuscation hypothesis predicts that the profits (losses) of firms with more complex 
annual reports are less (more) persistent.” 
 
6.4.2 READABILITY OF FUND MANAGER COMMENTARIES AND 
PERFORMANCE 
One can argue that readability is best explored by an operational definition, i.e. by 
assessing the method or the formula used to measure it. While there are a large 
number of methods that claim to measure readability, two of them have been often 
referenced in finance and accounting literature: Gunning (1952)’s Fog Index and 
Flesch (1949)’s eponymous Flesch Reading Ease Score. Both measures, which are 
derived from the computational linguistics literature, use the number of words per 
sentence and the number of syllables per word to create a combined measure of 
readability. The Flesch score is arguably more precise than the Fog score since the 




potentially decreasing readability. The Flesch score, however, takes the exact 
number of word syllables into account. The formula for computing the Flesch score 
is: 
Flesch Reading Ease Score = 206.835 – 0.846*WL – 1.015*SL 
where:  
WL = number of syllables per 100 words   
SL = average number of words per sentence  
The Flesch formula is arranged such that a higher score denotes more readability 
(See figure 15). 
 
Figure 15: The Flesch reading ease score and typical readability 
 
While Fog and Flesch are widely used readability measures in accounting and 
finance literature, Loughran and McDonald (2010) argue that, in general, syllable 
counts cannot produce robust measures of corporate disclosure readability. They 
demonstrate that the top-quartile of multi-syllable words in these r ports (including 
such commonly used words as corporation, company, directors, executive, etc.) is 
often easy to understand for an “average” investor. The authors propose that the 
Plain English standardized guidelines proposed by the SEC can provide a more 
robust measure of annual report readability using which should reduce measurement 
errors and attenuation bias in regression tests. They further show that among the 
above three readability measures, only Plain English is significantly linked to equity 
issuance, and only Plain English and Flesch are correlated with a share-holder 




The Plain English guidelines came into force in 1998 with the following 
specification which is mandatory for prospectuses and highly recommended for other 
disclosures: 
“Companies filing registration statements under the Securities Act of 1933 
must: (1) write the forepart of these registration statements in plain English; 
(2) write the remaining portions of these registration statements in a clear, 
understandable manner; and (3) design these registration statements to be 
visually inviting and easy to read.” (SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No.7) 
The Rule 421(d) specification further illustrates the Plain English requirements: 
“Substantially comply with these plain English principles: (1) short 
sentences; (2) definite, concrete everyday language; (3) active voic ; (4) 
tabular presentation of complex information; (5) no legal jargon; and (6) no 
multiple negatives.” 
In this section, I use the Flesch score, as defined above, as well as the Plain English 
measure developed by Loughran and McDonald (2010) to investigate the readability 
of mutual fund annual reports. Loughran and McDonald (2010)’s Plain English 
measure incorporates six components including sentence length, word length, 
personal pronouns, and other style directives. They design a proprietary computer 
program to compute this measure based on each given text in the following way: 
(1) Sentence length: The average number of words per sentence in the 
document is calculated according to the Rule 421(d) and the specific 
examples in the Plain English Handbook (e.g., pp. 28-29).  
(2) Average word length: Following SEC’s recommendation for using “short, 
common words”, this component is calculated by counting the character 
length of each word and averaging across all words in the document. 
(3) Passive: It is important to avoid passive voice to improve readability, as 
the SEC Handbook (pp. 19-21) highlights. To calculate this readability 
component, I use Loughran and McDonald’s approach to look for 




“will be”, “has been”, “have been”, “had been”, “will have been”, 
“being”, “am”, “are”, “is”, “was”, and “were”, as well as auxiliary verbs 
followed by a the “ed” ending or one of the commonly known 158 
irregular verbs. 
(4) Legalese: The SEC Staff Legal Bulletin32 identifies certain words and 
phrases as inappropriate legal jargon (e.g., “set forth under” or 
“hereinafter”). Loughran and McDonald look for a list of 12 phrases and 
48 words of this nature. 
(5) Personal pronouns: The SEC Handbook (p. 22) recommends using 
personal pronouns as they can “dramatically” improve the readability of 
the report. The first-person plural and second-person personal pronouns 
(i.e. “we”, “us”, “our”, “ours”, “you”, “your”, “yours”) are searched. 
(6) Other: Loughran and McDonald (2010) also combine a number of less 
frequently used categories identified in the Handbook including negative 
phrases, superfluous words and the use of the word “respectively” (pp. 
17-35). They search for (1) a list of 11 negative compound phrases (e.g., 
“not unlike” or “not… unless”); (2) a list of eight superfluous phrases 
(e.g., “despite the fact that” or “in the event that”); and (3) occurrences of 
the word “respectively”.  
I use the Concordance program to circumvent the problem of not having access to 
the proprietary computer program used by Loughran and McDonald (2010). In doing 
so, I simplify the analysis by combing all the fund manager commentaries in a given 
category in one text file. Since both Flesch and Plain English measures are computed 
using linear formulae, and since the fund manager commentaries are ach roughly 
around 700 words long, this simplification does not introduce any major 
measurement bias.  
                                                                 
32 The Bulletin can be accessed at http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb7a.htm. A list of such legalese 




Concordance easily provides such global statistics as the number of lines, words 
(“tokens”), distinct words (“types”), characters, sentences, words per sentence, type-
token ratio, etc. Hence, I use the above statistics as well as the program’s selective 
concordancing capability to build the Plain English measure in a similar way to 
Loughran and McDonald (2010).   
I specifically aim to test the following hypothesis in this section: “There is no 
significant difference in the readability of fund manager commentaries whose 
corresponding funds have experienced varying degrees of past investment 
performance, ceteris paribus.” Therefore, I use the same fund performance categories 
as used in Rutherford (2005) to trace the readability of various mutual fund 
commentaries. While Plain English and Flesch are used to measure readability, the 
type-token ratio (ratio of distinct words to total words) and arrative length (number 
















Table 10: Readability analysis of various fund categories in the study corpus 
 

























Length 750 646 655 682 *   









-0.98 -0.56 0.13 -0.65  * * 
 
The results suggest that loss-making funds are less readable and slightly more 
verbose than least profitable funds, which are in turn less readable and ver so more 
verbose than the most profitable funds. While Plain English clearly shows a 
significant difference between the readability levels of the thr e fund groups, the 
Flesch score also shows a similar pattern in aggregate, which, at least in the case of 
mutual fund reports, does not seem to support Loughran and McDonald’s claim 
about the inferiority of Flesch as a readability measure.  
The verbosity of the commentaries is closely related with the readability, i.e. the 
loss-making funds appear to be slightly more verbose on average, although the 
difference between the fund groups is, except in one case, not significant at the 5% 
level using the Mann-Whitney U test. This may be due to the fact th t investment 
companies have to file annual reports with the SEC that adhere to the industry 
conventions in terms of structure and length, and due to the large number of 
mandatory performance tables and schedules that need to be included in th  annual 






6.5 HOW DOES OVERCONFIDENCE RELATE TO PAST PERFORMANCE?  
Gervais and Odean (2001), extending their earlier work in Odean (1999), develop a 
model to explain the process in which financial agents become overconfident by 
learning about their own ability and past performance. They argue that initially, 
financial agents do not recognize their ability, but in the course of time and with 
accumulating more experience, they attribute successful outcomes t  their superior 
judgements, and failure to external factors or chance. Hence, they “learn” to become 
overconfident through time. This mechanism, which has a net positive impact on 
overconfidence, can be coupled with the weakening or distortion of informati n 
signals triggered by anxiety, as outlined in the conceptual model introduced earlier in 
the thesis and reiterated below. In other words, it is reasonable to expect a similar 
pattern among mutual fund managers such that their overconfidence level should 
vary subject to prior investment performance.  
 





In order to measure the degree of this co-variation, I rank the funds in each year on 
prior-year Carhart alphas and form decile portfolios. Then, I combine all the extreme 
(top and bottom) deciles across 2003-2009 and use the t-test with unequal variance to 
measure the difference between the two groups. The results are displayed in Table 11 
Panel A. I reiterate this analysis based on funds ranked by prior th ee-year alphas 
(Panel B).  
 
Table 11: Variation of fund manager overconfidence in extreme portfolios sorted on prior 
Carhart alphas 
This table compares the top and bottom deciles formed by sorting the funds in each year on prior-year 
Carhart alphas and combining all the extreme deciles across 2003-2009. *, ** , ***  indicate significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% levels based on two-tailed tests. 
 
It can be inferred that prior positive performance, both during the previous one-year 




expected and the difference between the extreme deciles for both variables is 
significant at the 5% level. In fact, funds belonging to the top decile of Carhart alpha 
have a mean optimism which is, on average, about three standard deviations higher 
than the funds belonging to the bottom decile in the case of previous one-year alpha. 
The difference between the two deciles when funds are ranked by previous three-
year alphas is similar but less pronounced. The effect of prior performance on fund 
manager certainty is also similar. 
The difference between the funds in the two extreme deciles in terms of self-
reference is also significant in the case of previous one-year alpha, although at the 
10% significance level. This is in line with the anecdotal examples of manual content 
analysis in Chapter 5 which suggest that high-performing fund managers tend to 
refer to themselves more often their poor-performing counterparts. 
Alternatively, I investigate this effect using a parallel method starting from fund-
manager expressed attributes. First, the funds are sorted in each year on fund 
manager-expressed optimism, certainty, and self-reference scores. Th n, decile 
portfolios are similarly formed and all the extreme deciles across 2003-2009 are 
combined. The average prior-year Carhart alphas of top and bottom deciles are then 












Table 12: Variation of Carhart alphas in extreme portfolios sorted on fund manager 
overconfidence 
This table compares the average prior-year Carhart alphas of top and bottom deciles formed by sorting 
the funds in each year on fund manager-expressed optimism, certainty, and self-reference, and then 
combining all the extreme deciles across 2003-2009.  
 
 
In a similar way, these results indicate that, on average, fund maagers who adopt a 
more optimistic, certain and self-referring approach in writing their reports to 
shareholders have higher previous-year alphas compared to the other group. 
Therefore, it is important to account for the role of prior performance before 
interpreting any cross-sectional variation in fund returns that may be marginally 
explained by certain differences in fund manager characteristics. However, as I note 
above, the Carhart model already captures the previous-year momentum effect which 
has a relatively low correlation with the overconfidence scores used in this study.    
It is also interesting to investigate the effect of prior performance on a fixed cohort of 
fund managers through time. The conceptual model explained above leads us to the 
expectation that in an alternating round of prior performance outcomes, the average 
fund manager’s level of inherent overconfidence is likely to increase, cet ris paribus. 
I attempt to test this hypothesis by tracing the overconfidence proxies of all eligible 




years until 2009. Results reported in Table 13 demonstrate that mean optimism and 
mean self-reference both tend to rise with fund manager duration. 
 
Table 13: Does fund-manager expressed overconfidence increase by fund manager duration? 
This table reports the mean optimism/certainty/self-reference scores for a given cohort of fund 












Figure 18: Variation of self-reference by fund manager duration 
 
This dynamic change in overconfidence proxies is better illustrated in figure 17 and 
figure 18 which indicate that both optimism and self-reference tend to rise during the 
sample years, further confirming the findings in Chapter 6 using the corpus-linguistic 
approach.33  
 
6.6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Several points can be taken away from the findings in this chapter. First, from the 
perspective of genre analysis and corpus linguistics, fund managers write their 
reports in distinguishably different genres depending, among others, on their past 
performance record, their size and their investment style. The hypothesis regarding 
the existence of distinct rhetorical genres (different fund manager tone) subject to 
prior performance is supported using a number of cross-sectional tests.  
In addition, I establish in a longitudinal study that the overall economic environment 
in which fund managers operate does influence the tone of fund manager reports in 
                                                                 
33
 While this observation is not robust to survivorship bias, one may hypothesize that the growing 
overconfidence accumulated in this way, on average, leads fund managers to make sub-optimal 
investment decisions causing adverse performance, as Choi and Lou (2008) demonstrate using the 
Active Share method. In addition, there is significant literature on the topic of “escalating 
commitments” in psychology which can provide traction here. I am grateful to Prof. Nick Oliver for 




aggregate. The results also provide support for the Pollyanna hypothesis, particularly 
among a number of categories such as loss-making funds. These findings, together 
with the evidence on readability, are consistent with the close-reading evidence from 
the previous chapter. To a certain extent, one may be able to conclude that fund 
managers strategically adjust the overall tone and rhetoric of their reports in a self-
serving way. However, it is equally plausible for this behaviour t stem from the 
unconscious psychological processes that are in play in the mind of the und 
manager, since, as it is often demonstrated in this study, the underlyi g investment 
story can be an excellent sense-making implement for the prof ssional investor in 
general. 
In the final section of the chapter, I demonstrated cross-sectional variations 
suggesting that superior past performance boosts overconfidence as measured by all 
proxies used which is in line with theoretical expectations. The following chapter 
continues the study by empirically investigating the impact of fund manager 
overconfidence on future investment returns. I use the well known Carhart asse  
pricing model as the basis of an empirical model which I seek to improve by adding 














CHAPTER 7 – FUND MANAGER OVERCONFIDENCE AND PERFORMANCE 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter seeks to investigate the dynamic relationship between fund-manager 
expressed overconfidence and the investment performance of a mutual fund. The 
areas of focus in this chapter are the extent to which (1) fund manager 
overconfidence impacts the fund’s future investment performance and (2) the 
dynamics of this complex relation across fund type, investment style, fund manager 
duration and the proxies used to measure overconfidence. I use the well known
Carhart asset pricing model as the basis of an empirical model which I seek to 
improve by adding independent variables proxying for fund manager psychologi al 
attributes. The chapter includes controls for other potential confounding factors, and 
tests the overall robustness of the empirical model. I specifically test the following 
null hypothesis: 
There is no significant difference in the future investment performance of 
mutual funds whose managers exhibit varying degrees of 
optimism/certainty/self-reference in their annual reports to investors, ceteris 
paribus.   
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 7.2 addresses the question of who writes 
the fund manager commentaries and its relevance to the research rsults. This section 
also outlines the structure of the annual reports and explains which parts of the report 
are content-analysed. Section 7.3 discusses the measures of overconfiden e us d in 
this chapter and provides relevant descriptive statistics. Section 7.4 uses a number of 
empirical methods to explore how fund manager overconfidence and associated 
measures may impact future investment performance. Finally, section 7.5 







7.2 AUTHORSHIP AND STRUCTURE OF FUND MANAGER COMMENTARIES 
It is of course important to discuss the authorship of the mutual fund annual reports 
for the purposes of this study. Firstly, I argue that according to the conventions in the 
mutual fund industry, fund managers write their own reports and commentaries 
which may then be edited by in-house writers only to check correct spelling and 
grammar, and to ensure presentational consistency with other section  of the annual 
report (the researcher learnt about this convention in conversation with a number of 
mutual fund managers).34 In other words, the in-house editors are mostly concerned 
with the professional presentation of the annual report as a whole document and are 
much less concerned with the core thematic elements, sentence structure and other 
rhetorical features of the fund manager narratives.  
Secondly, a similar pattern is observed in CEO communication and the research on 
CEO letters, speeches, etc. Fund managers, like CEOs, are signatories of their reports 
and assume legal responsibility for their content. According to Amernic, Craig and 
Tourish (2010), this attribute acts as an incentive for them to closely scrutinise and 
approve the final version of the narrative before signature and publication. More 
importantly, they argue, “whether or not a CEO is actively involved in composing a 
letter to stockholders does not matter: the words in the CEO’s letter are symbolic and 
emblematic, and the reader takes them to be the CEO’s own.” Clearly, a similar 
proposition can be made about fund managers. And finally, to what extent mutual 
fund manager narratives are linked with investment performance is inherently an 
empirical question, regardless of the subject of authorship.      
The question of authorship of fund manager reports can be further examin d by 
investigating the variations between individual fund manager reports within the same 
investment company. This is because if we assume that the content f fu d manager 
reports and the writing style of fund managers are substantially influenced by the 
                                                                 
34 The conversations took place during 2007 and 2008 with fund managers and public relations staff 
that I came across in various conferences and, in particular, in a number of meeting in Martin Currie 




overarching investment philosophy of the organisation in which they operate or th  
role of in-house writers, one should expect to find a homogeneous set of narratives in 
each company’s annual report regardless of who the fund manager is.  
This, however, does not appear to be the case. In order to study the extent of cross-
sectional variation in fund manager reports, in a pilot study I examined 50 mutual 
fund reports randomly selected from 5 different investment companies. The results of 
cross-comparisons across a range of Diction variables as well as readability and tone 
indicate that there is indeed a significant level of within-sample variation that can be 
attributed to individual fund manager characteristics. Clearly, a more robust test that 
would control for the types of funds in cross-comparisons can further confirm this 
observation. 
Since the overconfidence proxies used in this research are based on txtual data in 
the annual reports, it is important to select the appropriate sections of the annual 
report for relevant study. The body of mutual fund annual reports filed in Edgar 
typically consists of several sections, including the pr sident’s (chairman’s) letter, 
individual fund manager commentaries, schedule of portfolio investments, financial 
statements, financial highlights, notes to financial statements, report of independent 
public accounting firm and schedule of shareholder expenses. Among these sections, 
only the president’s letter and fund commentaries by individual fund managers 
contain non-quantitative information useful for my study purposes. Often, the 
president and the fund manager narrate different but complementary sections of the 
investment story, demonstrating the concept of contrasting narrators. Since the 
individual fund managers are often solely responsible for making investment 
decisions, the fund manager commentaries, compared to the president’s letter, ar  
likely to provide more leverage in understanding any relation between the manager’s 
state of mind and past or future performance. Although the president’s l tter can 
provide investors with a useful big picture of the investment company’s pre ent 
circumstances, it is often too broad to be helpful for the purposes of this study. In 
contrast, the fund manager commentary is an information-rich section of the annual 
report which helps explain the past performance of the fund and portray its likely 




These narratives are less homogeneous compared to corporate annual reports (10-K 
reports). However, they often include sections on investment strategy, market 
environment, discussion of past performance, sector by sector analysis and the fund 
outlook. Although these sections of the commentary often form a single narrative, 
sometimes, particularly in the case of underperformance, fund managers choose the 
sub-genre of question and answer to communicate to investors.  
In my content analysis performed mostly by the Diction program, the optimism 
scores calculated are based on the fund outlook section, the self-r ference scores are 
based on the past-performance discussion section and certainty scores are based on 
the whole narrative. The reason for dividing up each annual report in this way is to 
increase accuracy of measuring overconfidence. The fund outlook section, by 
definition, is where the fund manager writes about his or her views on the fund’s 
possible performance in the future, and therefore, this section of the narrative often 
lends itself to an optimistic or pessimistic tone of voice. Similarly, the discussion on 
past performance is an appropriate place to look for occasions of self-reference since 
managers are inclined, often in a self-serving way, to take ownership of their 
performance record when they write about it in this section. For the certainty 
variable, however, it is best to look at the whole commentary as it c n come through 
in both the discussion of the past performance and the fund manager’s projections 
about the future.  
 
7.3 MEASURES OF OVERCONFIDENCE USED IN THIS CHAPTER 
The overconfidence effect, in general terms, can be measured in a number of 
different ways. Hoffrage (2004) lists some of the most common approaches: (1) 
subjects can be requested to evaluate their own confidence in a statement, and then 
all the statements with a given level of confidence can be grouped together and be 
compared that to the actual frequency of being correct; (2) subjects can be tested 
with multiple-choice questions and then their level of confidence in their answers can 
be elicited on a scale from chance to total certainty by comparing this to the true 




response to questions with numerical answers; and (4) subjects can be given the 
opportunity to bet on the correctness of their answers with chances that are 
favourable if their judgements of accuracy are correct, which means that they lose 
money if they are overconfident.35  
In the context of finance and accounting, some of the proxies used for measuring 
overconfidence include trading activity, managerial option exercise and active share. 
The pros and cons of each of these proxies are discussed in detail in ch pter 2 where 
I establish that while the above measures can work robustly for corporate managers, 
they are somewhat handicapped when applied to professional investors. Hence, I 
employ a more straightforward approach to measuring overconfidence which 
includes content analysing various sections of fund manager reports.  
I specifically look at optimism, certainty and self-reference of fund manager 
commentaries to infer the overconfidence of their corresponding managers. Full 
description, definitions and formulas for calculating these measures are provided in 
chapter 4. Table 14 summarises the descriptive statistics provided there for the 







                                                                 
35 Assuming that the human confidence has perfect calibration, judgments with 100% confidence 
should be correct 100% of the time, 80% confidence correct 80% of the time, etc. By contrast, 
research findings suggest that confidence exceeds accuracy so long as individuals are answering hard 
questions about unfamiliar topics. For example, subjects were correct about 80% of the time when 
they were “100% certain” about their performance in a spelling task (Adams and Adams, 1960). 
Adams, P. A., and J. K. Adames, 1960, Confidence in the recognition and reproduction of words 





Table 14: Descriptive statistics of overconfidence proxies 
This table reports the distribution of selected overconfidence proxies based on the content 
analysis of fund manager narratives. Optimism and certainty are computed by Diction, and certainty is 
adjusted according to Demers and Vega (2010). The optimism scores are based on the fund outlook 
section, the self-reference scores are based on the past-performance discussion section and certainty 




Mean              SD Min         1st Quart Med         3rd Quart 
 
Max 
OPTIMISM 52.20 2.11 43.50 49.28 51.58 55.42 64.16 
CERTAINTY 47.25 1.37 44.39 46.14 46.92 48.15 51.97 
SELF-REFERENCE 1.13 0.18 0.74 0.99 1.04 1.28 1.76 
 
Figure 19 provides a simple histogram for optimism scores in a typical year by 
averaging the distributions of the scores across the sample years. The hape of the 
histogram, as well as the mean and median values in Table 14, indicate that there is a 
small positive skew in what is a largely normal distribution. In addition, the instances 
of extreme (outlier) fund manager overconfidence are more common than 
underconfidence. This can be due to the fact that fund manager selection processes 
that are in operation in the investment industry, which often include an interview 
with the fund manager to be recruited (Goyal and Wahal, 2008), are bias d in the 
favour of overconfident managers. However, this observation may equally be 
explained by survival issues. A similar distribution exists for the certainty and self-
reference measures.36  
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Figure 19: Histogram of the distribution of fund manager optimism scores during an average 
sample year 
 
Table 15 reports the correlations between the overconfidence measures derived from 
the narratives and the risk factors embedded in the Carhart asset pricing model based 
on the same sample.  
 





Importantly, the cross-correlations between the overconfidence proxies suggest that 
optimism and certainty are to some extent associated measures of overconfidence 
and they are both positively correlated with momentum (previous one-year return), 
i.e. a fund manager experiencing positive prior returns is likely to grow more 
optimistic about her future performance as well as more resolute in h r tone of voice. 
There is a also significant correlation between optimism and self-ref rence which is 
consistent with the expectations and the empirical evidence demonstrated in the 
previous two chapters.  
In addition, the relatively low correlations between the proxies and the Carhart risk 
factors are promising since they suggest that fund manager overconfidence, as 
measured here, is not directly driven by any intrinsic fund charateristics and 
associated risk factors. Particularly in the case of momentum, one can argue that a 
large part of the variation in optimism is not explained by momentum. In other 
words, the implication is that our overconfidence measure has a good chance of 
capturing an effect which is distinct from other previously studied factors that 
influence investment performance.  
 
7.4 HOW DOES OVERCONFIDENCE AFFECT FUTURE INVESTMENT 
PERFORMANCE OF MUTUAL FUNDS? 
7.4.1 OVERVIEW 
In this section, I test the hypothesis that excessive levels of overconfidence interfere 
with sound investment decision-making and thereby diminish future investment 
returns. In other words, I expect that a fund manager with higher lev ls of net 
overconfidence (after considering the effect of prior performance) may experience 
lower future returns, everything else held constant. Therefore, the general null 






“There is no significant difference in the future investment performance of 
mutual funds whose managers exhibit varying degrees of overconfidence 
(proxied by overoptimism, excessive certainty and excessive self-ref rence), 
ceteris paribus.”   
As explained in detail in Chapter 3, the well-known Carhart model is used as the 
base regression model to test the research hypotheses in this chapter. The Carhart 
(1997) model builds on the Fama-French three-factor model by adding prior-year 
momentum which, for the purpose of this research, adequately captures the effect of 
previous performance.37 Therefore, the general approach would be to add the 
overconfidence measure as independent variable to the Carhart model, and then to 
regress the average monthly returns subsequent to the publication of the annual 
reports accordingly. 
 
I use two empirical approaches to investigate this effect: the portfolio-tracking 
approach and the calendar-time method. 
7.4.2 THE PORTFOLIO-TRACKING APPROACH 
In this section, I use the portfolio-tracking empirical approach to test the research 
hypotheses. Generally, the portfolio-tracking method requires the funds to be sorted 
based on a given parameter into decile portfolios. Then, portfolios of extreme deciles 
are formed, and the monthly returns series are followed using an appropriate asset 
pricing model (the Carhart model in this case). Subsequently, the Car art factors of 
the extreme portfolios are compared each year, and then the portfolios are rebalanced 
annually. 
                                                                 
37 In conversations with Prof. Keith Cuthberson and Prof. Taffler, it was agreed that a simple four-
factor regression model such as Carhart should haveadequate accuracy in studying the impact of fund 





Following this methodology, I rank my sample funds based on their OPTIMISM, 
CERTAINTY, and SELF-REFERENCE scores in each year and form 10 equally 
weighted decile portfolios for each of the sample years between 2003 and 2009. 
Since about 45% of the annual reports are typically filed during the first quarter and 
for the purpose of consistency, I perform the portfolio sorts in the end of March in 
each year.38 Following this ranking month, each portfolio is held for twelve months 
and the time-series of monthly portfolio excess returns (i.e. average cross-sectional 
fund returns within each portfolio minus the corresponding risk-free interest rate) is 
constructed. The portfolio is then reformed at the end of March in the following year 
and the time series is extended.  
 
In addition, I test a hedge strategy inspired by the research hypotheses in this chapter. 
Are fund managers that express abnormal levels of overconfidence (as proxied by 
OPTIMISM, CERTAINTY, and SELF-REFERENCE) likely to underperform in the 
following months since their excessive overconfidence may negatively impact their 
investment decisions? I construct a long-short portfolio strategy based on shorting 
the portfolio with the highest level of overconfidence (P10) and going lo in the 
portfolio with a lower level of overconfidence. I do the long stage in two ways. In the 
Hedge1 strategy, I long the portfolio with the lowest level of confidence (P1) and in 
the Hedge2 strategy, I long the portfolio with an average (i.e. “normal”) level of 
overconfidence (P5). Hence, the H dge1 strategy captures the P1-P10 returns while 
the Hedge2 strategy captures the P5-P10 returns.  
 
As explained in the literature review in Chapter 2, prior studies in accounting and 
finance as well as other domains (e.g. competitive sports) indicate that 
underconfidence (diffidence) can have a similarly detrimental effect on decision 
making and performance, resulting in an inverted U shape when performance is 
plotted against confidence. Thus, everything else being equal, I expect the Hedge2 
strategy to capture higher positive abnormal returns compared to the Hedge1 
                                                                 
38 There is a large body of accounting literature that investigates the issue of delay in reporting, and
further research can look at this issue in the context of mutual fund annual reports to gain a better 




strategy. In other words, while it is not reasonable to assume that fund managers with 
the lowest confidence levels are significantly better at making investment decisions 
compared to overconfident fund managers, one might expect “reasonably” confident 
fund managers (i.e. those with an average, “normal” confidence level)to make better 
investment decisions compared to their peers and thus produce higher returns, ceteris 
paribus.  
 
In order to test the significance of the abnormal returns using the Carhart (1997) 
four-factor model, I first gain an overall picture by plotting themonthly portfolio 
excess returns for the extreme portfolios P1 and P10 as well as the intermediate 





Figure 20: Monthly average excess returns of extreme decile portfolios and an intermediate 
portfolio based on OPTIMISM scores 
P1 is the annually ranked portfolio of funds with the lowest OPTIMISM scores, P10 is the annually 
ranked portfolio of funds with the highest OPTIMISM scores, and P5 is the annually ranked portfolio 





It appears from the above figure that the monthly excess returns of the extrem  decile 
portfolios co-move to a large extent. However, the monthly excess returns of the 
intermediate portfolio are slightly out of sync and appear to be marginally higher, 
which prompts further investigation. Thus, following the portfolio-tracking approach, 
I perform the required monthly time-series regressions for each portfolio as in Barber 
and Odean (2001) and Kumar and Lee (2006). Therefore, I use the following 
equation in Table 16: 
 
 




Table 16: The impact of fund manager overconfidence on excess returns, using portfolio-tracking analysi  
Sample funds are sorted into decile portfolios based on prior year OPTMISM scores for each year, i.e. the funds in each portfolio may change ev ry year based on their manager’s 
expressed overconfidence. Then, equally weighted avrage return in each month is calculated for the ten decile portfolios. The Hedge1 returns are the difference between the returns 
of the top and bottom decile portfolios (P1-P10) and the Hedge2 returns are the difference between the returns of the top and intermediate decile portfolios (P5-P10). (RM – Rf) is 
the excess return on the broad market portfolio. SMB is the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and that of large stocks. HML is the differenc  between the 
return on a portfolio of high-book-to-market stocks and low-book-to-market stocks. MOM is the differenc  between the return on a portfolio of high prior return stocks and low 
prior return stocks. 
 
Panel A: Fund portfolios formed on OPTIMISM scores 
 
 




Rm-Rf 1.067***  1.011***  0.918***  0.933***  1.182***  1.072***  1.005***  0.916***  0.949***  1.052***  0.015***  0.130***  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
 
SMB 0.494***  0.450***  0.397***  0.426***  0.406***  0.401***  0.389***  0.356***  0.337***  0.314***  0.180**  





HML 0.644***  0.686***  0.656***  0.589***  0.577***  0.586***  0.578***  0.598***  0.628***  0.551***  0.093***  






























Alpha 0.00063 -0.00027 0.00140 0.00183* 0.00177* 0.00096 0.00108 0.00055 -0.0004 -0.00067* 0.00130 





Adj. R2 0.723 0.775 0.804 0.824 0.796 0.810 0.702 0.696 0.711 0.733 0.308 0.282 
 








Table 16: Continued 
 
Sample funds are sorted into decile portfolios based on prior year CERTAINTY scores for each year, i.e. th  funds in each portfolio may change every year based on their 
manager’s expressed overconfidence. Then, equally weighted average return in each month is calculated for the ten decile portfolios. The Hedge1 returns are the 
difference between the returns of the top and bottom decile portfolios (P1-P10) and the Hedge2 returns are the difference between the returns of the top and intermediate 
decile portfolios (P5-P10). (RM – Rf) is the excess return on the broad market portfolio. SMB is the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and that of 
large stocks. HML is the difference between the return on a portfolio of high-book-to-market stocks and low-book-to-market stocks. MOM is the difference between the 
return on a portfolio of high prior return stocks and low prior return stocks. 
 
 
Panel B: Fund portfolios formed on CERTAINTY scores 
 
 




Rm-Rf 1.132***  0.911***  0.995***  1.208***  1.085***  0.877***  1.101***  1.106***  0.902***  0.930***  0.172***  0.115***  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
 
SMB 0.524***  0.409***  0.448***  0.516***  0.577***  0.529***  0.479***  0.401***  0.359***  0.388***  0.136***  





HML 0.627***  0.582***  0.690***  0.619***  0.556***  0.550***  0.521***  0.583***  0.503***  0.484***  0.143***  






























Alpha 0.00094 0.00025 -0.00040 0.00068 0.00105* 0.00209* 0.00101 0.00050 -0.00094 -0.00133 0.00227 





Adj. R2 0.813 0.805 0.790 0.786 0.704 0.756 0.698 0.760 0.810 0.803 0.366 0.295 
 









Table 16: Continued 
 
Sample funds are sorted into decile portfolios based on prior year SELF-REFERENCE scores for each year, i.e. the funds in each portfolio may change every year based 
on their manager’s expressed overconfidence. Then, equally weighted average return in each month is calculated for the ten decile portfolios. The H dge1 returns are the 
difference between the returns of the top and bottom decile portfolios (P1-P10) and the Hedge2 returns are the difference betw en the returns of the top and intermediate 
decile portfolios (P5-P10). (RM – Rf) is the excess return on the broad market portfolio. SMB is the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and that of 
large stocks. HML is the difference between the return on a portfolio of high-book-to-market stocks and low-book-to-market stocks. MOM is the difference between the 
return on a portfolio of high prior return stocks and low prior return stocks. 
 
 
Panel C: Fund portfolios formed on SELF-REFERENCE scores 
 
 




Rm-Rf 0.883***  0.917***  0.955***  0.990***  1.034***  1.007***  1.045***  1.015***  0.922***  0.874***  0.009***  0.160***  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
SMB 0.338***  0.391***  0.407***  0.433***  0.412***  0.365***  0.369***  0.320***  0.375***  0.399***  -0.061***  





HML 0.715***  0.692**  0.636***  0.680***  0.729***  0.762***  0.771***  0.677***  0.663***  0.601***  0.114**  






























Alpha -0.00018 0.00023 0.00085 0.00105 0.00139 0.00092 0.00092 0.00041 -0.00006 -0.00029 0.001 





Adj. R2 0.705 0.676 0.702 0.795 0.780 0.724 0.702 0.736 0.801 0.840 0.311 0.383 
 






The findings in Table 16 are interesting in a number of ways. Firstly, consistent with 
theoretical expectations, the regression coefficients for all the three Fama-French 
factors as well as the momentum factor are significant at the 1% level across all three 
panels. The positive coefficients in the case of Fama-French factors indicate that 
funds with investments in smaller, high beta, value-oriented stocks are associated 
with higher excess returns. I have also done this analysis without te momentum 
factor (i.e. the three factor model) and the adjusted R2 slightly less than the 
corresponding figures for the Carhart model, which is consistent with theory. 
Secondly, the results indicate that holding the portfolio with the highest OPTIMISM 
scores results in negative abnormal excess returns to the extent of around 1% per 
year (significant at the 10% level). The corresponding negative abnormal excess 
returns for CERTAINTY and SELF-REFRENCE are, respectively, around 1.6% and 
0.4% per year. More broadly, P4, P5 and P10 alphas for OPTIMISM as well as P5 
and P6 alphas for CERTAINTY are significant at the 10% level, while SELF-
REFERENCE does not yield significant alphas in any of the portfolios.   
 
 
Figure 21: Average abnormal excess returns of ten equally weighted decile portfolios ranked by 
previous-year overconfidence proxies 
P1 is the annually ranked portfolio of funds with the lowest overconfidence scores. P10 is the annually 




Thirdly, in the case of OPTIMISM and CERTAINTY, the Hedge2 strategy, on 
average, returns 2.9% based on shorting funds with extremely overconfident 
managers and longing funds with normally (over)confident managers. The 
corresponding return in the case of SELF-REFRENCE is 2%. On the other hand, the 
Hedge1 strategy, based on shorting funds with extremely overconfident fund 
managers and longing funds with the least (over)confident fund managers, captures 
1.6% based on OPTIMSIM scores, 2.8% based on CERTAINTY scores and 1.3% 
based on SELF-REFERENCE scores. In combination, the two strategies indicate the 
inverted U shape relationship between overconfidence and performance discussed 
earlier. This relationship can be best displayed by plotting the portfolio-specific 
Carhart alphas for each of the overconfidence proxies, as displayed in figure 21 
above. 
 
7.4.3 THE CALENDAR TIME APPROACH 
In this section, I employ the calendar time portfolio approach which is one of the 
most widely used techniques for analysing risk-adjusted investment performance.39 
In performing the calendar time analysis in the context of mutual funds, two steps are 
commonly taken. First, average excess return for the cross-section of funds is 
calculated. Second, a multifactor time-series regression model, such a  the Fama-
French or the Carhart model, is used to measure the risk-adjusted performance of the 
funds in a given timeframe. This approach allows robust statistical inference in the 
presence of cross-sectional dependence. In other words, by aggregating the returns of 
the sample funds into a number of portfolios, the problem of cross-sectional 
                                                                 
39 The calendar time portfolio approach has many different applications in empirical finance, such as, 
for example, studying the performance of private investors (e.g., Barber and Odean, 2000, 2001; 
Kumar and Lee, 2006), the long-run performance of st cks (e.g., Fama, 1998; Mitchell and Stafford, 
2000), insider trading (e.g., Jeng, Metrick, and Zeck-hauser, 2003), and in the performance analysis of 
investment funds (e.g., Fama and French, 2003; Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai, 2008) which is of 
interest in this study. 
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dependence amongst individual fund returns is eliminated (Hoechle, Schmid and 
Zimmerman, 2009). 
 
For each fund-year observation during 2003-09, I calculate Carhart alpha using 36 
monthly returns from month -24 to month 12 (month 0 being the publication month 
of the annual report).40 Pooled cross-sectional time-series regressions are used to 




where i indicates a particular fund and t refers to a particular month. 
I perform the above regression four times, including each overconfidence proxy once 
individually in the model, and then including all three of them together as an 
overconfidence meta-variable. I use dummy variables to indicate that a fund belongs 
to the top 10% of each overconfidence proxy. For example, if fund i ranks in the top 
decile of optimism based on its 2006 annual report published in March of the sam  
year, the dummy variables OPTIMISMi200604 up to OPTIMISMi200703 will be set to 1. 
Finally, I initially exclude year fixed effects from the model, and then add them to 
the model in order to compare the results.  
Table 17 shows the results of the panel regressions for each of the verconfidence 
proxies. In obtaining the results reported in this table, measurements of optimism, 
certainty, and self-reference are made universally without dividing up the fund 
manager reports into relevant sections.  
 
 
                                                                 
40 I also replicate this approach using the prior 12-month returns, which yields similar results. 
However, the 36-month timeframe is preferable to mitigate noisy standard errors. I am grateful to 
Prof. Abhayankar and Prof. Armitage for making this comment. 
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Table 17: Does fund-manager abnormal overconfidence impact subsequent mutual fund 
performance?  
(Reports analysed universally) 
This table displays the results of panel regression of fund returns during the 2003-09 period using the 
four Carhart risk factors (market excess return, SMB, HML, MOM) as well as fund-manager 
expressed optimism, certainty and self-reference dummy variables. The dummy variables indicate that 
the fund belongs to the top decile in each category (e.g. top 10% overoptimistic, etc.). Two-tailed t-
statistics are reported in brackets.  
 
 
As I established in section 7.3, it is important to select the corr t parts of the annual 
report for content analysis purposes. The insignificant regression coefficients in 
Table 17 further confirm my expectation that one needs to divide up the reports into 
separate sections (past performance discussion a d fund outlook) before performing 
the required textual analysis. Table 18 reiterates the same analysis with reports 
categorized by the above sections. The optimism scores are based on the fund 
outlook section, the self-reference scores are based on the past-performance 





Table 18: The impact of overconfidence on subsequent mutual fund performance 
(Reports analysed by section and grouped in deciles) 
This table displays the results of panel regression of fund returns during the 2003-09 period using the 
four Carhart factors (market excess return, SMB, HML, OM) as well as fund-manager expressed 
optimism, certainty and self-reference dummy variables. The dummy variables indicate that the fund 
belongs to the top decile in each category (e.g. top 10% overoptimistic, etc.) The optimism scores are 
based on the fund outlook section, the self-reference scores are based on the past-performance 
discussion section and certainty scores are based on the whole narrative. Two-tailed t-statistics are 
reported in brackets. 
 
 
It can be inferred from the results in Table 18 that higher levels of net 
overconfidence (as proxied by optimism and self-reference) predict lower future 
monthly returns based on the Carhart model. Furthermore, optimism appears to be a 
more significant proxy for overconfidence based on the reported significance levels. 
The very low regression coefficient associated with certainty, however, bears a 
positive sign, contrary to our expectation, which, I believe, may be due to the fact 
that fund managers commonly use a firm and resolute tone of voice in their reports to 
investors. This observation about the resoluteness of fund manager commentaries i  




To what extent is the accumulated fund manager overconfidence in the past few 
years (and not only the past year) capable of explaining the effects observed above? 
To investigate this question, I substitute the prior one-year with the prior three-year 
OC scores in Table 19. Since SEC started filing mutual fund annual reports online in 
the Edgar database as of 2003, I have to start from 2005 to compute the average 
overconfidence scores. Another approach, not pursued here due to data collection 
limitations, is to take the average overconfidence scores of both annual and semi-
annual reports, thereby increasing data points.  
 
Table 19: The impact of overconfidence on subsequent mutual fund performance 
(Reports analysed by section and grouped in deciles, average previous three-year proxies used) 
This table displays the results of panel regression of fund returns during the 2005-09 period using the 
four Carhart factors (market excess return, SMB, HML, OM) as well as average previous 3-year 
fund-manager expressed optimism, certainty and self-reference dummy variables. The dummy 
variables indicate that the fund belongs to the topdecile in each category (e.g. top 10% 
overoptimistic, etc.) The optimism scores are based on fund outlook section, the self-reference scores 
are based on the past-performance discussion section and certainty scores are based on the whole 
narrative. Two-tailed t-statistics are reported in brackets. 
 
The results still indicate a negative relationship between excess net overconfidence 
and future returns. However, they are relatively weaker compared to when previous 
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one-year proxies are calculated, which may be due to the potentially transient nature 
of overconfidence among professional investors. 
Next, I look at a broader picture by including quintiles rather than deciles in my 
analysis. In the results reported in Table 20, the dummy variables indicate belonging 
to the top quintile of the overconfidence proxy. The results are slightly weaker as one 
may expect, nevertheless still significant and suggestive of the inverse impact of net 
overconfidence of subsequent-year returns. 
 
Table 20: The impact of overconfidence on subsequent mutual fund performance 
(Reports analysed by section and grouped in quintiles) 
This table displays the results of panel regression of fund returns during the 2003-09 period using the 
four Carhart as well as fund-manager expressed optimism, certainty and self-reference dummy 
variables. The dummy variables indicate that the fund belongs to the top quintile  in each category 
(e.g. top 20% overoptimistic, etc.) Two-tailed t-statistics are reported in brackets. 
 
 
An interesting question is how the observed negative impact of overconfidence on 
fund returns varies in the months following the publication of the annual report. If we 
regard the level of fund-manager expressed overconfidence as a snapshot t ken at the 
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time of producing the annual report, it is reasonable to expect that the impact of such 
overconfidence would be relatively stronger in the nearer months than the more 
distant future. I have investigated the 3-, 6-, and 9-month windows following the 
publication date of the annual report in Table 21.  
 
Table 21: Short-term impact of abnormal overconfidence on subsequent mutual fund 
performance 
This table displays the results of panel regression of fund returns during the 2003-09 period using 3, 
6, and 9 month timeframes following the publication of the annual report and the four Carhart factors 
as well as fund-manager expressed optimism, certainty a d self-reference dummy variables. The 
dummy variables indicate that the fund belongs to the top decile in each category (e.g. top 10% 
overoptimistic, etc.) Two-tailed t-statistics are reported in brackets. 
 
 
The regression results reported in Table 21 seem to suggest that the impact of net 
overconfidence on future returns very slightly fades away in time. This is not 
surprising given the fact that most mutual funds publish, by definition, only one 
annual report per year, and thus investors have to refer to the most recen annual 
report in order to get a good picture of how a particular mutual fund is performing in 
general.   
In order to test whether the way monthly returns are calculated aff cts the above 
regression results, I replicate the analysis using buy-and-hold returns instead of 
average monthly returns during the specified periods. However, I find that the 
regression results are not significantly different.  
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In a similar way, I test my model by including year fixed effects in the regressions. 
Year dummies can control for potential time-specific conditions that m y have 
affected the funds’ performance, such as boom and bust periods. However, the 
results are comparable, as can be seen in Table 22, and still suggest that abnormal 
levels of overconfidence can be detrimental to the fund’s future investment 
performance. 
 
Table 22:  Does fund-manager abnormal overconfidence impact subsequent mutual fund 
performance? 
(Inclusion of year fixed effects) 
This table displays the results of panel regression of buy-and-hold fund returns during the 2003-09 
period using the four Carhart factors (market excess r turn, SMB, HML, MOM) as well as fund-
manager expressed optimism, certainty and self-referenc  dummy variables. The dummy variables 
indicate that the fund belongs to the top decile in ach category (e.g. top 10% overoptimistic, etc.) The
optimism scores are based on the fund outlook section, the self-reference scores are based on the past-
performance discussion section and certainty scores ar  based on the whole narrative. Two-tailed t-
statistics are reported in brackets. 
 
 
The relationship between the performance of mutual funds and their investment 
styles is widely researched, as explained in chapter 2. To obtain a ge eral perspective 
on the role of fund managers’ overconfidence in this regard, I look at two broad 
categories of investment styles, namely, growth and value. This information is 
extracted from the funds’ Lipper objective codes as reported in the CRSP database. 
Table 23 reports the regression coefficients for optimism, certainty nd self-reference 
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associated with each subgroup. The results suggest that highly overconfident growth-
oriented fund managers are more negatively disadvantaged by this attribute in terms 
of subsequent returns, compared to their value-oriented peers.  
 
Table 23: Investment style and the impact of overconfidence 
This table displays the results of panel regression of fund returns during in the 3 months following 
the publication of the annual report on the four Cahart factors as well as fund-manager expressed 
optimism. The optimism dummy variable indicates that the fund belongs to the top decile in its 
category. The funds are categorized by investment style (as per Lipper Objective Code). Two-tailed t-
statistics are reported in brackets. 
 
 
This finding is potentially interesting as it may suggest that growth-oriented fund 
managers have more incentive and opportunity to become overconfident by virtue of 
having to “believe” in and relate to the growth stories associated with their 
investments. However, a more detailed breakdown of fund investment styles and the 
associated impact of excess net optimism on future returns can be more useful. One 
may expect to find a similar general pattern suggesting that t e effect of 
overconfidence on the future performance of a mutual fund depends, among other 
factors, on where the fund is located along the value-growth investment style 
continuum.  
A question that may arise here is the link between this finding and the evidence of 
skill among growth-oriented fund managers. Chen, Jegadeesh and Wermers (2000) 
and Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers and White (2006) have shown that growth-
oriented fund managers possess better stock-selection skills than value-oriented 
managers. Can it be then posited that growth-oriented fund managers have imilar 
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evidence of negative skill on the other side of the distribution? And coul this be due 
their susceptibility to certain behavioural biases such as overconfidence? These 
questions obviously provide fertile ground for further empirical work in this area.
 
7.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated cross-sectional variations suggesting that 
good past performance boosts overconfidence as measured by all proxies used which 
is in line with theoretical expectations. In this chapter, I set out to investigate the 
dynamic relationship between fund managers overconfidence and the performance of 
their funds. 
I ran Carhart four-factor regressions with overconfidence and year dummy variables 
with results suggesting that excess overconfidence does indeed diminish onthly 
returns following the publication of the annual report, assuming everything else is 
held constant. This effect is robust across different investment styles, although it is 
stronger among growth-oriented funds. Incorporating average scores f fund 
manager overconfidence over the previous three years results in similar regression 
coefficients, although relatively weaker. 
The portfolio-tracking approach sheds further light on the dynamics of this effect. In 
general, there appears to be an inverted U relationship between ov rconfidence and 
subsequent investment performance. In particular, a hedging strategy based on 
shorting funds with extremely overconfident managers and longing funds with 
normally (over)confident managers, on average, returns between 2.04% and 2.88% 
per year, depending on which overconfidence proxy is used to make fund portfolios. 
Finally, it was observed that overoptimism and self-reference are likely to be more 
representative indicators of overconfidence than certainty, possibly due to th  fact 






CHAPTER 8 – CONCLUSIONS 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a summary of the findings made in this thesis and draws 
conclusions relevant to the proposed research questions. The implications of the 
research both for theory and practice as well as its limitations are discussed. Finally, 
suggestions for areas of future research are provided. 
 
8.2 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
In this thesis, I developed and tested a model based on the theoretical contributions 
of Gervais and Odean (2001) and Choi and Lou (2008). This model explains the 
process by which financial agents become overconfident through learning about their 
own ability and past performance. While financial agents may not initially recognize 
their ability, in the course of time and with accumulating more experience, they 
attribute successful outcomes to their superior judgements, and failure to external 
factors or chance. Hence, financial agents “learn” to become overconfident through 
time. We also know that fund managers cannot outperform systematically better than 
chance, as the detailed review of literature in Chapter 2 illustrate . The question that 
arises is to what extent this effect may be due to the psychologica  factors 
influencing the process of investment decision making, as opposed to market 
characteristics. 
In my empirical analysis, I test the hypothesis that excessive levels of overconfidence 
interfere with sound investment decision-making and thereby diminish future 
investment returns. In other words, everything else being equal, I expect a fund 
manager with higher levels of net overconfidence (after considering the effect of 
prior performance) to experience lower future returns. Therefore, the gen ral null 
hypothesis can be formed as follows: 
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“There is no significant difference in the future investment performance of 
mutual funds whose managers exhibit varying degrees of overconfidence 
(proxied by overoptimism, excessive certainty, excessive self-ref rence) as 
well as tone and readability, ceteris paribus.”   
I used the well-known Carhart model as the base regression model to test my core 
research hypotheses. The Carhart (1997) model builds on the Fama-French three-
factor model by adding prior-year momentum which, for the purpose of this research, 
adequately captures the effect of previous performance.41 Therefore, the general 
approach would be to add the overconfidence measure as independent variable to the 
Carhart model, and then to regress the average monthly returns subsequent to the 
publication of the annual reports accordingly. Hence, the term β5iE(OCt) is added to 
the RHS of the Carhart model below. I use two empirical approaches to investigate 
this effect: the portfolio-tracking approach and the calendar-time method: 
 
 
Several findings are explained in the thesis. Firstly, consistent with theoretical 
expectations, the regression coefficients for all the three Fama-French factors as well 
as the momentum factor are significant at the 1% level across all three panels. The 
positive coefficients in the case of Fama-French factors indicate that funds with 
investments in smaller, high beta, value-oriented stocks tend to have high r excess 
returns. Secondly, and more interestingly, the results indicate tha holding the 
portfolio with the highest OPTIMISM scores leads to negative abnormal excess 
returns to the extent of around 0.84% per year (significant at the 10% level). The 
corresponding negative abnormal excess returns for CERTAINTY and SELF-
                                                                 
41 In discussions with Prof. Cuthbertson (Cass) and Prof. Taffler, it was agreed that a four-factor 
regression model such as Carhart should have adequate accuracy in studying the impact of fund 




REFRENCE are, respectively, 1.56% and 0.36% per year. More broadly, alphas 
corresponding to the P4, P5 and P10 decile portfolios sorted on fund manager 
OPTIMISM as well as P5 and P6 in the case of CERTAINTY are significant at the 
10% level.   
Thirdly, a hedging strategy based on shorting funds with extremely overconfident 
managers and longing funds with normally (over)confident managers returns, on 
average, 2.88%. On the other hand, another hedging strategy based on shorting funds 
with extremely overconfident fund managers and longing funds with the least 
confident fund managers captures between 11 to 23 basis points per month based on 
the overconfidence proxy employed. In combination, the two strategies sugge t an 
inverted U-shape relationship between overconfidence and performance. This 
relationship can be best displayed by plotting the portfolio-specific Carhart alphas for 
each of the overconfidence proxies, as displayed again in figure 22 below.  
 
 
Figure 22: The effect of prior-year overconfidence on average abnormal excess returns (an 
inverted-U relationship) 
(P10 is the annually ranked portfolio of funds with the highest overconfidence scores) 
 
In chapters 5 and 6 of the thesis, I explored the effect of self-serving attribution bias 
among fund managers by analysing their reports in the light of their prior 
performance. What can be generally learnt, from the perspective of genre analysis 
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and corpus linguistics, is that fund managers write their reports in distinguishably 
different genres depending, among others, on their past performance record, their 
size and their investment style. My hypothesis regarding the existence of distinct 
rhetorical genres in fund manager reports is supported using a number of cross-
sectional tests.  
In addition, I established in a longitudinal study that the overall economic 
environment in which fund managers operate does influence the rhetoric of fund 
manager reports in aggregate. The results also provide support for the Pollyanna 
hypothesis; particularly among a number of categories such as loss-making funds 
(Table 1 is included at the end of this document as a representative example). For 
instance, the keywords “market” and “economy” are more frequently used among 
funds with negative absolute returns, and the least profitable funds in the positive 
return category. These observations seem to suggest that fund managers, in 
aggregate, refer to the market and the economy as external performance detractors in 
a self-serving way, which is consistent with the anecdotal evidence based on close-
reading mutual funds. The frequency of use for “index” yields a similar conclusion, 
i.e. fund managers tend to make benchmark comparisons more frequently when 
performance is in the negative domain, and in doing so they strategically shift the 
reader’s attention away from the fact that they have, in fact, lost money by investing 
in the fund.  
These findings, together with the evidence on readability, are consistent with the 
close-reading evidence also presented in the thesis. To a certain extent, one may be 
able to conclude that fund managers strategically adjust the overall tone and rhetoric 
of their reports in a self-serving way. However, it is equally plausible for this 
behaviour to stem from the unconscious psychological processes that may be in play 
in the minds of fund managers, since, as it is often demonstrated in this study, the 
underlying investment story can be an excellent sense-making implement for 





8.3 RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS 
My research results have a number of theoretical implications. Firstly, the results 
suggest that the predictive power of a multi-factorial asset pricing model such as 
Carhart’s can be enhanced by adding independent risk factors proxying for i vestor 
psychology to the RHS of the model. To my knowledge, this is the first instance in 
the literature where fund manager psychology is quantified and accounted for in a 
traditional asset pricing model. 
The finding of an inverted-U relationship between overconfidence and subsequent 
performance is consistent with the theoretical model proposed in Shefrin (2009) 
which illustrates the log-change of a measure corresponding to overconfidence bias. 
This finding also resonates with the relevant literature in other domains such as sport 
psychology, as described in chapter 2.   
The results from the corpus-linguistic study of fund manager commentari s, which is 
another part of the thesis, demonstrate that the narrative section of mutual fund 
annual reports does have sufficient stability in patterns of usage to b considered a 
distinct genre of finance and accounting narrative. However, there is far less 
uniformity in the structure and contents of investment company annual reports 
compared to mainstream corporate annual reports (10-K). The precisely defined 
guidelines for preparing a 10-K report do not have an equivalent in the mutual f nd 
industry. Given that investment companies can, in theory, use the flexible structure 
of the annual report as a vehicle for impression management incentives, there seems 
to be a strong case for demanding more regulation regarding investment company 
annual reports. Along similar lines, I believe that the SEC-proposed Plain English 
guidelines which came into force in 1998 should be made mandatory not only for 
prospectuses, but also for other investment company disclosures filed with the SEC 
including the annual report. 
In terms of practical implications, retail investors can benefit from the research 
results by starting to think more seriously about fund manager psychology when 
choosing their fund manager. Investing in mutual funds, as any other investment in 
financial markets, is inherently associated with significant uncertainty. Nevertheless, 
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the research results of this study seem to suggest that retail investors are perhaps well 
advised to stay away from funds whose managers exhibit a high level of 
overconfidence in their annual reports.   
The investment industry as a whole, and fund trustees in particular, an also benefit 
by introducing some type of psychological screening in the fund manager selection 
process. The hiring of fund managers, in its traditional form, is heavily dependent on 
the manager’s past performance record. In fact, a 2010 survey of US investment 
committees performed by a major investment house42 lists the top five factors 
influencing the hiring decision as: 
 
 
Figure 23: Top five factors in hiring investment managers 
 
The same survey reveals that the average length of fund manager retention in the 
industry is 5.8 years: 
                                                                 






Figure 24: Average length of relationship with an investment manager 
 
Hence, hiring and firing decisions are highly important in the mutual fund industry. I 
argue that by adding certain psychological attributes to the list of critical factors in 
hiring fund managers, investment companies can raise their chances of r cruiting 
more “successful” managers. What is more, psychometric tests are already the norm 
in the recruitment process of most companies. Firms have been maki g increasing 
use of psychometric tests as part of the selection process for job vacancies. 
Psychometric tests attempt to measure the abilities, attributes, personality traits and 
various skills of the candidates under consideration for particular vacancies. 
 
The findings of this thesis can have important implications for fund rating 
companies. Currently, as explained in chapter 2, despite the power of fund ratings to 
influence asset flows in relation to mutual fund, there are doubts as to their predictive 
ability. In addition to the shortcomings pointed out by Amenc and Le Sourd (2005), 
fund rating systems have to deal with a number of other dilemmas. For example, 
while using broad categories to divide the funds into peer groups compromises 
accuracy, it is equally challenging to identify similar funds to be allocated to narrow 
groups. Moreover, in order to be able to properly classify funds, theirportfolio 
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holdings need to be known throughout the whole evaluation period, which is not 
feasible most of the time.43  
One aspect of the common fund rating methodologies that can be improved using the 
research findings of this thesis is the potential for incorporating certain fund-manager 
specific psychological attributes in the rating system. Initially, this new system need 
not replace existing ratings; rather it should help produce an altern tive, more 
comprehensive rating methodology. Indeed, variables such as fund manager 
overconfidence can be added to existing performance-related metrics to enable an 
increased predictability of future investment returns. 
 
8.4 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
Empirical studies in accounting and finance, as in any other area of research, may 
have limitations in their scope and methods used, and by extension, in their results. 
This study uses novel methods in an emerging area of behavioural finance, and is 
therefore no exception in this regard. In this section, the research limitations known 
to the researcher are pointed out, and some areas for potential further research are 
identified.   
8.4.1. LIMITATIONS RELATING TO CONTENT ANALYSIS AND THE DICTION 
PROGRAM 
Content analysis as a research methodology has its own strengths and weaknesses. 
Fundamentally, content analysis is based on the assumption that the lnguage people 
choose to express themselves in contains information about the nature of th ir 
                                                                 
43 Another issue concerns the identification of a fund’s style. While the classification of a security 
along the value/growth continuum is neither objective nor stable, the fund manager’s self-declared 
style can be equally misleading. For example, a style analysis on a sample of 748 funds performed by 
diBartolomeo and Witkowski (1997) demonstrates that40% of the funds belong to a category other 
than the one declared. Similarly, Cooper, Gulen and Raghavendra Rau (2005) report that a significant 
number of mutual funds change their names only to benefit from the current hot investment styles. A 
year after such a name change, the fund experiences a 28% average cumulative abnormal flow, 
although no improvement in performance is made. Finally, Sensoy (2009) conducts a similar study 
that shows a mismatched size and value/growth benchmark is reported by about one third of actively-
managed, diversified US equity mutual funds. 
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psychological states. A large body of literature on narrative analysis, both in 
psychology and more specifically in the area of accounting and finance, is built on 
this core assumption. The alternative assumption, however, is that environmental 
circumstances may shape verbal and written communication in a way that may 
render the underlying psychological states of individuals untraceable.  
A potential weakness of large-scale computer-assisted content analysis is related to 
the computer programs used to analyse textual data. For example, ost content 
analysis software packages such as DICTION rely on word frequencies and word 
categories to imply intended meaning. This approach, of course, is not perfectly 
accurate, yet it is a compromise that allows researchers to analyse large amounts of 
textual data in a practical way. To circumvent such problems, I have attempted, in 
chapter 5, to triangulate the results of computer-assisted analysis with manual coding 
and close-reading methodologies on a random sample of the annual reports studied in 
this thesis. 
A few other points have to be made here. Firstly, any content analysis program has to 
deal with the issue of homographs. While DICTION has a built-in featur  that 
enables it to make context-dependent judgements on homographs, and therefore is 
superior to most other comparable packages, human coding can obviously lead to
more accurate results.  
Secondly, DICTION makes use of pre-defined dictionaries which may not always be 
perfectly tuned to specific research needs. The program also allows user-defined 
dictionaries which clearly increase flexibility. Although the current study has not 
taken advantage of this feature, I believe that this should not have contributed to any 
significant inaccuracy since almost all of the fund rankings and comparisons 
performed are within sample, and therefore such biases should have mostly cancelled 
out in the process.  
Thirdly, for each of the content analysis variables, DICTION specifies thr holds and 
declares values exceeding those thresholds as “out of range”, assuming a normal 
distribution for the underlying scores. While this is a useful featur , researchers 
should examine the distribution normality of the content analysis scores beforehand 
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(a step taken in this study). More importantly, DICTION thresholds are by definition 
static whereas, ideally, the researcher can improve the accuracy of the results by 
defining dynamic thresholds for time-series data depending on market environment 
and investor sentiment at any given observation date.44  
8.4.2. LIMITATIONS RELATING TO THE EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
The findings in this thesis have to be interpreted with some level of caution. Given 
that the conceptual model proposed in Chapter 2 of the thesis eliminates certain 
contextual variables that are highly intangible and hence very difficult to quantify, 
correlations between psychological attributes and investment performance can be 
influenced by a number of potential confounding factors.  
For instance, the organisational setting in which fund managers operate is only 
briefly described in Chapter 5. Further research can look at these organisational 
variables and more closely study their impact on fund manager behaviour. For 
example, it is valid to ask to what extent fund managers make investment decisions 
individually and/or to what extent their decisions are influenced by an overarching 
investment philosophy communicated by directors of the financial organisation. 
Equally, a more careful examination has to be made in relation to those funds that are
run by a group of fund managers. One might wonder to what extent decision-making 
activities are shared in such funds, and how individual fund managers with 
potentially different investment ideas manage to influence the final investment 
outcomes. All of these questions provide fertile areas of future research.  
With regard to empirical issues, I have used the calendar time method in part of the 
empirical analysis in this thesis. A word on the limitations of this approach is 
therefore necessary. The statistical robustness of the calendar time analysis comes at 
a cost. The calendar time approach is restricted to analysing a i le, binary investor 
characteristic (Hoechle, Schmid and Zimmerman, 2009). Although it is sometimes 
possible to segregate investors or firms naturally into two clear- ut groups such as 
men and women (e.g., Barber and Odean, 2001), some research questions require the 
                                                                 
44 I am grateful to Dr. Lucy Liu for making this comment. 
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researcher to analyse continuous or multivariate investor or firm chara teristics. 
Researchers often circumvent this limitation, as is done here, by first segregating 
investors into sub-groups, such as deciles or quintiles, and then measuring the 
performance for each of these sub-groups independently based on the calendar time 
approach.  
However, such portfolio-rankings have a number of drawbacks. Hoechle et al explain 
that due to the lack of a natural grouping criterion, the resulting group definitions 
may be somewhat arbitrary, and an analysis based on this method has to be limited to 
only a few investor characteristics in order for the number of sub-groups not to 
become too numerous. In addition, it may be challenging to fully interpret the 
statistical results of an analysis based on portfolio sorts and, therefore, for simplicity, 
statistical inference is often based on comparing top and bottom sub-groups. 
The Carhart four-factor model, which is the core asset pricing model used in this 
study, is of course not without some weaknesses in certain applications. While the 
momentum factor is an important addition to the Fama-French three factor model, in 
essence, it consists of a persistence test. Fama and French (2010) argue that testing 
for persistence in fund returns, i.e. whether past winners continue to outperf rm and 
losers continue to underperform, is not a suitable approach to distinguishing skill 
from luck. While this thesis does not seek to enter the skill versus luck debate, it is 
worth pointing out that persistence tests often rank funds on short-term past 
performance, and therefore there may be little evidence of persistence since the 
allocation of funds to winner and loser portfolios is largely based on noise. The 
alternative approach used in more sophisticated empirical studies of perf rmance 
measurement, as in Fama and French (2010), consists of using long histories of 
individual fund returns together with bootstrap simulations of return historie  in 






8.5. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
A potentially rich area for further research in the context of this thesis is the mutual 
link between overconfidence, fund flows and performance. In the conceptual model 
used in this study, the simplifying assumption was made that abnormal 
overconfidence affects the quality of investment decisions, and by extension 
investment returns, through three intermediate variables grounded in psychology 
(anxiety, concentration and motivation). However, a more complicated picture 
emerges when one considers the fact that superior past performance is often 
associated with increased fund inflows, and inferior past performance is often 
associated with increased fund outflows. In other words, one may expect fund 
inflows and outflows to be another set of intermediate variables throug  which the 
performance of an overconfident fund manager may suffer.  
The issue of performance persistence in the negative domain also provides fertile 
ground for future research. While the evidence is mixed with regards to persistence 
of performance, the bulk of prior research appears to agree that genuine stock 
selection skill exists only among a very small number of fund managers, if at all. 
However, persistence of performance in the negative domain is morestrongly 
observed, with some studies suggesting that inferior fund managers are not merely 
unlucky; rather they demonstrate “bad skill” (e.g. Cuthbertson, Nitzsche and 
O'Sullivan (2008), using 1975-2002 mutual fund data). One might naturally ask: 
“Could abnormal overconfidence be a component of this bad skill?” Whether bad 
skill is due to lack of relevant experience and knowledge, susceptibility to certain 
behavioural biases such as overconfidence, other factors or even predominantly 
down to luck, is clearly a very researchable area.  
Overconfident fund managers can be classified in a number of ways as explained in 
section 2.5 of the thesis. This depends, among others, on how overconfidence is 
defined and measured in the first place. In this study, I focus, to some extent, on the 
value/growth distinction. However, one can equally examine passive fund managers 
as a control group for the main study. In other words, if we hold onto the thesis that 
overconfidence develops through active investment decision-making, we can 
normalize the overconfidence measures using any observation of this variable in 
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passive managers. That is to say, any given fund manager is only overconfident by as 
much as his or her measured overconfidence level exceeds that of an equivalent 
passive fund manager. Since I have initially excluded passive fund managers from 
my study sample, this approach was not chosen in the thesis. However, it can clearly 
provide an interesting area for further research. 
With regards to hedge funds, measuring overconfidence following the methods used 
in this study can prove challenging since it is quite difficult to access hedge fund 
manager reports in any systematic way. Hedge funds, compared to mutual funds, are 
not as transparent in reporting to their investors. In addition, hedge funds are subject 
to far less stringent SEC disclosure requirements. However, assuming that data 
access issues are resolved, hedge funds can provide a fertile ground for study of 
manager reports. This is because hedge fund managers are supposedly les  restricted 
in writing to their clients as their reports are not reflected in the public domain. 
Hence, one may argue that hedge fund reports can provide more traction for inferring 
psychological attributes from narratives.  
Further research can also include an additional set of control variables on the RHS of 
the asset pricing model. Glaser and Weber (2010) list a number of fact rs that are 
generally considered to have an influence on the actual level of individual 
overconfidence. These factors include, among others, gender, culture, availability of 
relevant information, monetary incentives and individual expertise.  
Another possible area for further investigation is the effect of overc nfidence on 
compensation contracts and vice versa. Gervais, Heaton and Odean (2011) argue th t 
overconfidence has different effects on managers depending on their risk appetite. 
For example, since a risk-averse manager’s overconfidence makes him less 
conservative, it is easier and cheaper to encourage him to pursue valuable risky 
projects. Interestingly, “when compensation endogenously adjusts to reflect outside 
opportunities, moderate levels of overconfidence lead firms to offer the manager 
flatter compensation contracts that make him better off. Overconfident managers are 
also more attractive to firms than their rational counterparts becaus  overconfidence 
commits them to exert effort to learn about projects.” While the authors present a 
model where overconfidence can increase value by aligning incentives and 
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mitigating moral hazard, they also conclude that too much overconfidence has a 
negative effect since it leads managers to accept highly convex compensation 
contracts that expose them to excessive risk.  
Further research can address a number of limitations in the data collection process. 
For example, a number of mutual funds with annual reports not easily accessible in 
electronic format were deleted from the sample. These funds can be dded back into 
the sample through further retrieval attempts. In addition, to increase the sample size 
and inter-observation frequency, future researchers can collect and analyse semi-
annual reports in addition to annual reports. Doing so will reduce the duration 
between overconfidence observations to six months. However, the downside of this 
approach is that semi-annual reports do not always have the same richn ss of 
narrative information as annual reports.  
Finally, further work can explore a number of avenues related to the current study. 
Detailed breakdowns on fund sectors or fund families can potentially reveal 
interesting results. Additionally, one can explore a similar set of mutual funds based 
in a different location (e.g. UK) to look for possible cross-cultural differences in the 
propensity for overconfidence. Assuming the availability of disclosure data, hedge 
funds can also prove a rich area for studying fund manager overconfidence. This is 
because the nature of investing in hedge funds and the distinct features of h dge 
funds as investment vehicles may drive hedge fund managers to become m re 
emotionally associated with their investments, and thus overconfidence ca  assume a 
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APPENDIX 1: AN EXAMPLE OF FUND MANAGER COMMENTARIES STUDIED 
The financial statements that make up the Annual Report give us an opportunity to 
review what has happened and give insight into what may happen.  For the twelve 
months ending September 30th, 2009, the Growth & Income Fund was up 
8.64%.  This compares favorably with the S&P Index down 5.91% for the same 
period. 
In preparing to write this letter, I review the previous year’s letter to note what 
concerns were driving the markets at that time.  September 30th, 2008 the financial 
meltdown was intensifying and accelerating.  Peeling back the financial onion 
revealed numerous economic short-comings.  Once the finger pointing began, it ws 
obvious who was to blame – everyone.  Greedy Wall Street, consumers lying on 
mortgage applications, real estate speculators, bankers that didn’t know the first 
thing about banking, regulators “in bed” with those they were regulating, a 
Department of Treasury bought and paid for by the hedge fund industry, and the 
likes of Goldman Sachs.  Additionally, “challenged” regulators ignored abusive 
trading practices and couldn’t catch Ponzi king Bernie Madoff even when his 
shenanigans were presented to them on a silver platter. 
The markets continued their free fall for the next six months but by March the stock 
market had reached an emotional low point.  The financial meltdown of 2008-09 had 
established itself firmly in the history books as a true financial crisis.  Fear, panic 
and then capitulation created a classic buying opportunity.  Our Elite Growth & 
Income Fund declined more severely than most funds but we did correctly anticipate 
that the financial crisis was not the end of the world.  We positioned our portfolio to 
take advantage of Government recovery programs and the subsequently expected 
stock market rally.  For the next six months from March to the end of the fiscal year 
(September 30th,) the stock market and our Elite Growth & Income Fund had 
significant recoveries.  As indicated earlier, the Growth & Income Fund was up 
8.64% for our fiscal year while the stock market was still in negative territory. 
The obvious question is; where do we go from here?  As I indicated in my last 
shareholder letter, we believe it would be prudent to strike a note of caution.  The 
recovery from the March lows have been significant but to assume the advance will 
continue unabated would be a mistake.  In reviewing the enclosed Annual Report, 
you will see that we hold a large part of our portfolio in cash, in the form of Treasury 
Bill investments.  We also have dedicated funds to health care, believing the 
confusion surrounding healthcare issues have depressed healthcare stocks creating a 
great investment opportunity.  We are also staying with our investments in financial 
stocks, specifically insurance stocks. For the new fiscal year, I believe we have 
positioned our portfolio to capture the appreciation potential in a number of 
undervalued investments.  Our large cash position allows us the flexibility to seize 
investment opportunities if the stock market were to have a significant decline or 
correction.  We look forward to the new fiscal year and believe it will be rewarding. 
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APPENDIX 2: DEFINITIONS OF DICTION VARIABLES USED IN OPTIMISM 
AND CERTAINTY MASTER VARIABLES 
(Source: Diction 5.0 User’s Manual) 
TENACITY: All uses of the verb to be (is, am, will, shall), three definitive 
verb forms (has, must, do) and their variants, as well as all associated 
contraction’s (he’ll, they’ve, ain’t). These verbs connote confidence and 
totality. 
LEVELING: Words used to ignore individual differences and to build a sense 
of completeness and assurance. Included are totalizing terms (verybody, 
anyone, each, fully), adverbs of permanence (always, completely, inevitably, 
consistently), and resolute adjectives (unconditional, consummate, absolute, 
open-and-shut).  
COLLECTIVES: Singular nouns connoting plurality that function to decrease 
specificity. These words reflect a dependence on categorical modes of 
thought. Included are social groupings (crowd, choir, team, humanity), task 
groups (army, congress, legislature, staff) and geographical entities (county, 
world, kingdom, re public). 
INSISTENCE: This is a measure of code-restriction and semantic 
contentedness. The assumption is that repetition of key terms indicates a 
preference for a limited, ordered world. In calculating the measur , all words 
occurring three or more times that function as nouns or noun-derived 
adjectives are identified (either cybernetically or with the us r’s assistance) 
and the following calculation performed: [Number of Eligible Words x Sum 
of their Occurrences] ÷ 10. (For small input files, high frequency terms used 
two or more times are used in the calculation).  
NUMERICAL TERMS: Any sum, date, or product specifying the facts in a 
given case. This dictionary treats each isolated integer as a single word and 
each separate group of integers as a single word. In addition, the dicionary 
contains common numbers in lexical format (one, tenfold, hundred, zero) as 
well as terms indicating numerical operations (subtract, divide, multiply, 
percentage) and quantitative topics (digitize, tally, mathematics). The 
presumption is that Numerical Terms hyper -specify a claim, thus detracting 
from its universality.  
AMBIVALENCE: Words expressing hesitation or uncertainty, implying a 
speaker’s inability or unwillingness to commit to the verbalization being 
made. Included are hedges (allegedly, perhaps, might), statements of 
inexactness (almost, approximate, vague, somewhere) and confusion (baffled, 
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puzzling, hesitate). Also included are words of restrained possibility (could, 
would, he’d) and mystery (dilemma, guess, suppose, seems). 
SELF-REFERENCE: All first-person references, including I, I’d, I’ll, I’m, 
I’ve, me, mine, my, myself. Self-references are treated as acts of indexing 
whereby the locus of action appears to reside in the speaker and not in the 
world at large (thereby implicitly acknowledging the speaker s limited 
vision).  
VARIETY: This measure conforms to Wendell Johnson’s (1946) Type-
Token Ratio which divides the number of different words in a passage by the 
passage’s total words. A high score indicates a speaker’s avoidance of 
overstatement and a preference for precise, molecular statements. 
PRAISE: Affirmations of some person, group, or abstract entity. Included are 
terms isolating important social qualities (dear, delightful, witty), physical 
qualities (mighty, handsome, beautiful), intellectual qualities (shrewd, bright, 
vigilant, reasonable), entrepreneurial qualities (successful, conscientious, 
renowned), and moral qualities (faithful, good, noble). All terms in this 
dictionary are adjectives. 
SATISFACTION: Term s associated with positive affective states (cheerful, 
passionate, happiness), with moments of undiminished joy (thanks, smile, 
welcome) and pleasurable diversion (excited, fun, lucky), or with moments of 
triumph (celebrating, pride, auspicious). Also included are words of 
nurturance: healing, encourage, secure, relieved. 
INSPIRATION: Abstract virtues deserving of universal respect. Most of the 
terms in this dictionary are nouns isolating desirable moral qualities (faith, 
honesty, self-sacrifice, virtue) as well as attractive personal qualities 
(courage, dedication, wisdom, mercy). Social and political ideals are also 
included: patriotism, success, education, justice. 
BLAME: Terms designating social inappropriateness (mean, naive, sloppy, 
stupid) as well as downright evil (fascist, blood-thirsty, repugnant, malicious) 
compose this dictionary. In addition, adjectives describing unfortunate 
circumstances (bankrupt, rash, morbid, embarrassing) or unplanned 
vicissitudes (weary, nervous, painful, detrimental) are included. The 
dictionary also contains outright denigrations: cruel, illegitimate, offensive, 
miserly. 
HARDSHIP: This dictionary contains natural disasters (earthquake, 
starvation, tornado, pollution), hostile actions (killers, bankruptcy, enemies, 
vices) and censurable human behaviour (infidelity, despots, betrayal). It also 
includes unsavoury political outcomes (injustice, slavery, exploitation, 
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rebellion) as well as normal human fears (grief, unemployment, died, 
apprehension) and in capacities (error, cop-outs, weakness). 
DENIAL: A dictionary consisting of standard negative contractions (aren’t, 
shouldn’t, don’t), negative functions words (nor, not, nay), and terms 
designating null sets (nothing, nobody, none). 
ACCOMPLISHMENT: Words expressing task-completion (establish, finish, 
influence, proceed) and organized human behaviour (motivated, influence, 
leader, manage). Includes capitalistic terms (buy, produce, employees, sell), 
modes of expansion (grow, increase, generate, construction) and general 
functionality (handling, strengthen, succeed, outputs). Also included is 
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APPENDIX 4: THE JAVA PROGRAM USED TO EXTRACT MUTUAL FUND 
ANNUAL REPORTS FROM EDGAR 
 
The following is a simple Java code I developed in collaboration with Dr. Mark 
Greenwood (Manchester Business School) that can be used to read a large number of 
webpages with known URLs and save them in a desired location. The program can 
also choose to save an alternative URL if the first address is invalid or missing data.  
 




public class MultURLfiler3 
{ 
  FileInputStream fis = null; 
  FileInputStream fi2s = null; 
  FileInputStream fws = null; 
  FileOutputStream fos = null; 
  FileOutputStream fes = null; 
  PrintWriter err = null; 
   boolean URLtester (String givenURL) 
   { 
     try { 
       URL url = new URL( givenURL ); 
 
       BufferedReader in = new BufferedReader( 
                               new InputStreamReader(  
                               url.openStream() )); 
        String inputLine; 
               // Test reading data from URL 
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        inputLine = in.readLine(); 
        in.close(); 
        return true; 
     } 
     catch (MalformedURLException e) { 
       System.out.println("URL problem " + e); 
       err.println("URL problem " + e ); 
       err.println(givenURL); 
       return false; 
     } 
     catch (IOException e2) { 
       System.out.println( "IOException tester " + e2 ); 
       err.println("IOException " + e2 ); 
       err.println(givenURL); 
       return false; 
     } 
  } 
  void URLfiler (String givenURL, String fname) 
  { 
     try { 
       URL url = new URL( givenURL ); 
       fos = new FileOutputStream( fname ); 
       BufferedReader in = new BufferedReader( 
                               new InputStreamReader(  
                               url.openStream() )); 
       PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter(fos); 
       String inputLine; 
              while ((inputLine = in.readLine()) !=null) 
             out.println( inputLine ); 
        in.close(); 
        out.close(); 
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     } 
     catch (MalformedURLException e) { 
       System.out.println("URL problem " + e); 
       err.println("URL problem " + e ); 
       err.println(givenURL); 
     } 
     catch (IOException e2) { 
       System.out.println( "IOException filer " + e2 ); 
       err.println("IOException " + e2 ); 
       err.println(givenURL); 
     } 
  } 
  public MultURLfiler3 (String fnameurl, String fnameout, String alturl) 
  { 
     // this.theURL = givenURL; 
     try { 
       fis = new FileInputStream(new File(fnameurl) ); 
       fws = new FileInputStream(new File(fnameout) ); 
       fi2s = new FileInputStream(new File(alturl) ); 
       fos = new FileOutputStream("testout.txt"); 
       fes = new FileOutputStream("errors.txt"); 
       //Object content = urlcon.getContent(); 
       //System.out.println(content); 
       BufferedReader in = new BufferedReader( 
                               new InputStreamReader(  
                               fis )); 
       BufferedReader in2 = new BufferedReader( 
                               new InputStreamReader(  
                               fws )); 
       BufferedReader in3 = new BufferedReader( 
                               new InputStreamReader( 
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                               fi2s )); 
       PrintWriter out = new PrintWriter(fos); 
       err = new PrintWriter(fes); 
       String inputLine1, inputLine2, inputLine3 ; 
        
       while ((inputLine1 = in.readLine()) != null) { 
             inputLine2 = in2.readLine(); 
             inputLine3 = in3.readLine(); 
             if ( URLtester(inputLine1) ){ 
              out.println( "Copy " + inputLine1 + " to " + inputLine2 ); 
              System.out.println( "Copy " + inputLine1 + " to " + inputLine2 ); 
              URLfiler( inputLine1, inputLine2 );  
             } 
             else { 
              out.println( "Copy " + inputLine3 + " to indx" + inputLine2 ); 
              System.out.println( "Copy " + inputLine3 + " to indx" + inputLine2 ); 
              URLfiler( inputLine3, "indx" + inputLine2 ); 
             }; 
       } 
        in.close(); 
        in2.close(); 
        in3.close(); 
        out.close(); 
        err.close(); 
     } 
     catch (IOException e2) { 
       System.out.println( "IOException " + e2 ); 
       err.println("IOException main" + e2 ); 
       err.println(fnameurl); 
     } 
  } 
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   public  static void main (String[] args) { 
      System.out.println( "start" ); 
      System.out.println( args[0] + " - " + args[1] + " alt " + args[2] ); 
      new MultURLfiler3( args[0], args[1], args[2] ); 
      System.out.println( "finish" ); 

























APPENDIX 5: LEADING EQUITY MARKET INDICES PROXYING FOR 




S&P 500 (source: Google Finance) 
 
 





APPENDIX 6: LEGALESE AND INDUSTRY JARGONS USED TO COMPUTE THE 
PLAIN ENGLISH READABILITY MEASURE 
 
Source: SEC Staff Legal Bulletin at http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb7a.htm 
 




coordinated manufacturing  
    and distribution efforts 
proprietary medicines 
vertically integrated cost- 
    efficient providers  
revenue synergies 
lower margin  
products utilization realigning 
    sales forces  
centralized management 






those preceded by 
herein 
set forth under 
by such forward- 
    looking statements 
without limitations 
cease to conduct 
completion of the 
    combination 
commencing 
hereinafter so 
    surrendered  
defeased 
as amended 
qualified in its entirety 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
